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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will be concerned with investigating the empirical characteristics of stock returns, 
forUKfirms which are distinguished by market value. The primary aimof thisworkis to identify 
whether there are differences between the behaviour of large and small firm retums. 
A substantial amount of attention has recently focused upon how firm size influences the 
behaviour of stock returns in US markets, but, the role that firm size might have in determining 
the behaviour of stock returns in UK markets has received very little attention. The aim of this 
thesis is to redress this imbalance. 
The first part of this study will be concerned with showing that the returns of small firms are 
more predictable than the returns of large firms. The second part of this study will show that 
the relationship between risk and return depends on firm size. The third and final part of this 
thesis will show that not only are the mean returns of large and small firms different but that 
there are also important differences in the conditional variances of large and small firms. In all 
three parts of this thesis, important differences between the behaviour of large and small firm 
returns are documented for the first time. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Aims and Objectives of this Study 
1.1 Background 
The belief that financial markets are efficient is widely held among financial economists. 
For example, Jensen (1986) says of market efficiency that 
"there is no better documented proposition in any of the social sciences. " (p95). 
As we shall see in Chapter 2, one definition of market efficiency' is that "share prices 
must reflect all available information " Fama (1970) (p387). There is good reason to expect 
stock markets to be efficient in this way. Stock markets consist of a large number of investors 
which are in competition with, millions of other self interested and well informed investors. 
Therefore, if prices do not reflect publicly available information there will be enough investors 
who will attempt to profit from this inefficiency, and therefore, drive prices to a level where 
they really do reflect the available information. However, the existence of persistent regularities 
such as the "small firm effect" have led a number of researchers to suggest that stock markets 
are not as efficient as we once thought. 
Following the pioneering research, which was undertaken by B anz (198 1), evidence has 
now accumulated to indicate that the returns of small firms, in a number of major stock markets, 
including that of the UK, 2 are apparently substantially more predictable than the returns of large 
firms. 
Subsequently empirical work, has uncovered a second regularity in the behaviour of 
small firm returns, which appears to be equally puzzling. Not only are small firm returns 
predictable, but a large proportion of the predictability appears (in the US) to be associated with 
one month of the year, January. See for example, the work of Roll (1983) and Keim (1983) 
which documented that over half of the US small firm premium was due to the performance of 
small firms during the first few trading days of January. Such evidence is puzzling because 
regularities such as these, which are now documented on over half a century of data, appear to 
suggest that markets are inefficient. 
In an attempt to help our understanding of why small firms behave differently to large 
firms, subsequent empirical work has searched for additional empirical differences, between 
the behaviour of small and large firms. A large number of papers, which will be reviewed in 
1.1 As Chapter 2 will show there are also many other definitions of an efficient market. 
1.2 See, for example, Levis (1985), Fong (1992), or Strong and Xu (1994). 
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Chapter 3, have considered the role that firm size might have in determining the extent to which 
stock returns are predictable. Generally, these papers have found that the returns of small firms 
are substantially more predictable than the returns of large firms. 
An example of this work is provided by Lo and MacKinlay (1988,1990a), who found 
that portfolios of small firms were substantially more autocorrelated, and therefore more 
predictable, than their large firm counterparts. Furthermore, Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) also 
discovered that the returns of small firm portfolios were cross serially correlated with the returns 
of large firms but the reverse was not true. This implies that the returns of large firms predict 
the future returns of small firms but the returns of small firms do not predict the returns of large 
firms. 
Most of the studies which have looked at differences in the behaviour of small and large 
firms have directed their attention to comparisons of mean returns. Relatively little work has 
been concerned with exploring differences in the behaviour of the second moments of large and 
small firms. An exception is Conrad, Gultekin and Kaul (199 1), who found for the US market 
that, the conditional variances and returns of small firms could be predicted from volatility 
shocks (unexpected returns) experienced by large firms, but the reverse was not true, shocks to 
small firms did not predict future volatility or return in the large firms. 
Clearly, a substantial amount of research effort has been directed at discovering 
differences in the empirical behaviour of small firms, although most of these studies have been 
directed at companies listed on the US stock markets. In contrast relatively few studies have 
considered the behaviour of small and large firms listed on the UK stock market. The aim of 
this thesis is therefore to provide a comprehensive study of " small firm effects" in the UK stock 
exchange and extend the empirical models which have been used in this field. Primarily, this 
study will show that the first and second moments of small firm retruns listed on the UK stock 
market are more predictable than those of the large firms. 
1.2 Objectives of This Study 
This thesis will begin by defining an efficient market. This is an important starting point 
because a re-current question which has to be addressed in later chapters is whether the returns 
of companies investigated in this study are consistent with market efficiency. Although, defining 
an efficient market appears to be straightforward, this is not the case because there has been a 
substantial degree of controversy surrounding exactly what constitutes an efficient market and 
what are the testable implications of such a market. Traditionally as we shall see in Chapter 2, 
it has been recognised that one testable implication of the efficient markets hypothesis is that 
10 
stock returns should vary in a random fashion. Although, as we shall see in that chapter the 
existence of microstructure frictions implies that return predictability can exist even if markets 
are efficient. 
Chapter 3 reviews the empirical literature that has sought to test whether stock market 
returns are predictable or not. This is necessary to provide assistance in establishing the 
contribution made by the empirical work presented in later chapters of this thesis. Since this 
study will primarily focus upon differences between small and large firms, Chapter 3 where 
possible, will highlight the major empirical differences which have been observed. 
Chapter 4 contains the first part of empirical work. This chapter confirms the existence 
of a small firm premium in the UK over the period investigated in this study. This in itself is 
important because it indicates that the small firm effect, previously observed in the UK, is not 
an artifact of the sample periods previously investigated (although evidence presented in this 
chapter suggests that the size premium has diminished in magnitude in recent years). 
Autocorrelation tests, which are performed on portfolios of large and small firms, confirm that 
portfolio returns of small firms are more autocorrelated, and therefore more predictable, than 
the portfolio returns of large firms. In contrast, the individual security returns of small firms, 
like those of large firms, appear to be uncorrelated. This indicates that there are some important 
differences between the returns of individual securities and portfolios of different capitalisations. 
This chapter also uses co-integration tests to identify predictability in individual security prices, 
and this is the first example of these tests having been applied to a study of the small firm effect. 
As was mentioned in Section 1.1 return seasonality has been shown to have an important 
influence over the magnitude of the size premium. Chapter 5 will investigate the extent to which 
monthly return regularities can explain the UK size premium. Although this chapter finds 
substantial evidence of return seasonality, this does not appear to have a strong influence over 
the size premium. The focus of this chapter will be on extending the work of Tinic and West 
(1984,1986), which found that high January returns in the US appeared to be associated with 
the pricing of risk. Essentially, Tinic and West (1984) found that systematic risk was not priced 
during any month of the year other than January. Surprisingly, the role that firm size might have 
on determining the magnitude of the risk premium, particularly the systematic risk premium, 
during the different months of the year, and the relationship this might have with the size 
premium, has not previously been investigated. 
Few US studies, and no UK studies have been concerned with identifying differences in 
the second moments of the returns of large and small firms. Chapters 7 and 8 will respond to 
this by providing a substantial amount of information on the characteristics of second moments. 
II 
An important objective of Chapters 7 and 8'is to show that the return predictability such as that 
identified in Chapters 4 and 5 does not provide evidence of market inefficiency, if such 
predictability is also consistent with time variation in expected returns. 
Primarily, Chapter 7 will be concerned with testing a conditional version of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model to establish whether the return autocorrelation for large and small firms 
can be explained by a time varying systematic risk premium. Although, a number of papers have 
tested whether the systematic risk premium is time varying, no study has considered the role 
that firm size has on the conditional co-variances/variances of portfolio returns. 
Chapter 8 will be concerned with identifying the impact that volatility shocks (unexpected 
returns) might have on the future volatility and return performance of portfolios. This chapter 
investigates whether there are volatility spillover shocks in the UK stock market, which requires 
testing whether a volatility shock to one portfolio can predict future volatility in another portfolio. 
The aim of these investigations is to establish whether there are differences in the transmission 
of shocks across portfolios of different capitalisations. For example, do shocks to large firms 
predict future volatility for small firms and vice versa. This chapter will also investigate whether 
there is any evidence of a leverage effect3 for portfolios that have been organised on the basis 
of firm size. Although, Nelson (1991) for the US and Poon and Taylor (1992) for the UK find 
some evidence of a leverage effect on market indexes no paper has previously investigated 
whether a leverage effect exists for portfolios formed on the basis of firm size. Finally, Chapter 
9 provides a summary and some conclusions to the study. 
1.3 As chapter 8 will show the leverage effect suggests that volatility is related to changes in the gearing ratio of companies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Efficient Markets Model 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will be concerned with reviewing the development of the efficient markets 
model. This is an important starting point for this study, because one issue which this thesis 
attempts to address is whether the behaviour of the UK stock market is consistent with market 
efficiency. Considering whether markets are efficient is a worthwhile area of research, because 
stock prices, like prices in any other market, are signals for the allocation of resources. For 
resources to move to companies which can make the best use of investment funds, prices must 
be a fair reflection of the value of a company and therefore its future earnings potential. Since 
this study will be concerned with the empirical behaviour of stock prices it is important to identify 
the testable implications of an efficient market, in order to establish whether the UK market 
which will be studied in this thesis is efficient or not. 
Essentially, there are three phases to focus upon when considering the development of 
the efficient markets hypothesis. Firstly, there was what LeRoy (1989) called the "prehistory" 
which was a period when significant developments in the empirical work were being made, but 
a theoretical framework to explain the empirical findings was lacking. LeRoy (1989), suggests 
that this prehistory ended with the Fama (1970) paper, which formalised the concept of an 
efficient market and comprehensively surveyed the empirical literature. Although, Fama (1970) 
was fundamentally important in generating interest in efficient markets, it was arguably the 
paper by S amuelson (1965) that acts as the boundary between the prehistory and modem efficient 
markets because of the shift this paper caused in turning the emphasis of testable predictions 
away from the random walk model to the martingale model. 
The second phase in the development of the efficient markets hypothesis, stretches from 
Samuelson's (1965) paper to approximately the end of the 1970's. During this period a large 
number of empirical papers appeared which attempted to test empirically whether markets were 
efficient. Most of these empirical studies, many of which are surveyed in Fama (1970), strongly 
supported market efficiency. In this survey paper, which is entitled "Efficient Capital Markets" 
Fama concludes 
"In short, the evidence in support of the efficient markets model is extensive, 
and (somewhat uniquely in economics) contradictory evidence is sparse" (1970, 
p. 416) 
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The third and most recent phase stretches from the end of the 1970's to the present day. 
In this most recent phase, new tests have been developed that have indicated that stock prices 
are much more predictable than was first realised, see for example Shiller (1981a), DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988). A comprehensive survey of this work follows 
in Chapter 3. So overwhelming has been the contribution of these new tests in suggesting that 
stock markets are inefficient, that even Fama (1991) in "Efficient Capital Markets 11" (which 
was a follow up to his survey paper to Efficient Capital Markets) had to admit that perhaps 
markets were not quite as efficient as they had first appeared. This phase has also been important 
for directing attention towards the importance of microstucture factors and inadequate risk 
measurement, which can introduce empirical predictability into stock prices even when markets 
are informationally efficient. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. In Section 2.2 the random walk model, 
which was initially believed to be the model underpining the efficient markets model is discussed. 
The focus of this section will be on discussing the historical development of the random walk 
model of stock prices. In Section 2.3 the martingale model, which was introduced by Samuelson 
(1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) will be discussed. The first attempt at formally linking the 
martingale model to the behaviour of stock prices was undertaken by Fama (1970). The nature 
of the model discussed by Faina was controversial and has subsequently caused a lengthy debate 
regarding its appropriateness. This controversy is discussed in Section 2.4. Alternative 
definitions of market efficiency, which unlike the martingale model, do not assume perfect 
markets are discussed in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, the efficient markets model will be reconciled 
to stock valuation models, which explain movements in the intrinsic value of stocks. Section 
2.7 will be concerned with discussing the role of asset pricing models in tests of market efficiency. 
Section 2.8 discusses the role of microstructure frictions which can introduce predictability into 
the behaviour of share prices even in an informationally efficient market. 
2.2 The Random Walk Model 
2.2.1 Background 
It is customary to suggest that a stock market is efficient if share prices reflect all available 
information. As such we would expect realised share prices to fluctuate in a random fashion, 
reflecting the random arrival of new information. This is a description of an efficient market 
that lacks rigour and does not tell us what the testable characteristics of an efficient market are. 
In order to test the efficient markets hypothesis we need more than this vague statement. 
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Prior to the development of a rigourous theoretical framework for the efficient markets 
model, that is in what LeRoy (1989) calls the "prehistory" of efficient markets, research on the 
behaviour of speculative prices had little formal content. Primarily, research had been directed 
at documenting the empirical characteristics of speculative prices, usually in the expectation of 
identifying predictable patterns. At this time, the behaviour of speculative prices became to be 
associated with the random walk model, because of the seemingly random behaviour of prices 
which had been documented in empirical studies. An example of this work is provided by Kendall 
(1953) who found that successive changes in the value of stock indexes appeared to be random. 
A random walk is a very restrictive example of a stochastic process'. Essentially, the 
random walk model assumes that the probability distribution of a stochastic process such as Ix, I 
is independent and identically distributed such that the distribution must be the same for all time, 
t. Such a distribution is illustrated below 
f(Xt +II od = f(x,, 1) (2.1) 
where f(x, ,IIý, ) is the conditional probability distribution of x, ,1 conditional on ý,, which is 
the information set available in time t, and f(x, ,) is the unconditional distribution of x, , 1. 
In the simplest example of a random walk process, which is a zero mean random walk, 
each successive change in x, is assumed to be drawn independently from a probability distribution 
with a zero mean. Thus x, is determined by 
xt --.,: xt -I+e, 
E(e, ) =0 E(e, 
2) 
= (72 E(e, e, ) =0 týs 
(2.2) 
The random walk model has the following important properties. If we knew the past 
history x,, x2,..., x, and we wanted to obtain a forecast X^,, , the forecast would be given by 
E(x ,1x,... x, ) 
(2.3) 
which is the expected value of x, ,I conditional on the previous values of x, which were (x,.... X, ). 
Since, x, ,I=x, + e, ,, is independent of (x, ... , xl) the forecast one period ahead becomes 
A x, -x, + E(e, +1) =x, 
(2.4) 
so that all the information required to make a forecast of the future value of x, is contained in 
its most recent observation. Similarly, the forecast n periods ahead is also x, 
(2.5) xt, x, +E(e)=x, n=1,2,3,4... 
A stochastic process is a variable whose values are random at successive points in time. 
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which can be interpreted as meaning that the optimal predictor of x,,,, can be obtained from x, 
If a stochastic process is a random walk, successive changes in x, must be uncorrelated 
since 
-x, )= e, +, (2.6) 
-x, -, 
) = e, (2.7) 
Cov Uxt +I- X), (xt - xt - 
Ol =0 (2.8) 
This is not only true for the covariance between successive changes in x, but is also true 
for the covariance between x, and x,,,, . 
(Xt+n-x, ) = et+ nn=1,2,3,... 
(x, - x, )=e, n= 192,3,.... 
Cov [(x. -x, ), (x, -x, -. 
)] = () n=1,2,3 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
The random walk model therefore appeared to be a good description of how stock prices 
should behave in an efficient market because it described well the apparently random behaviour 
of stock prices. 
The assumption of independence inherent in the random walk model requires that each 
x, is drawn from a probability distribution which repeats itself identically over time. This requires 
that dependence not only between the first moments, but also between higher moments of x, 
such as the conditional variance, must also be ruled out. This is a key weakness of the random 
walk model if this model is to be used to explain the behaviour of stock prices because a 
substantial amount of evidence has accumulated to indicate that higher moments are not 
independent. 
An example of such work was provided by Fama (1965), Mandelbrot (1966) and Brealey 
(1970) who demonstrated that the unconditional distribution of short-horizon returns was 
characterised by excess kurtosis (that is it is fat tailed). Such a distribution will be caused by 
the tendency for large returns to follow large returns and small returns to follow small returns, 
which suggests there is a changing conditional variance. A consequence of this is that returns 
are characterised by an excessive number of returns clustered around the expected return and 
a large number of returns which are extreme returns, which give rise to the fat tails. In this case 
a random walk would not be a good description of short-horizon returns in an efficient market 
because a distribution with excess kurtosis indicates that the conditional variance rather than 
being constant is time varying., The nature of the excess kurtosis in the stock returns is examined 
in detail in Chapter 7 and 8. 
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2.2.2 The Development of the Random Walk Model of Speculative Prices 
The first statement and test of the random walk model was provided by Bachelier (1900). 
Bachelier asserted that the current value of a speculative price was an unbiased estimator of the 
price for any future date, the increment in the price was independent of previous values and 
successive prices were Gaussian 2 with zero mean and a variance proportional to t. This was the 
first description of a random walk applied to speculative prices, although, Bachelier never 
actually used that terminology. The genius of this work went largely unappreciated and 
unacknowledged until subsequent empirical work, which is reviewed later in this chapter, 
showed that prices actually did behave randomly and therefore in a way consistent with 
Bachelier's descriptions. 
One of the developments which was important in vindicating Bachelier's work was the 
empirical study under-taken by Kendall (1953). This work aimed to discover whether patterns 
existed in speculative prices such as commodity or stock index prices which mirrored alleged 
trade cycle patterns in economic data. The finding that there appeared to be virtually no 
correlation between successive prices led Kendall to conclude that the "data behaved almost 
like a wandering series". At this stage a convincing rationale for the discovery could not be 
provided. Although similar findings were reported by Roberts (1959) and Osborne (1959). 
Roberts (1959) found that weekly changes in the Dow Jones index resembled a time 
series generated from a sequence of random numbers. The implication of the work undertaken 
by Roberts was that price changes were independent of their past history. Osbourne (1959) found 
that stock price movements were very similar to the random Brownian motion of physical 
particles, since the logarithm of their prices appeared to be independent of each other. 
This transformation to the use of log prices has been justified on both empirical and 
theoretical grounds. Granger and Morgenstern (1970) provide a full account. A summary of 
their main arguments follows. Theoretically, the distribution of prices is bounded from below 
by zero but is unbounded from above. The logarithm transformation results in a distribution 
which is symmetrically unbounded and hence may be more symmetric about its mean. 
Empirically, transformed data have more symmetric and more nearly normal histograms. They 
appear to have more time invariant first and second sample moments and appear to be much 
closer to being independent observations from a random process. 
It was confirmation in this early empirical work that share prices behaved randomly that 
caused speculative prices, in efficient markets, to be linked to the random walk model. Although, 
as the work of Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) showed, this association was premature. 
2. The Gaussian distribution is a normal distribution. The normal distribution is symmetric and bell shaped. The distribution can be fully 
described by the mean and the variance. 
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2.3 Martingales 
Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) were the first to link market efficiency to the 
martingale model. So simple was the exposition provided by Samuelson that he wrote of the 
martingale, it seemed 
It so general that I must confess to having oscillated over the years in my own 
mind between regarding it as trivially obvious (and almost trivially vacuous) and 
regarding it as remarkably sweeping" (1965, p. 45). 
Despite this initial uncertainty regarding the value of Samuelson's work, the contributions 
made by Samuelson and Mandelbrot 3 in shifting attention away from the random walk model, 
towards the martingale model are now viewed as one of the most important developments in 
Finance. 
2.3.1 Defining a Martingale 
A stochastic process Jxj is a martingale with respect to a sequence of information sets 
0, if x, has the property 
E(x ,1e, ) =x, (2.12) 
and a stochastic process y, is a fair game if it has the property 
E(y, I 10, ) = 
where, E (y, ,, 1ý, ) = (x , -x, ). 
Here if x, is a martingale, the best forecast of x, I that could be made based on currently 
available information 0, would be x, . This is true for any possible value of the information set 
0, Similarly, if y, is a fair game the forecast of y, I would be zero for any value of 0, Thus x, 
is a martingale if and only if (x, I-x, ) is a fair game. At first glance these properties look 
surprisingly similar to a random walk. Indeed, this is the case because a random walk is a more 
restrictive example of a martingale. The martingale model imposes the restriction that successive 
changes in the value of a stochastic process x, are uncorrelated, but in the martingale model the 
distribution of x, is not assumed to be identical and independent. The martingale model does 
not therefore impose any restrictions on the higher moments of the distribution so that 
dependence in the conditional variance of x, can not be ruled out. 
3. This exposition was made in terms of commodity futures prices, it was not until later that the martingale model was applied to stock prices. 
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2.3.2 The Sub-Martingale Model 
A model related to the pure martingale is the sub-martingale model. The sub-martingale 
assumes that the stochastic variable x, ,, has an expected value greater or equal to x, . In this 
case x, is a sub-martingale if y, has an expected value greater than zero. Therefore, the 
sub-martingale model assumes that x, grows larger each period. 
E(x ,1ý, ) ýý x, 
E(y, I 10) ý! 0 
(2.15) 
where, y, I= (x, ,-x, ). 
Since the expected returns of risky assets such as stock investments must be positive, 
stock prices must follow a sub-martingale, to ensure that stock prices grow over time to provide 
positive expected returns. From equation (2.14) we can see that if expected stock prices must 
rise then security prices must be a sub-martingale, and can be written as follows 
E(p, ,1ý, ) - p, >o 
Pt 
(2.16) 
where p, = the price of a security in time t (assurning expected returns are not negative ). By 
assuming that expected returns are constant, returns themselves should be a martingale. 
Turning now to abnormal returns, we can define an abnormal return as the difference 
between a realised return and an expected return as follows. 
Rt - E(R, ) = et (2.17) 
Rt = E(R, ) + et 
E(e, ) =0 E(e, e, ) t#s 
where, E(R, ) is the expected return for an asset, R, is the realised return in time t, so that et is 
the abnormal return. 
Expected returns E(R, ) will be set by an appropriate equilibrium asset pricing model to 
ensure that investors are provided with compensation for the time value of money and the amount 
of risk associated with the investment. Since E(e, ) = 0, abnormal returns must be a fair game. 
Chapter 3 will review empirical evidence which has tested whether E(e, ) = 0. 
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2.3.3 The Fama and LeRoy Controversy 
It was Fama (1970) who formerly linked the martingale model to the behaviour 
of stock prices in an efficient market. The framework used by Fama is notable because 
of both its subsequent popularity and the degree of controversy it attracted. Fama's 
interpretation of an efficient market assumes that market equilibrium can be expressed 
in terms of expected returns and that all currently available information is used by the 
market in forming equilibrium expected returns and thus current equilibrium prices. 
This enables Fama to represent the conditions of market equilibrium in terms of 
conditional expected returns as follows. 
E(pt +I 10) = [I + E(r, ,I 0)]p, 
(2.19) 
Fama then states that equivalent representations of equilibrium expected prices 
and returns can be made in terms of a fair game as follows 
yl+,: -pt+, -E(p, +1 
10) (2.20) 
E(y, I 10) =0 
(2.21) 
where y, , is a fair game with respect to the information set 0, because the expected difference 
between the future share price, p, I, and the future conditional expected equilibrium price, 
E(p, ), given the information set 0, is zero. 
Similarly, returns can be written in terms of an equilibrium condition as follows, 
zt+, r, +, -E(r, +, 
E(z, I 10, ) = 
(2.22) 
(2.23) 
where z, I is a fair game with respect to the information set 0, because the expected difference 
between the future return, r, ,, and the future equilibrium expected return, E (r, , 1) , given the 
information set 0, is zero, in which case abnormal returns would be a fair game. 
In which case, 
E(y, I 10, ) = E(z, , 10) = 
(2.24) 
Following Roberts (1967) Fama defines a weak form efficient market as one where share 
prices reflect all past information, a semi-strong efficient market as one where share prices 
reflect all currently available information and a strong form efficient market as one where share 
prices reflect all information. 
20 
According to Fama the representation of returns in this way rules out the possibility of 
implementing trading rules which are based on available information (however defined) to obtain 
abnormal returns. In this context a martingale means that on average, across a large number of 
samples, the actual return on an asset equals its expected return. But, as LeRoy (1976,1989) 
subsequently argued, Fama is rejecting the requirement that rates of return themselves be a 
martingale. Because, if they were then the covariance between returns must be zero as we saw 
earlier. In Fama's representation, however, it is only the deviation of the price from its conditional 
expectation that is a fair game, so that under this definition returns themselves may be serially 
correlated. 
A focus of LeRoy's (1976,1989) criticisms is on what appears to be the tautological 
nature of Fama's interpretation of the martingale. Any stochastic process such as jrj, Ipj, jyj 
and jzj that is related by equation (2.20) and (2.22) and the return definition 
Pt+l -Pt 
rt +I : -- A 
(2.25) 
implies that equation (2.19) and (2.24) must also follow. Appendix I provides a proof of the 
tautology. 
LeRoy (1976) argues that with this definition of an efficient market it is possible for any 
return distribution to be consistent with market efficiency, because if the expected return is not 
correct then the equality proposed by Fama could hold even if prices are informationally 
inefficient. In which case the equations do not imply any restrictions on the data so that any 
market capital market may be efficient, and can not provide any testable implications concerning 
market efficiency. 
It is often suggested, see for example Ball (1989), that LeRoy missed the spirit of Fama's 
original definition, which almost certainly intended the unconditional expected return to be its 
correct value. Even though Fama (1976a) refuted that his definitions were a tautology LeRoy's 
criticisms demonstrated that the definition of market efficiency needed to be made more precise. 
In an attempt to rectify the ambiguity, Fama (1 976a, 1976b) introduced an alternative definition 
of market efficiency which will be described below. 
2.4 Alternative Definitions of Market Efficiency 
In a later attempt to clarify the definition of an efficient market Farna (1976a, 1976b) 
defined an informationally efficient market as one where the market uses all information that 
is available to determine security prices at time t-1. Let us call this condition I- 
ii 
t-1 =t-I 
(2.26) 
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where 0, '- , is the information that the market uses to set security prices in time t-1, and 0, -I 
is all the information that was available in time t-1. 
Condition I indicates that the market uses all available information. Market efficiency 
then implies a second condition, let us call this condition 2 which can be expressed as 
f. (Pt+l IC 7) =f(p, +I I Of) 
(2.27) 
where f(p, I 10, ) is the actual probability distribution of stock prices, and f,,, (p, II 0I, ) is the 
market probability distribution of prices. 
Condition 2 states that the market understands the implications of the available 
information for the joint probability distribution of returns. Together these two conditions state 
that the market is efficient if it behaves as if the actual probability distribution used in setting 
current prices at time t is the true marginal distribution implied by all the information available 
to the market at time t. 
A major conceptual problem with Fama's revised definition of an efficient market is that 
it makes use of the term "the market". According to Fama, it is the market that assesses the joint 
probability distribution of future prices, and it is the market that sets current prices, but it is not 
clear what the market represents. A related problem with Fama's second definition is that it 
refers to the true probability distribution of security prices implied by the information available. 
Theoretically this is unsatisfactory. In a world where individuals have heterogeneous beliefs 
and differential information, the relationship between the beliefs of individuals and the beliefs 
of the market are not well defined; nor are the concepts of the true probability distribution of 
security prices or the "information available". 
Partly in an attempt to overcome these difficulties, Beaver (1981) has advanced an 
alternative definition of market efficiency which is concerned with making market efficiency 
dependent on the precise amount of information available. Beaver suggests that a securities 
market is efficient with respect to a signal, if and only if the configuration of security pr ices is 
the same as it would be in an otherwise identical economy (that is, with an identical configuration 
of preferences and endowments), except that every individual receives the defined signal as well 
as that individual's own information. Beaver also provided a more comprehensive definition of 
efficiency, defined with respect to the system that produces the observed signal and thus with 
respect to the set of all feasible signals. He termed this "information system efficiency" as distinct 
from "signal efficiency". The advantage of Beaver's definition is that the information set 
available can be partitioned to reflect almost any conceivable information set and assumes that 
investors do not have the same information set. In the Beaver model, market efficiency is defined 
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for markets which may or may not be perfect 4. Unfortunately, this approach does not provide 
us with empirically testable predictions because market prices reflect the beliefs of a large 
number of market participants, so it is impossible to model these heterogeneous beliefs. A 
detailed account of Beavers contribuAion, on which the analysis provided by this section 
draws, can be found in Strong and Walker (1989). 
Jensen (1978) was also concerned with defining market efficiency when markets were 
less than perfect because Jensen considered how efficient markets might behave in the presence 
of transaction costs. The definition of an efficient market provided by Jensen is much more 
practical because it recognises the importance of transaction costs. Jensen suggests 
"A market is efficient with respect to an information set 0, if it is impossible to make 
economic profits by trading on the basis of the information set 0,. By economic profits, we mean 
risk adjusted returns net of all costs" (1978, p96) 
This definition has the advantage of being a workable, economically meaningful 
interpretation of market efficiency, which does not need to assume that markets are perfect. It 
also reflects an important conceptual development. If markets are predictable then investors 
would only want to know about the source of the predictability to use that information to trade 
and make above normal profits. Sources of predictability which can not be exploited to provide 
abnormally high profits can not violate market efficiency. Ball (1989) has argued that this concept 
is vague because it does not suggest what level of predictability is acceptable or how transactions 
costs should be defined, or what level of transaction costs should be incorporated when testing 
market efficiency. These issues are not a serious impediment, it is important to be aware of a 
potential source of predictability even if its influence can not be measured precisely. Empirically, 
it is quite straightforward to establish an upper bound for transaction costs. If a predictable 
variation in stock returns exists above the level of transaction costs then markets would be 
considered as being inefficient. 
2.5 Stock Valuation Models. 
This section will be concerned with recoiiciling the behaviour of stock prices in an 
efficient market to fundamental valuation models which show that a risky asset's equilibrium 
price can be interpreted as the present value of the risk adjusted future cash flows that investors 
expect. 
4. Much of the theoretical foundations of an efficient market describe a perfect market. In a perfect market individual agents are assumed to 
have homogeneous beliefs, and use information rationally. Meanwhile, indi6dual agents are price takers and there are assumed to be no market 
frictions such as transaction costs or microstructure considerations. 
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The fundamental value of a stock is determined by the cash flows that accrue to investors 
over the life span of a company. Cash flows accrue in the form of dividends, which implies that 
the intrinsic value of a stock should be linked to the discounted value of future dividends as 
follows. 
- DI +j 
j (1 + ry 
1,2,3, ..., 
(2.28) 
where, 
po = the current intrinsic value of the share, 
DI 
--7= the discounted value of dividends over the whole lifespan of the company, and (I +rY 
the discount rate which allows future cash flows to be compared with current cash flows. 
Equation (2.28) says that if investors knew the future value of discounted dividends the 
equilibrium price would be p *. The equilibrium price could not be below p* because at this price 00 
investors would want to buy the stock, and benefit from the cost of the investment being less 
than the discounted value of future cash flows arising from the investment. Buying action would 
therefore tend to increase the price. Neither, can the equilibrium price of the stock lie above po 
because no rational investor will pay more for an investment than they can earn from the 
5 investment. In which case, the equilibrium price must be where the share price is equal to the 
discounted value of future dividends. 
If the distributions from which future dividends are drawn are not identical and investors 
do not know these distributions with certainty, then as dividends are observed, new information 
is incorporated into investors' estimates of the expected future dividends to be paid. Future 
dividends are therefore not known but are random variables in time t, and their ex-ante expected 
values are not observable. The prevailing sliare price, in an efficient market is deemed to be the 
best guess of the future fundamental streams, given the information set available as shown in 
equation (2.29) but at any point in time, the stock price may deviate from its fundamental value 
owing to a forecast error u, as shown in equation (2.30). 
D, (2.29) 
Po Et- (I +ry 
Dt 
E[jj 
I 
D, 
lo, 
]=Po-Po=Ut (2.30) 
j=i(l+rý = (I +rý 
5. If the share price was above pý investors would want to sell the share because the price is above the future discounted value of the cash flows. 
In this case the selling pressure would tend to reduce the price. 
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where po = the current value of the stock, conditional on the information available, and u, = the 
difference between the actual value of future discounted dividends and the expected value of 
future discounted dividends. 
In this setting, the current market price is a forecast of the expected discounted value of 
future dividend streams, and as such, the current price may deviate from the underlying 
fundamental value owing to a forecast error. However, the assumption of market efficiency 
requires that on average, actual market prices equal fundamental prices and when actual market 
prices deviate from fundamental values, available information can not be used to predict the 
difference between the actual market price and the fundamental price. If the difference between 
the fundamental price and the actual price can be predicted then it becomes possible to identify 
future price movements so the market in this case is not efficient. 
2.6 Equilibrium Asset Pricing Models and the Joint Hypothesis Problem 
A large number of the empirical tests which have attempted to test market efficiency 
have been concerned with testing whether abnormal returns (the difference between realised 
and expected returns) are predictable. To establish whether abnormal returns can be forecast, it 
is necessary to be able to identify the equilibrium expected return. A consequence of this is that 
many tests of market efficiency have been joint tests, of both an equilibrium asset pricing model, 
and market efficiency. The problem with a joint hypothesis such as this is that it is impossible 
to refute market efficiency unless there is no uncertainty concerning the appropriateness of the 
equilibrium model being used. But as this section will show such certainty does not exist. 
Initially, there was little controversy surrounding the adoption of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) as the appropriate model from which to generate expected returns. This model 
was developed into a theory of equilibrium asset pricing by Sharpe (1964), Treynor (1965), 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) from ideas put forward by Markowitz (1952,1959). These 
works resulted in the development of the relationship between return and risk, summarized in 
what has been called the security market line of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The security 
market line, says that the equilibrium expected return of an asset is a linear function of it's 
systematic risk which can be captured by 0. 
E(R) = rf + 
E(R. ) -r cy(Ri, Rj 
(2.31) 
21D 
E(Ri) = rf + Pi[E(R. ) - rf] (2.32) 
where, 
E(R) = the expected return of security i, 
E(R 
.. )= the expected return of the market, 
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r,. = the risk free return which compensates for the time value of money, and 
Pi = (F(Ri, R. )/(y2 (R. ). 
Equations (2.3 1) and (2.32) says that the required ex-ante return of investors on any asset 
is equal to the return, rf on a risk free asset plus a risk premium, Pi[E(R. ) - rf]. The Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) states that the risk premium is proportional to the systematic risk of the 
asset, where P captures the amount of systematic risk and E(R. ) - rf is the market risk premium. 
The implications of CAPM are therefore as follows: securities with larger betas, that is, more 
systematic risk, should have higher expected returns, returns should be linearly related to beta 
and nonsysternatic risk should not be priced by the market. 
CAPM can be written in terms of a fair game as follows 
yi, t- Ri, I-E (Ri, tloi, ) 
(2.33) 
E(Ri, tloi,, ) = rf,, + [E(R,.,, 10., ) - Rftjoi,, 
(2.34) 
E(y1) =0 
where Oi,, is the estimated amount of systematic risk. 
From this presentation the nature of the joint hypothesis problem becomes obvious. If it 
is assumed that the CAPM is the appropriate equilibrium model then E(yi,, ) must be a fair game, 
if markets are efficient. However, if tests of E(yi,, ) reveal that this is not the case then either 
markets are inefficient (so that a predictable difference between the actual and expected return 
exists) or CAPM is not the true model of equilibrium returns (in this case predictability of E(yi,, ) 
is due to the wrong model being used). 
A large number of papers have tested the properties of CAPM empirically. A discussion 
of the most important findings follows. The early tests of CAPM were generally supportive of 
the model, Sharpe and Cooper (1972) found that an almost perfect monotonic relationship existed 
between the average beta of a security and its return in the following year. 
Tests by Lintner (1965) and Douglas (1968) utilised cross-section regression analysis to 
identify the relationship between beta and return. The results of these papers appeared to refute 
CAPM because residual risk and total risk appeared to be positively priced by the market. 
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Although since the work of Miller and Scholes (1972) we have known that the results provided 
by Lintner and Douglas are probably due to misspecification of the tests 
6 
More sophisticated investigations, which used both time series and cross-section tests 
such as those undertaken by Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) 7 and Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
found confirmation of a linear relationship between systematic risk and return but the absence 
of a relationship between un-systematic risk and return. However, in the case of the tests 
presented by Fama and MacBeth during a number of their sub-periods there appeared to be no 
relationship between systematic risk and return. 
More recently, the validity of CAPM has been questioned. Tinic and West (1984,1986) 
repeated the Fama and MacBeth study, but tested the relationship between risk and return on a 
month by month basis, in order to establish whether systematic risk was priced in some months 
of the year but not in others. They found that the positive trade off between systematic risk and 
return was exclusively due to the relationship between systematic risk and return in January. 
Systematic risk did not appear to be priced in any other month other than January. Additionally, 
in a later paper Tinic and West (1986) demonstrated that the relationship between systematic 
risk and return was sensitive to the specification being tested. When un-systematic risk was 
added to the model, the positive relationship between systematic risk and return in January was 
eliminated and replaced by a positive relationship between un-systematic risk and return. 
In the late 1970's a number of papers appeared which indicated that variables other that 
beta could predict cross sectional returns. Basu (1977) showed that price earnings ratios could 
predict future excess returns, while Banz (1981) found that firm size could predict future excess 
returns. Leverage, has also been found to be an important predictor of excess returns. Bhandari 
(1988) found expected stock returns to be positively related to the ratio of debt to equity after 
controlling for beta and firm size. Fama and French (1992) also challenged CAPM because they 
found that the book to market equity ratio has strong explanatory power; after controlling for 
beta, higher book to market ratios are associated with higher expected returns. But this study is 
particularly important, because, not only was the book to market ratio found to be important, 
6. The work of Miller and Scholes; identified three possible sources of bias in estimates of the relationship between beta and return. Firstly they 
suggested that the correlation between the asset and the market should be estimated using the market risk premium form as follows. 
Ri., = rf., + Pi(R.., - rf. ) 
This ensures that if rf., fluctuates over time, and is correlated with R., a missing variable bias will not be incorporated into test results. 
Secondly, Miller and Scholes also advise testing for non-linearity in the relationship between beta and return. Finally they also draw attention 
to the possibility that heteroscedasticity might introduce biased estimates. 
7. This paper is particularly important because it identified a methodology which eliminated the "errors in the variables" problem. As Black et 
al(1972) noted when portfolios are formed on the basis of beta, cross-sectional errors across equations will be correlated. This is due to selection 
bias, stocks with high observed betas would be likely to have a positive measurement error while stocks with low betas will be more likely to 
have negative measurement errors. For firms or portfolios with high betas this would introduce a positive bias into estimates of beta. 
The methodology suggested by Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) to eliminate the problem required introducing an instrumental variable so 
that in one period portfolios should be ranked on the basis of portfolio beta (the instrument). Then, in a subsequent period the betas should be 
re-estimated and using these betas the relationship between risk and return should be tested. 
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Fama and French found that in addition to the book to market ratio, beta had no explanatory 
power at all. UK studies appear to support these results because Miles and Timmermann (1993) 
and Strong and Xu (1994) both find than the book to market ratio explains some of the 
cross-sectional behaviour of expected returns. The apparent empirical failure of CAPM has 
questioned whether this really is the appropriate model with which to capture equilibrium returns, 
which makes the joint hypothesis issue particularly important when undertaking tests of market 
efficiency. 
Partly as a response to dissatisfaction with the ability of CAPM to predict expected returns 
alternative models of equilibrium returns have been developed. One such alternative is the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) which was developed by Ross (1976) '. The APT is based on 
the concept that assets which have the same risk characteristics sell for the same price, and 
derives asset prices from arbitrage arguments. The APT requires that each asset is linearly related 
to a set of factors, each factor represents a form of systematic risk which might influence returns. 
The relationship between the factor, and the asset return depends on the factor loading b,, j which 
captures the sensitivity of the return to changes in the systematic factor. 
, r Ri = oci + bi, J, + 
bi, 
2,2 
+ bi, jIj + ej (2.35) 
E(R) =4+ Xibil + 
X2bi2 +* 
'+ Xjbij (2.36) 
where, 
Ri = the realised return for security i, 
E(R) = the expected return to security i, 
the return of stock i if all the factors/index have a value of zero, 
the value of the 'hindex that influences the return of stock i, 
bi, j = the sensitivity of stock i's return to the j" index, 
ej =a random error with a zero mean. 
Xi = the increase in the expected return which occurs as a result of a one unit increase in bj., that 
is, ki represents returns for bearing risk, and 
ý-,, = rf, or R, if the zero beta 9 version is being tested. 
8. Merton (1973) also descfibes a multifactor model. Rubinstein (1976) and Breeden (1979) develop models in which a proxy for the volatility 
of the (unobserved) value of the portfolio of wealth of individuals is used. Breeden's insight is that with efficient capital markets, intertemporal 0 
optimising decisions by individuals would make consumption expenditure closely linked to the present value of the total wealth of individulals. 
Here total wealth includes both human capital and and the expected productivity of future investments. As Breeden shows there is a strong 
relationship between changes in consumption and unexpected changes in the value of portfolios of assets. 
9. Because of the impossibility of observing a truly fisk free asset Black (1972) suggested using a zero asset beta rather than a risk free rate in 
tests of CAPM. A zero beta asset is an asset which is not correlated with the market return. 
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There has been considerable success in testing the APT empirically although, because 
the APT does not specify how many factors should be included, or what they are there have 
been criticisms of how tests are actually performed. Roll and Ross (1984) use factor analysis to 
test the APT, factor analysis '0 is used to extract common factors in returns, and then tests are 
performed which identify whether expected returns are explained by the cross-sectional factor 
loadings of security returns on the factors. Roll and Ross (1984) conclude that three factors 
appear to be significant in explaining expected returns. 
The primary concern of tests of a multifactor model is that the factor analysis approach 
which has been used to test APT only indicates how many common factors there are and not 
what the common factors are. 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) use an alternative approach to factor analysis, they identify 
economic variables which are correlated with stock returns and then test whether the factor 
loading of returns are related to the crosssection of expected returns. This approach therefore 
constrains the variables which could be included in the multifactor model. 
Chan, Chen and Ross (1986) examine a range of "business conditions" that might be 
related to returns because they are related to shocks to expected future cash flows or discount 
rates. They find that the most important variables are the growth rate of industrial production 
and the difference between the returns on long term, low grade bonds and long term Government 
bonds (which is a proxy for changes in the risk premium). They find that when 0 is added to 
the multifactor model it has no additional explanatory power. A study by Poon and Taylor (199 1) 
finds no evidence that these macroeconomic variables have an influence over the pricing of UK 
stocks. 
In a paper by Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) it is found that in addition to the business 
.' 
condition factors which were identified, beta had no explanatory role. This paper also found 
that the small firm premium could be explained by the APT model tested. This of course 
suggested that the sma: 1 firm anomaly, which indicates that there is a predictive difference 
between the actual return of small firms and the expected returns of small firms, may be a 
consequence of using CAPM as the equilibrium model rather than APT. Although, in a later 
paper Lehmann and Modest (1988) found that a fifteen factor model the multifactor model left 
an unexplained size effect, that is expected returns were too high relative to the model for small 
stocks, and to low for large stocks. 
10. Factor analysis provides estimates of the factor loadings bi. j's and the factors I, 's. In the factor analysis approach ij is an index consisting 
of a (different) weighted average of the securities on which factor analysis is performed. A specific factor analysis is performed for a given 
number of factors, the process is then repeated as additional factors are added until the covariance between residual returns is minimised. Since 
factor analysis provides estimates of the factor loading bij, these are then used in a second pass regression so that ki can be estimated. 
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Since the work of Roll (1977) forceful rejections of CAPM have been difficult to make. 
Roll demonstrated that empirical tests of CAPM are unable to tell whether the market portfolio 
is inefficient or whether the wrong proxy forthemarket is being used because the marketportfolio 
is empirically unobservable. To overcome this problem, Shanken (1986) suggests refining 
statistical techniques which are used when choosing a market portfolio: he terms this "Living 
with the Roll Critique". His work develops an empirical framework in which prior beliefs about 
the correlation between a proxy and the true market portfolio can be explicitly incorporated. 
The usual notation of a proxy is expanded to accommodate a vector of variables, which, together 
account for much of the variation in the market portfolios return. Shanken finds that if the 
statistical evidence of the proxy's inefficiency is sufficiently strong, then the inefficiency of the 
true market may be correctly inferred and CAPM rejected. 
Stambaugh (1982) argues that the relationship between risk and return does not appear 
to be sensitive to the proxy for the market portfolio which is used, because the relationship 
between risk and return does not appear to be any different even when four different market 
portfolios are utilised in tests of CAPM. Although, in a recent paper Jagannathan and Wang 
(1994) find that a value weighted index is a poor proxy for the market portfolio, following 
Mayers (1973) they argue that a measure of human capital should be included in the market 
index. When the Fama and French (1992) study which was reviewed earlier is replicated by 
Jagannathan and Wang, but where the betas are allowed to vary across the business cycle and 
are derived from a market index which includes human capital, beta is found to explain as much 
as 50% of the cross section of expected returns. 
This section has shown that tests of market efficiency and equilibrium models appear to 
be inseparable in many tests of market efficiency. Furthermore, given the empirical evidence 
which has been discussed in this section, it is not obvious that previous tests of market efficiency 
that appear to reject market efficiency, but use CAPM as the equilibrium model, can not provide 
us with a definitive answer on this issue. 
2.7 Microstructure Factors 
In an important paper Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1983) (see also Cohen et 
al 1986), demonstrated that microstructure frictions have a strong influence on the behaviour 
of stock returns. Three aspects of the microstructure literature are believed to be fundamentally 
important for this study and will consequently be discussed in detail. The first discussion will 
be concerned with the bid-ask spread, and the role that this has in introducing spurious negative 
autocorrelation into security returns. This will be followed by a discussion of how 
non-synchronous trading can introduce positive autocorrelation into portfolio returns, and cause 
the 0 estimates to be biased. The discussion of microstructure considerations will conclude with 
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a discussion of why beta estimates are dependant on the return interval. These three issues must 
be discussed because they demonstrate that predictability can be introduced into stock returns 
even if prices are set in accordance with market efficiency. That is why, in this study, 
predictability in itself will not be interpreted as providing evidence of market inefficiency. 
2.7.1 Bid-Ask Spread 
The bid-ask spread is the difference between the price at which investors can undertake 
buy and sell trades. This spread represents the cost to market makers, the wholesalers of 
securities, of providing predictable immediacy to participants in the market. When transaction 
prices are used in empirical studies the transaction price records the trade price whether, it is a 
purchase trade and therefore on the bid side of the margin, or a sell trade which is on the ask 
side of the spread. As Niederhoffer and Osbourne (1966) originally discussed, the use of 
transaction prices when a bid-ask spread exists means that some negative serial dependence in 
observed price changes should be anticipated. In a later paper, Roll (1984) has shown formally 
how the bid-ask spread can introduce spurious negative autocorrelation into successive changes 
in security prices. A summary of Roll's explanation, for why the bid-ask spread introduces 
negative autocorrelation into returns that are calculated from transactions prices follows. 
If at time t-I the market maker undertook a buy trade, the price of the stock would have 
been at the bid price. This means that (assuming no new information arrives) the next trade will 
be either at the bid price or the ask price with equal probability" .A similar, but opposite pattern 
will exist if the price at t-1 happened to have been a sell trade, so that the price was an ask 
price. In the next period the price could be either at the bid or the ask price with equal probability. 
This means that the joint probability of successive price changes in trades initiated other 
than by new information, depends on whether the last transaction was at the bid or at the ask. 
If the previous trade took place at the bid(ask) price, the next price change can not be 
negative(positive) because there is no new information. Similarly, there is no probability that 
two successive price increases(declines) can take place. 
This means that the covariance between successive price changes, as Appendix 2 
demonstrates, can not be zero. The correlation between two successive price changes, when 
there is no new information must be 
Cov (Ap, Ap, 1) = 118(-S 
2-s2) 
= -S 
2/4 (2.37) 
11. It is assumed that in the absence of no new information then there is no incentive for the price to be at the bid or the ask. The probability 
of the price being at either the bid or the ask is therefore a random event. 
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where Ap, is the change in the transaction price of a security between time t and time t+1, and 
S is the bid-ask spread. 
Thus the covariance between successive price changes is minus the square of one half 
the bid-ask spread . Similarly, as Appendix 2 demonstrates, the variance of Ap is S2/2. This 
predicts an autocorrelation coefficient of - 1/2, assuming no new information arrives. However, 
observed autocorrelations might be smaller than this because the estimated covariance is divided 
by the sample variance. The variance, is likely to be dominated by the effect of new information, 
whereas the covariance between successive changes will not be influenced by new information 
if markets are efficient. 
Roll (1984) tested empirically whether there really was an inverse relationship between 
the magnitude of the bid-ask spread and the first order autocorrelation coefficient. One of the 
most important findings presented by Roll was that the bid-ask spread and therefore the expected 
negative autocorrelation was larger for small firms than for large firms. In a later paper Kaul 
and Nimalendran (1990) also highlighted the importance of the bid-ask spread in empirical tests. 
Kaul and Nimalendran found that the bid-ask error in transaction prices could account for the 
observed short-run price reversals which appeared to take place for NASDAQ firms 12 . The 
bid-ask spread therefore appears to be responsible for the observed short-run overreaction of 
security prices. As Chapter 3 will show, work by Conrad and Kaul (1990) finds that the bid-ask 
spread component is able to explain as much as 5% of the variation in individual security returns. 
Surprisingly, unlike Roll (1984) Conrad and Kaul do not find that firm size influences the 
magnitude of the variation in realised returns which can be explained by variations in the bid-ask 
spread. 
2.7.2 Thin Trading 
Frequently, when empirical work is undertaken, the assumption is made that prices are 
sampled synchronously when in fact they are sampled non- synchronously. For example, prices 
quoted in the daily financial press are usually closing prices, that is prices at which the last 
transaction in each of these securities occurred on the previous business day. The closing prices 
of distinct securities need not be recorded simultaneously, but traditionally few studies have 
taken this into account, see for example, Fama and MacBeth (1973). Failing to take into account 
the non-synchronous nature of prices can alter substantially the characteristics of asset returns, 
as this section will illustrate. 
12. NASDAQ firms are companies traded through the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system. This is a dealer 
market (over the counter market) which accounts for about 25% of the market value of shares on the New York Stock Exchange. 
32 
The first to recognise the importance of non-synchronous price adjustments was Fisher 
(1966), who found that indexes which gave greater weight to small firms were more positively 
autocorrelated. More detailed models of nontrading have been developed by Scholes and 
Williams (1977) Cohen et al (1986) and Dimson (1979). Whereas, these early studies were 
concerned with the effects of thin trading on empirical applications of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, although, more recent attention, for example, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990b) and Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994) has focused on the effect 
of thin trading as a cause of spurious autocorrelation. 
Non-synchronous trading in stock markets exists when some stocks trade more frequently 
than others. Suppose that the two stocks i and j are independent but i trades less frequently than 
j. If some systematic news arrives in time t, it is more likely that stock j will reflect the news 
before stock i because it trades more frequently. Eventually, stock i will reflect the new 
information, but only when it trades. Because the price of stock i responds with a lag to the 
information, the prices of stock i and j will be cross serially correlated. As a result, a portfolio 
containing both i and j will be serially correlated. 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990b) introduce a model of non-synchronous trading which 
illustrates well why non-synchronous trading introduces positive autocorrelation into portfolio 
returns. A brief description of their model follows. 
In each period t, there is some chance that security i does not trade with probability pi . 
If it does not trade, its observed return is zero. Although, the true or virtual return will reflect 
any systematic shocks. In the next period t+I, there is again some chance that security i does 
not trade, also with probability pi. If security i does trade in period t+I and did not trade in 
time t, then the realised return is the sum of the two previous virtual returns for all previous 
consecutive periods in which stock i has not traded. In fact, the observed return in any period 
is the sum of all virtual returns for consecutive periods in which the stock failed to trade. 
When a portfolio contains both stocks i and j, the virtual returns of i and j will be 
contemporaneously correlated but serially uncorrelated. Observed returns, however, will be 
autocorrelated because the virtual return of i and j is observed at different intervals. As long as 
i and j have positive betas so that they react in the same way as the market to a systematic shock, 
the portfolio return will be positively autocorrelated. This means that identifying autocorrelation. 
in portfolio returns does not imply that the portfolio returns are predictable in the sense that such 
autocorrelation implies market inefficiency. 
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2.7.2.1 Risk Measurement and Thin Trading 
Dimson (1979) and Scholes and Williams (1977) were the first to recognise that 
non-synchronous trading will bias estimates of systematic risk. Estimates of 0 which were 
discussed in the following section are usually obtained from the market model (which provides 
an estimate of the correlation between the return of a security and the market return). The market 
model can be written as 
Ri't = (xi + PiR.,, (2.38) 
where, 
Ri, t the return to security i in time t, 
Rnl, t the market return in time t, and 
Pi = the estimate of systematic risk for stock i or portfolio i which indicates the extent to which 
stock i covaries with the market return, this can also be calculated as (Y(Ri, R,,, )l(y2(R. ). 
This equation measures the extent to which a variation in the market is also reflected in 
stock i. If a stock which is thinly traded, has a trade in time t, but not in time t-1 then the 
effects of a systematic shock in time t will not be observed in the security return until it trades. 
This means that the relationship between the market and an individual security will be understated 
in cases where stock i is thinly traded. In which case the P estimates will be biased downwards. 
To overcome this problem Dimson (1979) proposed an aggregate coefficient model which 
allows us to make unbiased estimates of betas in the presence of thin trading. This aggregate 
coefficients model can be written as 
T (2.39) 
Ri, 
t+ oci + 
PiR,,,,, +I Pi, R,,, 
-, 
T=1,2,3.. T 
T=l 
wher, ý, 
R,,,, f-T= the past market return in time t -, r 
00 = the covariability of the return of stock i in time t with the market return in time t 
Pk= the covariability of the return of stock i in time t with the market return in time t -, r 
If a stock fails to trade in time t, the effect on stock i of a change in the market index 
will only be observed when stock i trades. If stock i trades in time t+1, the effect of a systematic 
shock in time t will be captured by the relationship between the market return in time t-I and 
the security return in time t. Dimson therefore, suggests using an aggregate coefficients model 
where lagged market returns are allowed to enter the market model. The coefficients associated 
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with the lagged market return will capture the effect of systematic changes which are not observed 
in the security stock return because a stock is thinly traded. For thinly traded stocks, betas should 
be estimated as the sum of the contemporaneous beta that is PO and thePk'S from equation 
(2.39). 
Non-synchronous trading introduces a second problem when estimating betas. 
Frequently, traded stocks will also have betas which are biased. In this case the bias is introduced 
because the market index contains infrequently traded stocks. This means that the relationship 
between the frequently traded security return and the market index (which contains some 
infrequently traded securities) is overstated. An ad ustment for this can be made by including 
leading market returns in aggregate coefficient market model. 
2.7.3 The Intervalling Effect 
The "intervalling effect" recounts the empirical observation that risk measurements are 
sensitive to the return interval being used. Although, changes in the measurement of beta as the 
return interval increases have been documented extensively, see for example Scholes and 
Williams (1977) Dimson (1979) and Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1983). 
Handa, Kothari and Wasley (1989) focused on beta changes sternming purely from varying the 
return interval. They showed that as the return interval varies from one day to one year beta 
estimates vary in a predictable way. 
The main arguments put forward by Handa et al were as follows. As an earlier section 
showed, a security beta can be calculated as (T(Ri, R .. 
)I(T'(R. ). Betas are sensitive to the return 
interval because cy(Ri, R. ) and (y2(R,,, ) do not change proportionately as the return interval is 
varied. As Appendix 3 demonstrates, this means that for securities with a beta less than one, as 
the return interval increases the estimated betas get smaller, but for securities with betas greater 
than I the estimated betas get larger. Smith (1978) provided empirical confirmation of this. Ten 
portfolios were created on the basis of estimated beta and as the return interval increased the 
difference between the beta of the first and the last portfolio is found to widen considerably. 
Handa Kothari and Wasley (1989) also found empirical support for a relationship 
between the magnitude of a security beta and the return interval. Handa et al investigated twenty 
portfolios which had been stratified on the basis of market value. They found that beta estimates 
were closely associated with the return interval. To illustrate, they found that the portfolio with 
the smallest beta, when returns were sampled annually was 0.56 but this rose to 0.90 when 
returns were sampled daily. In contrast, the portfolio with the highest beta, when returns were 
sampled annually was found to be 1.66 but when returns were sampled daily this fell to only 
0.99. 
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As this section has demonstrated, microstructure considerations are crucially importdnt 
when trying to understand how stock prices behave. As we shall see in the next chapter, when 
the empirical work, that has investigated the behaviour of stock prices is discussed, the 
microstructure behaviour of stock prices has an important role to play in explaining the variation 
of stock prices. 
2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced the concept of market efficiency which will be a central 
theme in this study. Consequently, it is important to establish what the testable implications of 
stock market efficiency are, in order to test the hypothesis. This requires identifying a model 
with testable implications. Initially, as we saw at the start of the chapter the testable implications 
of the efficient markets hypothesis was initially associated with the random walk model. This 
model was readily accepted at the time because there was growing evidence that stock returns 
were uncorrelated, suggesting that stock return distributions were independent. 
In later work this conclusion was challenged, because although, mean returns appeared 
to be uncorrelated, this did not appear to apply to higher moments. Samuelson (1965) and 
Mandelbrot (1966) linked the efficient markets model to the martingale model, which is a less 
restrictive model. The martingale model requires that means are uncorrelated but no assumptions 
are imposed concerning higher moments. Essentially, it is the martingale property of returns 
that empirical research now tests when investigating whether capital markets behave efficiently. 
The application of the martingale to the behaviour of capital market efficiency was made 
first by Fama (1970) who demonstrated that abnormal returns in an efficient market should have 
an expected value of zero. Although, this application has been controversial as we shall see in 
the next chapter a vast amount of empirical work has been concerned with testing whether 
abnormal returns really do follow a martingale. 
In recent years a number of practical problems have been identified which makes it very 
difficult to conclude that violations of the martingale suggest market inefficiency. Fama 
suggested that the difference between realised and equilibrium expected returns should be a fair 
game. Testing capital market efficiency in this way implies that equilibrium returns can be 
identified. This chapter has shown that a great deal of uncertainty exists concerning which 
equilibrium model should be used. Because, of the empirical failure of CAPM it is no longer 
clear that this is the appropriate equilibrium model to use in tests of market efficiency. In which 
case tests of market efficiency are joint tests of both an equilibrium model and market efficiency. 
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As we saw towards the end of this chapter, even if the equilibrium model is identified 
then we would only expect abnormal returns (or returns according to LeRoy) to be a martingale 
if market imperfections and n-iicrostructure frictions are ruled out. This makes testing stock 
market efficiency very difficult indeed. As we shall see later in this study perhaps the best 
procedure under these conditions is to test for stock market efficiency and then if there is 
predictability present, test to see how much of the predictability can be accounted for by market 
imperfections or microstructure frictions. 
As we shall see from the next chapter which surveys the empirical work which has been 
undertaken on market efficiency there is a substantial amount of evidence to suggest that stock 
prices are predictable, but as we shall see little of the evidence suggests that markets are 
inefficient. 
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Appendix 1: Proof of the LeRoy Tautology 
Assume equation (2.20) of the text, 
yt+1 =pt+, -E(p, +1 
10) (A 1.1) 
Taking expectations of both sides provides, 
E(y, 1) = E(p, 1) - E(p, I 10, ) = 
Hence the tautology. 
Now looking at returns, taking equation (2.22) of the text, 
(A 1.3) 
and taking expectations of both sides provides 
E(z, +, )=E(r, +, )-E(r, +, I 0, )=0 
(AIA) 
Taking equation (2.19) of the text 
E(p, I 10) =[1+ E(r, II0, )p, ] 
By definition, rates of return are given by 
(Pt+1) (A 1.6) 
A 
Applying a conditional expectations operator to equation (A 1.6) gives 
E E[ Pt +1 1 
E(pt +I I 
(Al. 7) 
AA 
Multiplying through by p, gives, 
I O)p, =E (p, I 10, ) - p, 
(Al. 8) 
Rearranging gives 
E(p, I 10, ) = p, [E(r,, , 10) +II 
(Al. 9) 
which provides another tautology. 
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Appendix 2: Bid-Ask Spread as a Cause of Negative Autocorrelation 
1) The Covariance Between Successive Changes in Prices 
If a stock is trading at the bid price in time t-1, in the absence of any new information, 
assuming markets are efficient, market prices can not fall. This means that Ap, can only be zero 
(if the price stays at the bid) or be positive (if the price moves from the bid to the ask). If p, 
is at the bid price, Ap, must have been either positive or zero with equal probabilities. 
The joint probabilities of Ap, and Ap, ,, being in any direction can be found by taking 
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the probability of each occurrence as follows 1, (Ap, Ap,, I)pj, where pi is the probability of a I 
price change in any direction. The probability of a successive price change being in a particular 
direction is (0.5)x(O. 5)=0.25 because there is a 50% chance that if the price in t-1 is at the bid, 
then in the next period there is a 50% chance of it being at the bid again (a zero price change) 
or a 50% chance that the price will rise from the bid to the ask which would be a price rise. The 
sequence of successive price changes with probabilities is indicated in Table A. I 
Table A. I 
Ap, 
Apt 
+I 
0 +S 
-S 0 0.25 
0 0.25 1 0.2 
+S 0.25 
1 0 
If the price is at the bid in t-1 
In Table A. I above, +S indicates a price move to the ask price, while -S indicates a price 
move to the bid price. As we can see, there is a 25 % chance that Apt is zero and Apt I is also 
zero (this implies that prices stay at the bid price). There is a 25% chance that if Apt is zero 
Ap, I will be positive (this implies that the price stays at the 
bid price in time t but moves to 
the ask price in time t+ 1). Meanwhile, there is a 25 % chance that if at time t- I the price is at 
the bid then Apt is positive and Apt +I is negative (the price moves to the ask price 
in time t and 
moves to the bid in time t+ 1). Finally, there is also a 25% chance that if Apt is positive then 
Ap, , is zero (the price moves to the ask in time t 
but stays at the ask in time t+ 1). Because the 
price is at the bid price in time t-I it is impossible for Apt to be negative, since the price can 
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not fall below the bid price, in the absence of new information. This rules out successive price 
falls. In a similar way it is impossible to observe successive price rises in the absence of new 
information. 
If the price at t-I is at the ask 
Similarly, if a stock is trading at the ask price in time t-I then Ap, must be negative or 
zero with equal probabilities. The joint probability of Ap, and Ap, being in any direction must 
again be (0.5)x(O. 5)=0.25. The possible combination of sequences is summarised in Table A. 2. 
There are 25% probabilities that a) the price will stay at the ask in time t, but move to the bid 
in time t+1 b) the price will stay at the ask in time t and stay at the ask in time t+I c) the price 
will move to the bid in time t and stay at the bid in time t+1 d) the price will move to the bid 
in time t and move to the ask in time t+1. 
Table A. 2 
Ap, 
j6kpl +I 
-S 0 
-S 0 0.25 
0 0.25 
+S 0.251 0 
Since prices may be at the bid or the ask price with equal probabilities the probability of 
two successive changes taking place in a particular combination must be (0.25)x(O. 25)= 0.125. 
Thus, Tables A. I and A. 2 combine to give Table A. 3. 
Table A. 3 
Apt 
Ap, I 
-S 0 +S 
-S 0 0.125 0.125 
0 0.125 0.25 0.125 
+S 0.125 0.125 0 
The means of Ap, and Ap, , must be zero in the absence of new information. 
This implies 
the middle rows and columns of Table A. 3 can be ignored and the covariance between Ap, and 
A -- ap, , becomes, 
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Cov (Ap, Ap, 1) = (Apb,, - E(Ap, )) (Ap,,,,,, I-E (Apt + 1))0.125 
(A2.1) 
(Ap,,,, - E(Ap, )) (APb, t +I- 
E(Ap, 
+ 1))0.125 
where Apb, is a price change from the ask to the bid, and Ap,,,, is a price change from the bid 
to the ask. This simplifies to 
[(-s 2(o. 125)) +(-s 2(0.1 25))l = 
2(-s2) 
- 
-s2 (A2.2) 
0.125 4 
2) The Variance of Price Changes 
The possible range of price movements in time t are summarised below in Table A. 4. 
Table A. 4 
Price t-I 
Price 
Bid Ask 
Bid 0.25 0.25 
Ask 0.25 0.25 
From Table A. 4 we can see that there is a 50% of there being no price change at all, and 
a 25% chance that the price change will be positive, and a 25% chance that the price change 
will be negative. Thus, the variance of Ap, can be written as 
Cov (Ap,, Ap, ) = [Ap,,,, -E (Ap, 
)]20 
. 25 + 
IAPb, 
t-E 
(A pt)]20 . 25 
(A2.3) 
= [S2] (0.25)+ [S2 1 (0.25) = 
s2 
2 
3) The Autocorrelation of Successive Price Changes 
The first order autocorrelation statistic of the price changes is 
COV (Apt, Apt+ -S214 _I 
(A2.4) 
var(Ap) S2 /2 2 
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Appendix 3: The Intervalling Effect 
Define returns as price relatives, and let Ri(n) be the n -period buy and hold return from 
time 0 to time n for security i, defined as 
Ri(n) = 
Pi, 
n 
Pi, 
n -I 
Pi, k pi, I 
(A3.1) 
Pi, 
n- I 
Pi, 
n-2 
*** Pl, k-1 
*** Pi, O 
where the series of one period returns, Ri(l), are given by 
Ri(l) = 
Pi, 
k 
Vk 
(A3.2) 
Pi, k -I 
Define the expected buy and hold return over the period from time 0 to time n for security 
i, E(Ri(n)), as [ti(n). Then, assuming constant expected (one period) returns, it follows that 
gi(n) = g, 'i 
where gi is the expected one period return, E(Ri(l)). 
(A3.3) 
Now consider the covariance between the n-period returns on security i and those on 
security j, (Tij(n), which is defined as 
(Tij(n) = E[(Ri(n) - E(Ri(n))) (Rj(n) - E(Rj(n)))] (A3.4) 
This can be simplifed as follows 
E[Ri(n)Rj(n)] - E[Ri(n)]E[Rj(n)] (A3.5) 
= E[Ri(n)Rj(n)] - [giltjl' 
Similarly, the covariance between the one period returns of securityi and security j, (Yij. ) 
is defined as follows 
(Ti, j = E[Ri(I)Rj(l)l - E[Ri(l)]E[Rj(l)l 
= E[Ri(I)Rj(l)l - gigj 
(A3.6) 
Now define ilij =- E[Ri(l)Rj(l)], and Tlij(n) M E[Ri(n)Rj(n)]. if the expected one period 
returns on each security are constant, then 71ij will also be constant. It then follows that 
ln 
i ilij(n) v 
E[Ri(n)Rj(n)] = E[Ri(I)Rj(l)]' 
This means that equation (A3.5) can be simplified further to 
(Tijn) = E[Ri(I)Rj(l)]" - [gigj]" 
and by substitution of equation (A3.6) gives 
(A3.7) 
(A3.8) 
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[aij - Ri9j] /I - [Rigjl'l 
Similarly, by assuming that the expected returns on the market portfolio are constant 
over time, the covariance between the n -period returns of security i and those of the market, 
(Yi, m(n), can be shown to be 
(yi,., (n) =+ Rigj - [uiu. ]" 
where is the covariance between the one period returns of security i and the market portfolio. 
(A3.9) 
(A3.10) 
It follows that the beta of security i using n period returns is 
P, (n) = 
((Yi,. + Uiu. )" - (Uju )" 
(A3.1 1) 
(Cym2 + U2)n _ (U2)n mm 
while the beta of security i using one period returns is Pi,: -- 
Dividing the n -period return beta by the one period return beta gives the following ratio 
Bi(n) ((y im + UiUM)n _ (UiU"l )n/C7im 
Pi ((y2 (U 2n /C7m2 
m+ U2)n mm 
(A3.12) 
Important inferences can be made by looking at the ratio as a function of ui and n. Firstly, 
for a given return interval as ui increases then so does the beta ratio. Secondly, as the return 
interval, n, increases, for a given ui, the beta ratio increases for one-period betas greater than 
one. For one-period betas less than one the ratio declines as n increases. As the return interval 
increases the spread between high and low betas must increase. 
The conclusion of this analysis is important. For securities which have betas less than 
one, then as the return interval, which is used to calculate betas, decreases then so does the 
estimated beta. Meanwhile, when betas are greater than one the estimated security beta increases 
with the return interval. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Predictability of Stock Market Returns 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the empirical literature which has investigated stock market 
predictability. The first section considers the evidence which has explored whether short-horizon 
returns are serially correlated or not. This will initially study the work on market wide indexes 
and individual securities. The discussion will then progress to consider the behaviour of 
portfolios which have been formed in a number of different ways. A great deal of attention has 
currently been directed at the behaviour of portfolios because portfolio returns appear to be 
autocorrelated and therefore much more predictable than is the case for individual securities. 
Autocorrelation tests have played an important role in determining whether markets are efficient 
or not because they directly test the martingale property of returns. However, as Section 2.7 of 
Chapter 2 indicated, predictability in itself does not imply market inefficiency, predictability 
can exist even if markets are efficient. 
The second section of this chapter will review the evidence which has suggested that 
stock markets overreact to new information. There are three strands to this literature, which 
have all developed independently of each other. Firstly, there is the mean-reversion literature, 
which began with a paper by Summers (1986). This literature has demonstrated that over long 
horizons stock returns' are negatively correlated. Secondly, a similar theme is considered by 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985,1987) in the "winner loser hypothesis". DeBondt and Thaler have 
shown that companies that experience abnormally bad returns in one period provide excessively 
high returns in future years. Meanwhile, companies that are extreme winners in one period, 
because they have abnormally high returns, become extreme losers in subsequent years. Thirdly, 
variance bounds tests, which were pioneered by Shiller (1981a) have demonstrated that share 
prices appear to be much more volatile than the streams of fundamental information, such as 
dividends, which share prices are meant to represent. This appears to suggest that contrary to 
what we would expect in an efficient market, share prices tend to react to things other than 
changing expectations about future dividends. 
The final section of this chapter will examine the empirical evidence which suggests that 
stock markets are characterised by persistent regularities. The most important of these 
it anomalies" are the calendar and size anomalies which will be discussed in detail because they 
I-It is usual to characterise long-horizon returns as returns which are over one year or more. 
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are particularly important for this study. The calendar regularities indicate that stock returns are 
predictable during certain calendar periods, while the size effect demonstrates that returns to 
small firms are higher than returns to large firms, even after controlling for risk. 
A review of this empirical literature is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, a full 
review of the empirical literature is necessary to identify the issues which are important to 
consider when evaluating whether a market is efficient or not. Secondly, studying previous work 
in this way will allow us to gauge the extent to which the empirical work, which is undertaken 
in this study, adds to our understanding of how stock markets behave. Finally, discussing the 
extensive empirical literature will allow us to determine whether perhaps previous work which 
rejected market efficiency was a little premature in doing so. 
3.2 Short Horizon Returns 
Short-horizon returns exist when the differencing interval between the current share price 
and the previous share price is considerably less than one year. For example, daily, weekly or 
monthly returns would be considered as being short-horizon return. s. Due to the very different 
empirical characteristics of short and long-horizon returns they will be discussed separately. 
This section will focus upon the empirical properties of short-horizon returns. 
3.2.1 Autocorrelation Tests 
If prices reflect all available information, as they would in an efficient stock market, then 
future stock returns should not be predictable from past stock returns'. One way of testing 
whether stock returns are predictable is by undertaking an autocorrelation test which allows us 
to test the relationship between current and past returns. 
Assume that p, is the sample autocorrelation statistic which captures the average 
relationship between returns in time t and time t -, r. This statistic can be defined as 
n-T 
(r, - r) (r, 
PT 
n 
-2 r) 
where, r, is the return in time t, and r is the mean return over the sample period, that is, 
= (1/n) r,. 
2. Assurning that expected returns are constant. 
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A finding of positive autocorrelation between successive price changes would indicate 
that positive (negative) returns tend to follow positive (negative) returns. In contrast, negative 
autocorrelation would indicate that negative (positive) returns tend to follow positive (negative) 
returns. If the autocorrelation is significant and sufficiently strong, it would suggest that investors 
may be able to use these autocorrelation patterns to devise trading rules which would provide 
abnormally high returns. 
One of the earliest documentations of an autocorrelation test, being applied to the stock 
market, is provided by Kendall (1953). In this study Kendall sought to identify whether long 
term trends in the behaviour of stock market prices could be distinguished from day to day price 
fluctuations. Kendall investigated the correlation coefficient between successive weekly changes 
in the stock indexes of a number of industrial sectors. These computations produced correlation 
coefficients which were all close to zero, although, the serial correlation coefficient of the 
Financial Times All Share indeX3, which was positive, appeared to be considerably larger than 
the correlation coefficient for the industrial sectors that were tested. 
The first study to consider the autocorrelation structure of both individual securities and 
market wide indexes was conducted by Farna (1965). Farna investigated the daily serial 
correlation properties of the thirty stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 4 which were 
listed over the period 1957-1962. The results of these tests indicated that only a small number 
of the serial correlation coefficients were statistically significant. Furthermore, the magnitude 
of those coefficients which were found to be statistically significant were so small that little 
more than I% of the variation in stock returns could be explained by the autocorrelation pattern. 
This meant that after transaction costs, it would not be possible to use the information provided 
by the autocoffelation patterns to outperform the market. This led Farna to conclude that the US 
stock market appeared to be efficient. 
A similar study was undertaken by Dryden (1 970a, 1970b) who tested the autocorrelation 
properties of UK daily stock returns. The resu ' 
Its reported by Dryden for the UK market were 
strikingly similar to those reported by Fama. The chief findings were as follows. Autocorrelation 
tended to be more likely to be significantly positive for one period lags, particularly for indexes. 
Autocorrelation coefficients greater than one lag tended to have a tendency to being negative, 
although again the coefficients appeared to be very small, suggesting that any predictability 
which existed could not be used in a trading rule to provide excess profits after transaction costs. 
3. This index consists of over 500 companies which are listed on the London stock exchange. 
4. The Dow Jones index is a composite of the thirty largest companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
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Working (1960) was the first person to draw attention to the importance of 
non-synchronous sampling of stock price information, in an attempt to explain why stock market 
indexes had relatively more autocorrelation than commodity indexes. Working showed that 
spurious autocorrelation can be introduced into stock market indexes when average prices are 
calculated from prices taken at different points in time. Working had argued that this was the 
cause of the small amount of positive serial correlation which had been discovered previously 
by Kendall. A similar issue is discussed by Brealey (1970) who tested for serial correlation in 
the FT 30 share index 5. Brealey constructed his own index comprising of 29 of the shares in 
the FT 30 share index. Prices were taken at 2pm exactly each day over the sample period February 
to November 1968 which avoided the spurious autocorrelation which was discussed by Working. 
The magnitude of the autocorrelation coefficient reported by Brealey was approximately 50% 
smaller than the one reported by Kendall, and therefore Brealey appeared to provide support 
for Working's argument that some of the autocorrelation identified by Kendall, in indexes, was 
spurious. 
Unfortunately, Working did not discuss the impact that persistent thin trading (where 
companies fail to trade for at least one full trading day) would have had on the autocorrelation 
patterns of market indexes. Intra-day non-synchronous trading is likely to cause much less 
autocorrelation than persistent thin trading. In which case, it is difficult to ascertain whether the 
low degree of autocorrelation reported by Brealey is due to synchronous sampling times or is 
a consequence of Brealey using very large firms in the index, which would trade every day, and 
have lower autocorrelations irrespective of whether prices were sampled at the same time during 
the day or not. 
Unfortunately, none of these early studies included small firms in their sample. 
Consequently, these studies have a selection bias in favour of finding no autocorrelation. The 
firms investigated are all high profile companies and very large. This means they are likely to 
get more coverage in the financial press and will have more intense analyst following. In which 
case prices are much more likely to reflect fundamentals and therefore be uncorrelated. 
3.2.2 Filter Tests 
Although, the autocorrelation tests which were discussed in the previous section appeared 
to indicate that returns could not be forecast from previous returns, the only way to test whether 
an autocoffelation pattern is economically meaningful is by testing a trading rule based on the 
autocorrelation pattern. Alexander (1961) provided the first major evidence on the use of trading 
5. The Fr 30 index is a composite of the 30 largest shares listed on the London stock exchange. 
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rules. The development of filter trading rules by Alexander was an advancement over the 
autocorrelation tests described in the previous section because filter rules are able to capture 
non-linearities which might exist between successive price changes. 
An Alexander filter rule is based on price signals where buy (sell) signals are generated 
by some upward (downward) price movements from recent troughs (peaks). This requires that 
if the priceof a security rose by at least x%, buy and hold the security, until its price moves 
down at least x% from a subsequent high, at which time the rule requires that the trader sells 
short. The short position should be maintained until the price rises at least x% above a subsequent 
low, at which time one covers the short position and buys. Moves of less than x% in either 
direction are ignored. In the absence of serial correlation a trading rule should not provide 
abnormal profits. In a later paper, Fama and Blume (1966) compared the profitability of various 
filters to a buy and hold Policy 6 for the Dow-Jones Industrial Average stocks. The filter rules 
of both Alexander (1961) and Fama and Blume (1966) demonstrated that it was impossible to 
make profits from a filter rule. For very small filters such as 0.5%, 1.0% and 1.5% it becomes 
possible to devise trading rules which on average can out perform buy and hold strategies but 
the number of trades required for such small filter sizes are so large that very high transactions 
costs are incurred, which erode the profits. 
Dryden (I 970a, 1970b) tested a filter rule on the UK market and found that a filter rule 
of 0.1 % was capable of providing average profits of 32.9% per year, while a buy and hold policy 
provides average profits of only 2.6% a year. Transaction costs were specifically discussed by 
Dryden, assuming transactions costs of only 2% (which is very conservative since Stoll and 
Whaley (1983) find that average transaction costs in the US lie in the range 2-6%, while Thomas 
(1989, p77) also reports transaction costs as being higher than 2% in the UK) the after transaction 
cost return to the filter rule was found to be on average - 17.1 %a year. 
Cunningham (1973) and Girmes and Damant (1975) also provided evidence of trading 
rules which generated profits. However Cunningham failed to compare the profits to a buy and 
hold strategy, which is necessary if the filter profits are to be compared with normal profits. 
Furthermore, a weakness of both papers is that neither considered whether transactions costs 
would have eliminated the filter profits. 
Recent evidence by Chelley and Steeley (1995) has shown that profits from filter rules i' 
are overstated, particularly when filters are small, if some of the stocks which are used in the 
sample are thinly traded. An overestimate of profits occurs in ex-post tests of a trading rule 
because the decision to buy (sell) a stock assumes that another party is willing to undertake the 
reverse trade. This will not always be possible if at least some of the stocks in the sample are 
6. The return to a buy and hold strategy is calculated to capture normal returns, which for risky assets like stock investments should be 
positive. Only if a filter rule provides a higher return than the buy and hold return is the filter rule providing abnormally high profits. 
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thinly traded. In a sample of UK large and small firms they report that the profits from a trading 
rule based on the autocorrelation structure of portfolio returns will overstate profits for small 
firms by as much as 20%. Without further evidence on the trading characteristics of the stocks 
used in these earlier studies it is impossible to gauge the size of the potential pre-transaction 
cost profit with any reliability. 
3.2.3 Microstructure Frictions and Portfolio Autocorrelation 
The two previous sections have demonstrated that there is little evidence to suggest that 
either individual security returns or market wide returns are predictable from their own previous 
values. In these early studies, no attention was directed at the serial correlation patterns of 
portfolios. This section will be concerned with the recent discovery that portfolio returns are 
much more autocorrelated and therefore more predictable than market wide indexes or individual 
securities. 
Since the seminal work of Fisher (1966) and the empirical applications of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) it has been known 
that indexes which give greater weight to small firms are characterised by greater serial 
correlation. Furthermore, a number of recent studies have documented a similar pattern among 
portfolios of stocks, where the component companies have been sorted on the basis of their 
capitalisation value. For example, Perry (1985) and Lo and MacKinlay (I 990a) for the US market 
and Levis (1985) for the UK market, have found that portfolios which contain stocks with low 
capitalisation values have an autocorrelation coefficient substantially greater then the 
autocorrelation coefficient of portfolios which contain stocks with high capitalisation values. 
For example, Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) found that the first order autocorrelation statistic for 
a portfolio containing the largestand smallestfirms intheir samplewas 4% and 33% respectively, 
indicative of pronounced differences between the return autocorrelations of large and small 
firms. 
A cause of serial correlation in indexes and portfolios that are heavily weighted by the 
stocks of small capitalisation firms was identified by Fisher (1966). He observed that small firms 
tended to trade less frequently than large firms. As a result, their prices would not adjust 
immediately to new information. So, for example, the return today of stock A may be reflecting 
an adjustment to information that was fully reflected in the stock of B yesterday. Thus, the return 
of stock A today will be correlated with the return of B yesterday, and so stocks A and B are 
cross serially correlated. Consider a portfolio which contains both stocks A and B. An 
equally-weighted portfolio return is the average of the return of the two stocks. Because stocks 
A and B are cross serially correlated, the return of an equally-weighted portfolio today (which 
depends on the return of A) will be correlated with the return of the portfolio yesterday (which 
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depends on the return of B). Thus, cross serial correlation among stocks can generate 
autocorrelation in a portfolio. So, in portfolios or indexes, which are heavily weighted by stocks 
with non-synchronous price adjustments, we would anticipate positive return autocorrelation. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of this argument there has been extensive academic debate 
recently concerning the cause, or causes, of portfolio serial correlation. Atchison, Butler and 
Simonds (1987) appeared to find evidence to suggest that non-synchronous trading could not 
account for the high autocorrelation in portfolio returns. They derive an estimate of the implied 
theoretical portfolio autocorrelation for portfolios of different sizes from the Scholes and 
Williams model of non-synchronous trading. Their results indicate that the implied 
autocorrelations are much lower than observed levels. They conclude therefore that high index 
or portfolio autocorrelation is not due to thin trading. Lo and MacKinlay (1990b) support this 
argument, the authors constructed a model of non-synchronous trading (this model was discussed 
in Section 2.7.2.1 of Chapter 2) which was tested empirically with almost 30 years of portfolio 
return data for the USA. They concluded that non-synchronous trading could account for only 
a small fraction of the observed levels of portfolio serial correlation. However, a recent paper 
by Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994) has shown that by relaxing the assumption in 
the Lo and MacKinlay model that the average probability of thin trading is equal across all 
securities within a portfolio, an assumption which is unlikely unless it is imposed when portfolios 
are formed, then the amount of autocorrelation introduced by thin trading becomes close to 
observed levels. 
Because thin trading was initially dismissed as a plausible explanation of portfolio return 
autocorrelation, a number of other authors have focused on the importance of bid-ask bounce 
(the importance of this was explained in Section 2.7.1 of Chapter 2) and time variation of expected 
returns as a possible cause of portfolio serial correlation. Outstanding contributions in this field 
have been made by Conrad and Kaul (198 8) and Conrad, Kaul and Nimalendran (199 1). 
Conrad and Kaul (1988) find evidence of substantial time variation in the returns of ten 
portfolios which have been formed on the basis of firm size. They show that weekly expected 
returns are well represented by a first order autoregressive process as follows, 
E, 
-, 
(R, )=OE, 
-2(R, -I)+Ut-I 
(3.2) 
where, E, -I 
(R, ) is the expectation at time t-1 of the next periods weekly return, and 0 is the 
autoregressive coefficient and u, -, 
is a random error. If expected returns follow an AR(l) process 
as follows then if 0 is large enough autocorrelation in realised returns will be implied. It is now 
possible to write realised returns in terms of the expected return and the error as follows, 
E, 
- l(R, 
) + e, (3.3) 
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where, R, is the realised return in time t, and et is a random error. 
Using a Kalman filter, Conrad and Kaul (1988) test whether weekly expected returns for 
the ten portfolios are constant or time varying. This requires equation (3.3) being estimated as, 
Rt = ocCon + e, 
al = Oat -I + ut 
(3.4) 
where, Con has a value of 1 for all t, oc, is the expected return at time t which can be time varying. 
Both e, and u, are white noise errors. The coefficient 0 captures the autoregressive component 
in expected returns. In this test at captures the expected return, if (x, is a constant then expected 
returns are constant, but if at is an AR(l) process then expected returns are time varying. The 
k2 of equation (3.4) indicates how much of the variation in returns can be explained by the 
variation in (x, over time and, therefore the proportion of the variation in realised returns which 
is caused by the time variation of expected returns. 
The results reported by Conrad and Kaul indicate that weekly expected returns are time 
varying, and can explain a substantial proportion of the variation in weekly realised portfolio 
returns. Meanwhile, the magnitude of the estimated time variation appeared to be monotonically 
associated with firm size. As we move from the portfolio containing the smallest firms to the 
portfolio containing the largest firms the magnitude of the estimated time variation declines. To 
illustrate, the k2of equation (3.4) for the portfolio which contains the smallest firms is 26% but 
for the portfolio containing the largest firms in the sample the k2of equation (3.4) is only 1%, 
suggesting that very little of the variation in portfolio realised returns can be explained by time 
varying expected returns of the large firms. 
The failure by Conrad and Kaul (1988) to find any evidence of time variation in the 
returns of large firms appears to be a weakness of the study. Firstly, if the expected returns of 
the large firms are not time varying then they will not be well represented by an AR(l) model. 
Their results for the large firms may therefore be due to misspecification. Furthermore, their 
results conflict with Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) and Harvey (1989) who certainly 
do find evidence of time variation in the expected returns of large firms. These studies will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7 and 8. Finally, the approach used by Conrad and Kaul assumes 
market efficiency so it is not possible to rule out that at least some of the predictability found 
for small firms is caused by market inefficiency. 
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Research on the autocorrelation patterns of individual security and portfolio returns had 
discovered a striking pattern, although, portfolio returns appeared to be autocorrelated this did 
not appear to be reflected in the autocorrelations of individual securities, which seemed puzzling 
until Lo and MacKinlay (1988) developed a model to reconcile these findings. 
The Lo and MacKinlay model assumes that stock returns are made up of three 
components, a random component, a bid-ask spread and a component which captures time 
variation. The three components are summarised in the following equation, 
Rt = Et + B, + U, (3.5) 
where R, is the realised security return, E, is the positively autocorrelated time varying expected 
return, B, is the negatively autocorrelated bid-ask bounce, and U, =a random component. 
As shown by the work of Roll (1984), which was discussed in Chapter 2, the existence 
of a bid-ask spread can introduce negative autocorrelation into security returns when a stock 
price moves from the bid (ask) to the ask (bid). In a portfolio, some securities will be moving 
from the bid to the ask, while others will be moving from the ask to the bid, so the effects of 
bid-ask bounce are diversified away. This means that although, individual securities may contain 
negatively correlated components because of bid-ask bounce, portfolio returns will not be 
negatively correlated. 
Meanwhile, time variation of expected returns will introduce positive autocorrelation 
into security returns. Since all securities are characterised to some extent by positive 
autocorrelation, introduced because expected returns are time varying, there is no diversification 
effect and so portfolios will be autocorrelated. When the effects of bid-ask bounce and time 
variation are combined, at a security level the negative autocorrelation of the bid-ask bounce is 
offset by the positive autocoffelation caused by time variation. Consequently, individual 
securities will display little autocorrelation. In the case of portfolios, which will not be 
characterised by a bid-ask effect, and therefore have no offsetting negative autocorrelation, 
portfolio returns will be positively autocorrelated. 
Using a similar test procedure to the one developed by Conrad and Kaul (1988) Conrad, 
Kaul and Nimalendran. (1991) assess the extent to which variations in the realised returns of 
individual securities can be explained by the components identified by Lo and MacKinlay. 
Conrad et al find that time varying expected returns and bid-ask errors are found to explain 
substantial proportions of the variation in weekly realised security returns. Again, the magnitude 
of the variation in weekly returns which can be explained by time variation is associated with 
firm size. For the smallest firms in the sample time variation can explain 19% of the variation 
in weekly realised returns but only 5.8% of the variation in weekly realised returns for the largest 
firms. 
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When comparing that study to Conrad and Kaul (1988) no attempt is made to explain 
why time variation appears to be less important in that study for small firms but more important 
for large firms, although, this might be a consequence of how securities are grouped. In that 
paper Conrad et al study only three size groupings not ten so the results may reflect the degree 
of aggregation. 
Meanwhile, for both large and small firms, bid-ask bounce appears to explain 
ap ,, proximately 
5% of the variation in weekly returns. Again, this seems somewhat strange 
because the bid-ask spread tends to be related to firm size, see for example Stoll and Whaley 
(1983), so perhaps we mightexpect the bid-ask component to explain rathermore of the variation 
in the returns of small firms. Finally, Conrad et al (199 1) agree with Lo and MacKinlay (1988) 
that at a security level the bid-ask spread will offset any time variation. However, it is not clear 
why the security returns of small firms are not moderately positively autocorrelated because 
clearly the time variation component explains much more of the variation in small firm security 
returns than the bid-ask component. Furthermore, there is certainly no evidence to suggest that 
the returns of individual securities are positively autocorrelated, actually Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988) find that the security returns of small firms appear to be negatively not positively 
autocorrelated. 
Despite their flaws, the papers by Conrad and Kaul (1988) and Conrad, Kaul and 
Nimalendran (199 1 a) have been fundamentally important because they have been instrumental 
in turning attention towards microstructure considerations and time variation in expected returns 
as a potential cause of observed portfolio autocorrelation. Moreover, the work of Conrad and 
Kaul has demonstrated that if stock returns are to be modelled correctly then these factors must 
be taken into account where necessary. 
3.3 Market Volatility 
Until relatively recently, it was argued that although standard statistical tests, such as 
autocorrelation tests which were discussed in the previous section were generally unable to 
reject the null hypothesis of market efficiency this could not be taken as evidence in favour of 
the hypothesis. This principle applies to all scientific theories. Experiments can falsify a theory 
by contradicting one of its implications, but the verification of one of its predictions cannot be 
taken to prove or establish the theory. 
In response to this, new and more powerful ways of testing stock market predictability 
were introduced by Shiller (198 1): variance bounds tests; DeBondt and Thaler (1985): tests of 
long-run overreaction; Poterba and Summers (1988), Fama and French (1988); tests of 
mean-reversion. Although, these tests were developed independently of each other they can be 
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loosely grouped together because they are all concerned with testing whether stock prices 
over-react to new information. A useful summary of the overreaction literature is provided by 
Forbes (1994). 
3.3.1 Variance Bounds Tests 
The first of these new type of tests, which sought to test stock market predictability were 
the so called variance bounds tests. The variance bounds test is based on intrinsic value models 
of stock returns such as the dividend valuation model, which was discussed in Section 2.5 of 
Chapter 2. As we saw this model links the intrinsic value of a stock to the future value of expected 
discounted dividends. Variance bounds tests fall into two groups, the original tests known as 
first generation tests Shiller (1979,198 1), Shiller and Grossman (198 1), LeRoy and Porter (198 1) 
and the modified second generation tests, such as West (1985) and Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro 
(1985) which were developed primarily as a response to criticisms of the early models which 
were made by Flavin (1983) Kleidon (1986) and Merton and Marsh (1986,1987). 
The dividend valuation model implies that the fundamental value of a stock is related to 
the future value of discounted dividends as follows. 
D, +j pt =I 
j=i (I + ry 
(3.6) 
where p, * is the fundamental or intrinsic value of a stock at time t, r is the required discount rate 
which makes future cash flows comparable to cash flows which accrue in time t, and D, are the 
dividends which accrue in time t. 
Future dividends, are random variables so their expected values are not observable. 
Although, as dividends are observed, new information is incorporated into investors' 
expectations about future dividends. The current market price p, is therefore a forecast of the 
expected discounted value of the future dividend stream as follows. 
(Dt+j I ot) 
pt = E, (pt* E, - 
j=l (I +ry 
(3.7) 
where 0, is the information set currently available. The current market price may deviate from 
this intrinsic price by an error. Since in an efficient market stock prices must be an optimal 
forecast of future fundamentals, p, should be the best guess of p, * given the information set 
available 0, 
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Unless investors have perfect foresight, the markets guess of this intrinsic stream will 
differ from the actual out-turn. This difference will represent the forecast error u, such that 
u, = p: - p, In efficient markets the market share price must be an optimal forecast of p, * which 
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requires that u, must be uncorrelated with the forecast from equation (3.7) . 
Since stock market investors do not have perfect foresight the actual dividend series can 
be expressed as the forecast plus the forecast error as follows, 
Au (3.8) 
Similarly, taking the variance of each of the terms means that equation (3.8) can be written as 
follows, 
var(pt) = var(p) + var(u) (3.9) 
This says that the variance of p, * will be equal to the sum of the variance of the forecast plus the 
variance of the forecast error ut. Since a variance can not be negative the variance of the series 
p, can not be greater than the variance of the forecast p, 
var(pt*) ý! var(p) (3.10) 
If these variance bounds equalities are not met it implies that actual stock prices are more volatile 
than the underlying fundamental series which they are supposed to be linked to. That is stock 
prices over-react to new information. 
3.3.1.1 Empirical Evidence 
A casual observation of the behaviour of major stock markets over quite short horizons 
reveals that stock prices appear to be very volatile, for example during October 1987 stock prices 
fell by approximately 20% in one day. Such pronounced periods of volatility lead Shiller (198 1) 
to comment on the volatility of the Standard and Poor index8 as follows. 
"The real index rose 85% between 1927 and 1929, fell 52% between 1929 and 
1932. It rose 69% between 1954 and 1957. It fell 56% between 1973 and 1975" 
(198 1, p. 106). 
Shiller (198 1 a) and LeRoy and Porter (198 1) performed the variance bounds tests which 
were outlined in the previous section on both the Dow Jones and the Standard and Poor index. 
Shiller, found that the Standard and Poor was 6 times more volatile than pt* while the Dow Jones 
7. Correlation of u, with p, implies that information in u, can be used to predict future values of p, in which case p, can not be the best 
forecast of p:. 
8. The Standard and Poor index is an equally-weighted index which is made up of approximately 500 companies. 
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index appeared to be 13 times more volatile than the series P, * (the construction of the series p, * 
is described in Appendix 1). Similar tests have been performed on the UK market by Bulkley 
and Tonks (199 1) which have indicated that UK stock prices are also excessively volatile. 
Initially, violations of the variance bound inequalities were interpreted as striking 
evidence of market inefficiency. Although now, as we shall see, these tests are viewed at best 
as being very controversial, and it is not clear that they tell us anything about market efficiency. 
A recurrent criticism of the first tests was that the dividend and price series used in tests 
were both assumed to be stationary, in which case the variance estimates of both p, and pt* would 
have been consistent. Using Monte Carlo simulation, Kleidon (1986) found that even if prices 
reflect future discounted dividends, but if the price and dividend series are not Stationary then 
the variance bounds relationship can be violated. 
Flavin (1983) is also concerned with the statistical methodology used in the variance 
bounds tests. In large samples the estimated variances approach the actual variances, but if a 
small sample is used to calculate the mean of the time series, and the series is autocorrelated 
then the estimated variance of the series will be downwards biased9. Flavin argues that the typical 
100 observations used in the volatility tests was insufficient to provide unbiased results, which 
implies the tests may be biased in favour of finding excess volatility. 
Conceptual problems with the nature of the variance bounds tests have been discussed 
by Kleidon (1986) and Merton and Marsh (1986,1987). Both papers demonstrate that the 
violation of the variance bounds may not imply excess volatility. Merton and Marsh, 
(1986,1987), for example, summarise this by arguing that the variance bounds tests are really 
tests of different dividend process specifications, particularly stationary versus non-stationary 
alternatives under the assumption of a constant discount rate. It has been known since the early 
work on dividends by Lintner (1956) that managers set dividends in relation to permanent rather 
than realised earnings. This means that if dividends are smoothed in this way the dividend series 
will be autocoffelatcd. This implies that even small changes in the current dividend can cause 
considerable changes in the total value of dividends payable, and therefore large changes in the 
current share price. However, the perfect foresight price p, * is calculated from the ex-post 
dividend series, in which case there is no uncertainty about whether dividend changes were long 
or short lived. 
9. The price series p, is autocorrelated because it is the weighted sum of future dividends which is itself a series which is autocoffelated. p: is 
autocorrelated because it is a weighted average of both the weighted sum of dividends and the a weighted sum of future prices. p: Is 
therefore more autocorrelated than p, and will correspondingly be more downwards biased. 
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To illustrate this criticism, Shiller argues that a decline in dividends at the time of the 
1929 crash were short lived and could therefore not account for the large fall in share prices 
which took place at this time. This assumes that investors knew that dividends declines would 
not persist. Since investors in 1929 did not have this foresight violent changes in prices 
experienced at that time can not be assumed to be excessively volatile. 
Tonks and Bulkley (1989) model the persistence of changes in the dividend series by 
respecifying the way in which p, * is calculated. Allowing each observation of pt* to reflect even 
small dividend changes. Although, the results of Bulkley and Tonks provide confirmation of 
excessive volatility the extent of the breach is far less pronounced than the one reported by 
Shiller. Although, it should also be noted that Bulkley and Tonks tested a different market so 
their results may reflect the fact that the UK market is less volatile anyway. 
3.3.1.2 Second Generation Tests 
Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985) developed an alternative test which is both unbiased 
in small samples and overcomes the problem of non-stationarity. The Mankiw et al test assumes 
that a naive forecast of the fundamental stream p, * exists and is naive because it only utilises 
past dividend information. Let us call this pO. The difference between the perfect foresight price, 
p* and the naive forecast pO must be equal to 
0 (pt - pl) + (pt - pt 
Squaring both sides then taking expectations provides 
Et(p *_ po)2 =El(p 
*_ 
pt)2 + Et (pt _p 
0)2 (3.12) 
tttI 
which implies the following inequalities, centred around the naive forecast rather than the mean. 
Et(p*_PO)2 ýý Et(p *_ pt)2 
ttt 
Et(p* _ po)2 >Et(pt _p 
0)2 
ttt 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
The first inequality requires that the forecast error of the naive forecast must be larger 
than the error of actual market prices. The second inequality says that the variation in the 
fundamental price around a naive forecast must be greater than the variation in actual prices 
around a naive forecast. Neither of these conditions depend on the dividend process being 
stationary. A later paper by Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1989) defines the distributional 
properties of this test and finds that the variance bounds which are set out in equation (3.13) 
and (3.14) are only marginally violated. 
The variance bounds tests are a joint hypothesis of market efficiency and the hypothesis 
that fundamental stock prices are determined by the constant discount dividend valuation model. 
Time variation in discount rates may cause the variance bounds conditions to be rejected even 
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if markets are efficient. This follows because changes in the discount rate will cause the 
discounted value of expected dividends to fluctuate even when the raw dividend series itself is 
constant. This means that if discount rates are assumed to be constant when they are really time 
varying then prices will fluctuate in response to changes in the value of discounted dividends 
but this will not be reflected in the series p:. Mankiw et al (1989) test a time varying discount 
rate model and find that allowing for time varying discount rates increases the volatility of the 
ex-post rational price series substantially. 
Given the wealth of evidence which now exists to suggest that discount rates are time 
varying, which will be discussed in Chapter 7 and 8 it is not clear how results from the variance 
bounds tests should be interpreted. Certainly, it can no longer be claimed that the violation of 
the variance bounds relationship provides evidence of market inefficiency. Violation of the 
variance bounds relationship can only suggest that stock prices are more volatile than would be 
suggested by an efficient market where discount rates are assumed to be constant, which as 
Chapter 7 and 8 will indicate, is an unrealistic assumption. 
3.3.2 The Overreaction Hypothesis 
Although the variance bounds tests which were discussed in the previous section indicated 
that perhaps, stock prices overreacted to new information, these tests did reveal whether it was 
possible to make money from the overreaction. It was not until the work of DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985,1987) that it was demonstrated that a trading rule could successfully exploit the 
overreaction of share prices. Their empirical work has subsequently spawned a branch of the 
market efficiency literature concerned with testing the so called "overreaction hypothesis"10. 
Essentially, the overreaction hypothesis demonstrates that securities which are extreme 
losers in one period, that is those which are characterised by exceptionally bad performance, 
become extreme winners in subsequent periods and vice versa. The overreaction literature, has 
shown that a contrarian strategy, where winners are sold short, to finance the purchase of losers 
typically provides substantial abnormal profits. DeBondt and Thaler (1989) argued that the 
power of overreaction tests is stronger than most other weak form tests of market efficiency. 
This stems from the fact that overreaction tests concentrate on examining periods when some 
nik abnormal behaviour is most likely to take place, calm periods, where little news is released, are 
generally ignored. 
An overreaction effect is usually tested for in the following way. Initially the performance 
of securities is measured over a period, usually no more than a couple of years. On the basis of 
this performance stocks are then ranked. Securities are then grouped according to whether they 
1O. There is also evidence of a short-run overreaction effect, see for example Lehmann (1990). 
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are winners or losers, from these groups portfolios are created which consist of the extreme 
winners and losers. " In subsequent periods, the portfolio returns of the winners and losers are 
then compared. DeBondt and Thaler find that over a five year period their loser companies 
outperform their winners by almost 32% suggesting that it is possible to make money from the 
overreaction. 
Transaction costs can not reduce the high performance of the loser portfolio because they 
will be very small for a contrarian strategy such as the one outlined by DeBondt and Thaler. 
Their results indicate that the difference between the performance of the loser and the winner 
portfolios peaks after five years. This suggests that profits from the contrarian strategy are 
maximised if the loser portfolio is purchased and held for about five years, a strategy which 
would incur only very small transaction costs. DeBondt and Thaler argue that differences in 
risk can not account for the relative performance of the two portfolios since the average beta of 
the winner is slightly higher than the average beta for the loser portfolio. However, their results 
are based on the testing of ajoint hypothesis because the Capital Asset Pricing Model is assumed 
to be the equilibrium model of returns. 
The evidence presented by DeBondt and Thaler has not gone unchallenged. One criticism 
concerns the role of the January effect 12 in explaining the overreaction results. DeBondt and 
Thaler found that up to 84% of the discrepancy between winners and losers comes from the 
behaviour of returns in January, furthermore, return reversals continue to be important up to 
five Januaries after the portfolio formation data. Because, of the strong performance of losers 
in January it is clearly important to rule out that the overreaction effect is no more than an 
alternative way of capturing the January effect. Despite this close association, it is not obvious 
that a strong overreaction effect in January is merely further evidence of the January effect or 
the small firm anomaly. January is the month in which the most corporate earnings information 
is announced because firms tend to have tax years which coincide with the calendar year. If 
investors are going to revise expectations about the performance of a company then these 
revisions are most likely to take place in January because there is an abundance of new 
information during this month. An overreaction in January is therefore very likely for reasons 
which may or may not be associated with tax loss trading. 
Other critics such as Zarowin (1989,1990,199 1) believe that the overreaction effect is 
no more than another manifestation of the small firm effect. Since loser firms tend to be smaller 
than the winners, if small firms outperform large firms then losers will outperform winners even 
if there is no overreaction taking place. Although, DeBondt and Thaler (1989) accept that losers 
II. Studies concentrate on extreme performances in the formation period because these securities will be the ones investors are most likely to 
over-react to. 
12. The January effect describes the calendar regularity which finds that stock prices appear to be persistently higher in January than in other 
months of the year. The January effect will be discussed in detail in section 4 of this chapter. 
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are smaller than winners they dispute that there is not also an independent loser effect. When 
they form portfolios which are ranked on the basis of size and compare the return performance 
of these with the portfolios which were created on the basis of performance they find that the 
portfolio containing the smallest firms never outperforms the portfolio containing the loser firms, 
which indicates that even when loser companies are not small, losers outperform winners. 
This conclusion is contradicted by Zarowin (1989) who matches firms which have similar 
capitalisations but disparate earnings profiles, and in a second exercise matches firms which 
have similar earnings profiles irrespective of capitalisation value. To support stock market 
overreaction Zarowin argues that we would expect significant return differences between the 
portfolios matched by size but insignificant return differences between the portfolio matched 
by earnings. Verification of the importance of firm. size is found to exist because when poor 
earners are matched with good arrears of similar capitalisation values there is little evidence of 
differential performance. 
Zarowin (1990) continues to provide evidence of the link between firm size and 
overreaction. In this third paper portfolios are again matched by market capitalisation, but this 
time two sub-periods are examined. The first is a sub-period when winners are larger than losers. 
In the second sub-period winners are smaller than losers. It is found that when losers are smaller 
than winners, in the portfolio formation period, they subsequently outperform the winner 
portfolio. However, if losers are bigger than winners in the portfolio formation period then they 
do not outperform winners in subsequent months. This is a serious criticism of the overreaction 
papers because it implies that overreaction, rather than being a new discovery is capturing the 
same empirical patterns which had been discovered previously in tests of the small firm effect 
such as those of B anz ( 198 1) and of those which investigate tax loss trading, for example, Roll 
(198 1) and Ritter (1988) who found that losers over the previous yearbecame winners in January. 
Vermaelen and Vestringe (1986) test for overreaction on the Belgian stock market, and 
although overreaction is supported, they open up a new line of inquiry by suggesting that the 
superior performance of the loser portfolio can be accounted for by changes in the riskyness of 
the loser portfolio which takes place between the pre and post ranking period. The original work 
undertaken by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) assumed that the beta of a security was the same in 
the period prior and subsequent to the ranking procedure, despite extensive volatility in the 
capitalisation value, gearing and security price which would be experienced between these two 
periods. For example, DeBondt and Thaler find that extreme losers fall in value by 45%, while 
winners rise in value by 365%. Such large changes in the capitalisation value of companies is 
likely to have a pronounced influence over the size of security betas in the post ranking period. 
However, DeBondt and Thaler (1989) are unconvinced by the importance of time varying risk. 
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They find that in the post ranking period the betas of losers are only 0.22 higher than the beta 
of winners which is not enough to explain the difference in the returns of winner and loser 
portfolios. 
DeBondt and Thaler (1987) attempt to cast further doubt on the importance of time 
variation because the betas of the loser portfolio appear to be smaller than the betas of winners 
when markets are falling but larger than the betas of winners when markets are rising. This 
seems to suggest that time variation can not explain divergences in the performance of winner 
and loser portfolios because loser portfolios should be more risky in down markets if time 
variation is to explain their better performance in subsequent periods. 
Chan (1988) also investigates the role of time varying betas and provides further support 
for the winner loser effect being an artifact of beta non-stationarity. Chan finds that at the 
beginning of the ranking period winners have larger betas than losers, but losers become riskier 
than winners after portfolio formation. The difference between the beta of losers and winners 
in this later period was found to be 0.453 and therefore substantial, but still not large enough to 
explain fully the overreaction effect. 
Ball and Kothari (1989) also provide support forthe notion that inappropriate calculations 
of systematic risk fail to capture changes in equilibrium required returns. They show that when 
betas are estimated using annual returns the betas of the extreme losers are higher than the betas 
of the winners by 0.76, with a market risk premium of 14-15% this implies that only 3% of the 
overreaction effect is left unexplained. However, as we know from discussions of the intervalling 
effect, undertaken in Chapter 2, the return interval which is used to calculate betas influences 
the magnitude of beta itself. But, we have no guidance as to whether a short or a long interval 
is preferred, therefore, we do not know whether it is DeBondt and Thaler or Ball and Kothari 
that use the appropriate return interval. 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) suggest that papers such as those of DeBondt and Thaler which 
have tested for an overreaction effect, over a long period of time have; possibly provided biased 
estimates regarding the extent to which markets overreact. They argue that short horizon returns 
are upwardly biased (see for example, Blume and Stambaugh (1983) or Roll (1984)). Conrad 
and Kaul (1993) show that measurement errors in observed prices due to bid-ask errors and 
non-synchronous trading, introduce spurious returns in long horizon investment strategies when 
long term returns are calculated as the cumulation of a series of short-term returns. If this is 
done, the cumulated long-term return also accumulates the measurement error, which becomes 
substantial over long horizons ". Conrad and Kaul demonstrate that over long horizons the 
performance of previous losers is overstated which gives rise to the overreaction effect. 
13. This bias is a problem in any study which cumulates abnormal returns and therefore applies to event study work also. 
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Recently, Stroyny and DeBondt (1994) have considered the role that heteroscedastic 
disturbances might have on the estimation of betas. They argue that fan shaped heteroscedasticity 
biases estimates of beta when betas and the sample mean are simultaneously determined. This 
happens because if a disturbance is large and positive (negative), it results in too strong an 
upward (downward) influence on both the estimated slope of the regression (the beta) and the 
sample mean. As a result positive errors in the mean occur along with positive (negative) errors 
in the slope (beta). Furthermore, Stroyny and DeBondt argue that some of the beta changes 
which are observed between pre and post ranking periods are caused by rank period estimates 
being biased, using simulation techniques they find that Chan (1988) overstates differences in 
the risk premium between the pre and post ranking period by up to 40%. 
3.3.3 Mean Reversion 
The concluding discussion of market volatility will be concerned with reviewing the 
mean-reversion 14 literature, which was introduced by Summers (1986). The contribution of the 
mean-reversion literature is two fold. Firstly, it documents that long-horizon stock returns 15are 
negatively autocoffelated. For example, Fama and French (1988) undertake long-horizon 
autocoffelation tests and find that up to 45% of the variation in five year returns can be explained 
by the previous five year return. However, the mean-reversion literature is also important because 
it formally explains why transitory components can introduce negative autocoffelation into 
long-horizon returns, and why this negative autocorrelation can explain such a large proportion 
of the variation in long-horizon returns, even though, in short-horizon returns predictable 
components go largely undetected. 
Mean-reversion requires that stock prices are driven by both random and stationary 
components. The stationary component introduces negative autocorrelation, but because it is 
slowly decaying, traditional short-horizon autocoffelation tests are dominated by the effect of 
the random component. In which case the predictability introduced by the mean reverting 
component goes undetected. In long-horizon tests, the effect of the stationary component, 
because it is slowly decaying, begins to swamp the random component and can therefore be 
detected. 
Summers (1986) demonstrates that typical tests of market predictability, such as 
autocorrelation tests have low power in detecting departures from randomness, when stock prices 
contain both a transitory and a random component. Summers is able to show that even when 
observed prices deviate from fundamentals by as much as 30%, tests of weak form market 
14. A stock price can be above or below its fundamental value. If a stock price is mean reverting then it is not at its fundamental value but is 
reverting towards its fundamental value. 
15. As a rule of thumb long-horizon returns refer to return horizons of approximately one year or more. 
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efficiency can still fail to reject the null that stock prices are random 50% of the time. This was 
obviously an important finding because it drew attention to the possibility that previous tests, 
such as those which were discussed in Section 3.2, had failed to find evidence of market 
predictability not because markets were unpredictable but because the tests previously used had 
very lower power. 
Fama and French (1988) provide a comprehensive proof of why it is that traditional 
autocoffelation tests have such a low power. They consider a model where the logarithm of 
stock prices p, contains both a random walk q, and a stationary component z, as follows, 
p, =q, +zt 
where u is a drift term, and n, is a white noise process. 
The continuously compounded return from t to T is 
t+T '* r "': A+T-A 
which can be written as the sum of the change in the random component, and the 
change in the stationary component as follows, 
r, 
+T ý (q, +T- q) + 
(Zt 
+T- Zt) 
q,: --q, -, +u +n, 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
(3.18) 
The T period autocoffelation coefficient for changes in z, can be written as follows, 
PT 
CY(Zt +T- Zt5 Zt - Zt - T) 
(3.19) 
(Y (Zt +T- Zt) 
As Appendix 3 shows, stationarity of z, implies that the numerator of equation (3.19) 
will approach --(y2(z) as T increases. Meanwhile, as Appendix 4 demonstrates, stationarity of z, 
implies that as T increases the denominator of equation (3.19) approaches 2(j2(z). 
For large T this iMPlies that the slope of the regressionof Zt+T- z, on zt- Zt -Tapproaches 
--(Y'(z)/2(y2(Z) that is -0.5 for large T. Within this framework it is now possible to see why it is 
difficult to capture autocorrelation of returns in conventional tests, when returns contain a slowly 
decaying stationary component. 
If z, is an AR(l) process then, as Appendix 5 shows, the T period ahead forecast of z, is 
T E, (zt+ T) zt (3.20) 
If z, is an AR(l) process the expected change from t to T as Appendix 5 also demonstrates, 
is equal to 
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Et(Zt 
+T - Zt) = 
OT - lZt. (3.21) 
This means that the slope of the regression between E, (z, +T -Zt9Zt -Zt-T) is equal to minus the 
ratio of the variance of the expected change in z, to the variance of the actual change, as shown 
in equation (3.22), a derivation of which is provided in Appendix 6. 
PZ = 
-CýlEt(ZI Zt)l (3.22) 
a (Z) 
where P, is the slope of a regresssion between and El(z, +T - 
Zt)Zt - 
-a2[Et(Zt +T- ZM is the variance of the expected change in z, and 
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variance of the actual change in z,. 
This means that when 0 is close to 1.0, the expected change in an AR(l) process slowly 
approaches -z, as T increases, and the process is said to be stationary but slowly decaying. For 
short horizons therefore, the slope of Oz is close to 0.0 but slowly approaches -0.5 as the return 
interval increases. Since it is not possible to observe z, it is necessary to infer its properties from 
the behaviour of returns. lf OT is the slope of the regression of the return r, +Ton r', if changes 
in the random and stationary components are uncorrelated then the slope of the regression of 
r, +Ton r, as Appendix 7 demonstrates is 
PT = 
_. (ý2 [Et(zt+ T- Zt)l (3.23) 
(y2(rt ) 
PTtherefore measures the proportion of the variance of T period returns explained by 
the mean-reversion of a slowly decaying stationary component z, If stock prices do not have a 
stationary component, the slopes PTare 0.0 for all T. If stock prices do not have a random 
component but do have the slowly decaying stationary component z, PT: -- PT and the slopes 
approach -0.5 for large values of T. 
If stock prices contain both a random and a stationary component, then mean-reversion 
of the stationary component tends to push the slopesPT to-0.5 for long-horizon returns, while 
the variance of the white noise component pushes the slopeOf PTtowards zero. Since the variance 
Of Zt+T- z, approaches 2(y2(z) as the return horizon., increases and the white noise variance grows 
with T, the white noise component eventually dominates when T is very large. Thus, if stock 
prices have both random and slowly decaying stationary components, the slopes of the regression 
of r, +Ton r, might 
be U shaped starting about 0.0 for short horizons becoming more negative 
as T increases then moving back towards 0.0 as the white noise variance begins to dominate 
over very long horizons. 
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Empirical support for long-horizon mean-reversion was provided by Fama and French 
(1988) who estimate long-horizon return regressions for return horizons of I through to 10years. 
These regressions are estimated for both the value-weighted and equal-weighted CRSP indexes 
16 
, for portfolios of stocks formed according to capitalisation value and industry classification 
as well as for individual stocks. Fama and French find evidence of aU shaped pattern in the 0, 
estimates consistent with the Summers (1986) model of mean-reversion. Their estimates suggest 
a mean reverting component in stock prices which can account for up to 30% of the variation 
in three year returns, and up to 45% of the time variation in five year returns. 
As the small sample propertiesof PTare not known, Fama and French use Monte Carlo 
simulation to determine the statistical significance of their results. Their simulation results 
suggest that for the three and five year returns estimates of PTare more than two standard 
deviations from zero and therefore statistically significant. 
Interestingly, Fama and French also discover that the magnitude and persistence of the 
mean reverting component is associated with firm size. Fama and French report that for the 
small firms they investigate the effect of the stationary component takes five years to maximise 
the effect it has on the predictability of realised returns. But, for the largest firms the stationary 
component reaches its peak after only three years. Meanwhile, in the case of small firms the 
mean reverting component is able to explain a greater proportion of the variation in realised 
returns than is the case for the large firms. Although Fama and French document this empirical 
finding, they do not suggest what might be causing the difference in the behaviour of the large 
and small firms. 
From a comparison of the patterns for individual stocks and portfolio returns, Fama and 
French conclude that the mean reverting component is likely to be due to a common factor 
experienced by all stocks rather than being a firm specific component of returns, which they 
argue is consistent with a time varying expected return that is autocoffelated. This argument is 
consistent with predictable components in long horizon returns because a change in expected 
returns today must cause a change in the rate at which future dividends must be discounted. In 
which case, current dividend changes, must cause an offsetting price movement 17 . If expected 
returns are time varying, and autocorrelated, then a change in expected returns today will predict 
an offsetting change in prices in the future (when required returns change). Share prices will 
therefore contain predictable components which will be understated in a constant discount rate 
model. 
16. The CRSP (Centre for Research in Security Prices) is compiled by Chicago Business School, the index consists of all stocks listed on the 
New York Stock Exchnage (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). 
17.1f required returns rise then the share price must fall and vice versa. 
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3.3.3.1 Variance Ratios 
An alternative test which is capable of detecting autocorrelation patterns in either long 
or short-horizon returns is the variance ratio test, which was derived by Cochrane (1988) and 
applied to financial data by Poterba and Summers (1988) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988). 
The simplest variance ratio test is a test of the null hypothesis that prices follow a random 
walk. If stock prices follow a random walk with drift then, 
In(p, + D) = In(p, -I+u+e, 
) 
et -IID (0, (T) 
(3.24) 
where p, is the share price in time t, D, are the dividends paid in time t, u is the drift, and et is 
a white noise error. 
In this case returns, r, are 
r, = In(p, + D) - In(p, - 1) 
(3.25) 
Because innovations in a random walk are independent, the variance of a random walk 
process grows linearly with the differencing interval. This implies that if log prices are a random 
walk then the variance of [ln(p, ) - ln(p, - T)Igrows 
linearly with T and (72[ln(p, ) - ln(p, - 
A= T(T2. 
However, if log prices are not a random walk but are instead a stationary process then as shown 
in the previous section, the variance of [ln(p, ) - ln(p, - 
A approaches a constant, which is twice 
the variance of the series (y2[ln(p, ) - ln(p, - T)I= 
2cý. 
These properties are utilised by the variance ratio statistic, VR (T), which can be written 
as follows, 
VR (T) = 
(y2(RT 
t )IT 
(3.26) 
U2 (Rt 12)/ 12 
where 62(Rt T )IT is the average variance of the T period return, and (ý(Rt 12y 12 is the average 
variance of twelve month returns. 
If stock prices are random then the variance of returns will be proportional to the return 
horizon for all T. In this case equation (3.26) will have a variance ratio equal to I so that 
(Y 2 (R, T )IT = (Y2(R, 
12)/12 (3.27) 
But, if any of the price changes over T periods are due to the influence of a negatively 
autocorrelated transitory component, then as Section 3.3.2 demonstrated autocorrelations at 
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some lags must be negatively autocorrelated. In this case if any of the T period changes are due 
to the influence of a transitory component then Cy2 (Rt 
T) 
will grow at a rate less than (:; 
2 (Rt 12) in 
which case 
(y2 (R tT )IT < (ý(R tl2)/12 (3.28) 
Consequently, the variance ratio statistic will be less than one if there are negatively 
autocorrelated transitory components but greater than one when there are positively 
autocorrelated transitory components. 
Empirical work on mean-reversion which utilises the variance ratio statistic has been 
undertaken by Poterba and Summers (1988) who estimate variance ratio statistics for the US 
and 18 other countries. Their results suggest that stock prices display substantial mean reverting 
tendencies. In the US, stock prices exhibit positive autocoffelation at return intervals of less 
than a year, and negative autocoffelation over longer horizons. Consistent with the results of 
Fama and French (1988) Poterba and Summers finds that for long-horizon returns, a mean 
reverting component in stock prices appears to explain a sizeable proportion of the variation in 
returns. The evidence for indexes tested in a range of other countries including the UK also 
broadly supports mean-reversion. 
Because the variance ratio test appears to have much stronger power in detecting 
autocorrelation Lo and MacKinlay (1988) reconsider the predictability of short-horizon returns 
using the variance ratio statistic. The contribution made by Lo and MacKinlay is that they derive 
the following approximations which allow them to use overlapping data and take advantage of 
the technical improvements which are associated with large samples. 
Assume that po, p 1, .... p,, is a series of stock prices, the first difference (when p is sampled 
weekly, monthly or annually etc) has an unknown mean u and variance a2but these can be 
estimated with maximum likelihood as follows 
12 (3.29) 
u =- I n(Pk-Pk-1) 2nk =I 
&2 
2n 
2 (3.30) 
aI 
(Pk - Pk -I 2nk=l 
21- 2U^) 2 (yb -- -I (Pk - P2, k -2 2nk=l 
where u^ is the maximum likelihood estimator of the unknown u, (^T' - is the 
maximum likelihood estimator of (Y', and kis also an estimator of 62 , but where 
stock prices are sampled biweekly bi-monthly or bi-annually. 
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The general formulation for the variance of the qhdifferenced stock price series is given 
by 
^2 nq 2 
(yb-(q) I (Pk - Pk -q - qU^) nqk=q 
(3.32) 
A2 
where&bnow becomes a function of q which is the differencing period. Under the null hypothesis 
&2 
of a Gaussian random walk aand 
&b2(q) will be close in value, so a test statistic for a random 
walk is given by some measure of the difference between the two. 
Such a measure, [&b(q)1&! ] - 1, is constructed by Lo and MacKinlay (1988,1989) as a 
variation on the variance ratio test proposed by Cochrane. They then go on to define a statistic 
which is able to utilise overlapping returns. A new estimator of u2is described as 
&2 (q) =I 
nq 
-q ul) 
2 (3.33) 
c21 
(Pk 
-Pk-q 
nq k=q 
in which case the variance ratio statistic becomes 
&, 2(q) (3.34) 
VR(q)=- 1 &2 
In the Lo and MacKinlay test, if the variance ratio statistic is negative then negative 
autocorrelation is implied, if the variance ratio statistic is positive then positive autocorrelation 
is implied. 
Autocoffelation tests based on the variance ratio test are conducted by Lo and MacKinlay 
on both individual security returns and portfolio returns which utilise overlapping observations. 
For individual stocks they find that weekly returns are negatively autocorrelated, but 
insignificantly so. In contrast, for portfolios strong positive autocorrelation is discovered. For 
example, when portfolios are formed on the basis of market capitalisation it is found that for 
the portfolio containing the smallest firms positive autocorrelation in the order of 42% was 
documented but for the largest firms the positive autocorrelation was found to be 14% which 
provides results comparable to studies which have used simple autocorrelation tests. 
Surprisingly, Lo and MacKinlay dismiss the possibility that thin trading can account for 
the high positive autocorrelation in the short-horizon returns, which is found for the portfolios. 
Instead, they suggest that portfolio returns of well diversified portfolios contain transitory 
components and therefore suggest that perhaps the autocorrelation reflects market inefficiency. 
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A substantial amount of UK evidence also exists to suggest that UK stock prices are 
mean reverting. Fraser and Power (1993), examine persistence in the excess returns, of ten 
investment trust shares, over the period 1970-1989. The key findings are that the excess returns 
appear to have a predictable component because the variance ratios for return intervals of between 
2 to 60 months have dissimilar patterns. For return horizons of less than 24 months there is a 
tendency towards the variance ratios being greater than one, indicating positive autocorrelation 
in returns. Meanwhile, for return intervals greater than this the variance ratios were all less than 
one indicative of negative autocorrelation. 
In an alternative paper which tests for predictability in UK stock returns MacDonald and 
Power (1993) investigate the autocorrelation properties of ten UK size based portfolios using 
the variance ratio approach and find that short-horizon returns are significantly autocorrelated, 
although like Fama and French (1988), the strength of the positive autocorrelation appeared to 
be related to firms size. However, the study by MacDonald and Power can be criticised because 
each portfolio only contains ten securities and does not therefore reflect a fully diversified 
portfolio ". 
Although, the variance ratio test, because of its stronger power, has been useful in 
identifying autocorrelation, it is difficult to assess how important short-horizon variance ratio 
tests are as tests of market efficiency. As we saw in Chapter 2, there are a number of reasons 
why we would expect short-horizon, portfolio returns to be positively autocorrelated. But, the 
variance ratio test does not allow us to identify whether there is predictability greater than that 
introduced by such considerations, the variance ratio test can not therefore be used to reject 
stock market efficiency only to confirm its existence. 
The most important criticisms of the mean-reversion literature has been directed at 
questioning the empirical assumptions which have underpined the tests. Kim, Nelson and Startz 
(1991), for example, question the true significance of the mean-reversion studies. They 
re-calculate the mean-reversion test statistics on sub-samples provided by Poterba and Summers 
and Fama and French and find that the statistical evidence provided by Fama and French is 
generated by data from the 1930s. Using an alternative procedure to Monte Carlo simulation 
called randomisation stratification '9 they find that the standard error estimates used in 
mean-reversion studies are understated, consequently, mean-reversion can only be supported at 
a 60% significance level. 
IS. Steeley (1995) has demonstrated that as more securities are added to a portfolio the predictability of the portfolio increases because of 
serial diversification. 
19. Random stratification involves taking the population of a group and splitting it into sub-groups 
from which to estimate parameters. The 
advantage of random stratification 
is that estimates may be both more efficient and less biased. 
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Nelson and Kim (1990) discuss two important sources of bias which may have introduced 
spurious statistical significance into mean-reversion tests. Long-horizon estimates require the 
use of overlapping observations. The use of overlapping returns, introduces positive 
autocorrelation, and autocorrelated data may have produced an upwardly biased estimate of R2. 
Autocorrelated errors may have also biased t statistics, and although the studies corrected for 
autocorrelation the properties of the t statistics are not well known. 
Kim and Nelson also argue that the coefficient associated with a lagged dependant 
variable, is biased towards zero in small samples. In mean-reversion tests the bias has the potential 
to create the illusion that prices are mean reverting when they are really unpredictable. Because 
the bias is stronger in small samples, long-horizon tests will be the most biased and will appear 
to be more mean reverting than short-horizon tests. Kim and Nelson find that for return horizons 
of ten years over 20% of the apparent variation in stock returns seems to be caused by bias, 
which would mean that over half of the apparent predictability in ten year returns can be explained 
by the bias. 
In conclusion, this section has studied a number of the most recent studies which have 
suggested that stock markets over-react to new information. The results of these tests have been 
interpreted by many as finally providing clear cut evidence of stock market inefficiency. 
Although, as this section has argued, rational explanations and weaknesses in the test procedures 
can also explain these findings. 
3.4 Anomalies 
Market anomalies can be described as unexplainable return regularities, which make 
stock returns predictable. There are two anomalies '0 which will be discussed in depth in this 
section because they are particularly important for the empirical work which is to be presented 
in later chapters of this study. The first part of this section will be concerned with the so called 
calendar regularities which indicate that stock returns over different calendar periods are 
predictable. The second part of this section will be concerned with the so called small firm effect 
which recounts the fact that even after adjusting for differences in systematic risk, small firms 
appear to provide a premium over large firms. A third anomaly will also be discussed ie the 
earnings anomaly. This anomaly is not directly relevant for this thesis but it may be of interest 
to provide some background information concerning this topic because the earnings anomaly 
has been closely linked to the size effect. 
20. Other anomalies which have been identified but will not be discussed here are the price earnings anomaly and the dividend yield 
anomaly. The price earnings ratio anomaly suggests that even after adjusting for systematic risk companies with high price earnings ratios 
earn risk adjusted premiums. The dividend yield anomaly indicates that companies with high dividend yields also earn risk adjusted 
premiums. Since this study will focus on the calendar and size effects only these anomalies will be discussed. 
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Although, much of the work which documents the anomalies has been conducted on US data, 
we are becoming increasingly aware of similar patterns in other major markets such as the UK, 
which appears to rule out data snooping " as a potential cause of the regularities. 
3.4.1 The January Effect 
The January effect describes the empirical observation that stock returns appear to be 
higher in January than in other months of the year. The January effect was first observed by 
Watchel (1942) and was investigated more fully by Rozeoff and Kinney (1976) who found that 
returns to an equally-weighted portfolio tended to be higher in the month of January than in 
other months. Another dimension to the January effect indicates that a substantial proportion of 
the January effect was caused by the performance of small firms, see for example, Ikenberry 
and Lakonishok (1989) who found that over the period 1926-1986 small firms outperformed 
large firms in the month of January by about 5.5%. Furthermore, out of the 71 years which were 
investigated in this study small firms have only underperformed large firms in 6 of the Januaries. 
An excellent summary. of the issues involved with the January effect are provided by Haugen 
and Lakonishok (1990). Although, we have known about the January effect for some time, there 
still exists an exiting lack of consensus regarding its causation as we shall see in the following 
sections. 
3.4.1.1 Tax Loss Trading 
An explanation for the January effect is provided by Keirn and Roll (1982) who link the 
superior performance of firms inJanuary totaxloss trading. Taxloss sellingexists wheninvestors 
sell stocks before the start of the new tax year, if they have declined in value over the preceding 
year. This ensures that capital losses are realised so that capital gains tax is minimised. As loser 
stocks are offloaded onto the market additional price depreciations may take place, induced by 
excessive selling pressure. At the beginning of the new tax year as portfolios are re-balanced, 
buying pressure pushes up prices creating a January price rise which is most obvious during the 
first few trading days of January. Ritter (1985) has provided empirical support for tax loss trading 
in the US because he finds that buy/sell ratios tend to be higher in January but lower in December. 
Reinganurn (1983) also supports the tax loss trading hypothesis because an empirical link 
between firm size, the January premium and tax loss trading is discovered. Reinganum. reports 
that firms which depreciate in value by the same amount provide diminishingly higher returns 
in January as firm size increases, indicating that small firms are more influenced by tax loss 
trading than large firms. 
21. Data snooping refers to using the same data set to empirically measure different predictable patterns. If the observed predictability is an 
artifact of the data set used, and can not be replicated on alternative data sets then data snooping may have taken place 
71 
Ritter (1988) explained why tax loss trading influences small firms more than large firms. 
Individual investors have stronger tax loss trading incentives because institutional investors are 
governed by different tax codes. Proportionately, individual investors also own more stocks in 
small companies. The securities of small firms tend to be more volatile, a consequence of this 
is that small stocks are more likely to be tax loss candidates, since they are more likely to have 
declined in value over the previous year. Reinganum (1982) confirms this empirically because 
he finds that 60% of firms which had a depreciating share price over the previous year were to 
be found in the quartile of firms with the lowest capitalisation value. In contrast, less than 10% 
of the firms in the largest quartile experienced significant price declines. 
What appears puzzling in the tax loss literature is why shareholders wait until December 
to sell off their badly performing shares and why non tax paying investors do not pick up the 
bargain shares before the start of January. These are important questions which have not yet 
been answered by those who promote tax loss trading as a rational explanation for the turn of 
the year effect. 
If the January regularities are caused only by tax loss selling, countries with tax years 
which do not start in January should experience a regularity at the start of their tax year, but not 
in January. Meanwhile, countries that do not tax capital gains should not experience a new tax 
year rally whatsoever. In which case, the UK, with an April/March tax year should experience 
an April seasonality. Australia with a July/June tax year should experience a July seasonal but, 
in Japan, where capital gains are not taxed, no seasonal should be observed at the start of its tax 
year. An examination of average monthly returns in countries with different tax years provides 
little support for the January effect having been only caused by tax loss trading. Kato and 
Shallheim (1985) provide evidence of high January and June returns in Japan despite the lack 
of incentiveto undertaketax losstrading. InAustraliaas Brown etal (1983) discover itis January 
returns which appear to be abnormally high not July returns. Finally, seasonalities in the UK 
market can not be explained completely by resorting to the tax loss trading explanation. The 
UK market is characterised by a January return which is substantially higher than the April 
regularity, see for example Levis (1985). The pattern of monthly returns in these countries does 
not appear to be consistent with the January effect, unless we assume that foreign investors are 
exerting sufficient pressure on domestic markets to introduce a January effect. 
3.4.1.2 Return Seasonality and the Pricing of Risk 
Although, the tax loss trading explanation is the one that has received most of the 
attention, an attempt has been made by Tinic and West (1984) to link the January effect to the 
pricing of systematic risk. Tinic and West repeat the CAPM tests originally undertaken by Fama 
and MacBeth (1973), but organise the tests into two groups. The first group tests CAPM only 
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in the month of January, the second group tests CAPM using observations for the other eleven 
months of the year. Tinic and West find that the positive relationship between systematic risk 
and return which is found by Fama and MacBeth is caused by the dominating influence of 
January. For the eleven months of the year other than January no relationship between systematic 
risk and return was found to exist. This appears to indicate that the January premium in the US 
can be linked to the provision of a systematic risk premium. 
Similarly, when Corhay, Hawawini and Michel (1987) undertake similar tests for the 
UK, no relationship between systematic risk and return was found to exist for any month other 
than April. It appears that in the UK systematic risk is only ever priced during the month of 
April. The work of Tinic and West and Corhay et al shifts the monthly regularities from being 
a return anomaly to be an equally puzzling risk anomaly. Chapter 6 will attempt to shed some 
light on this puzzle. 
3.4.1.3 Day of the Week Effects 
Not only are expected returns different across the months of the year, they also appear 
to be different across the days of the week. Cross (1973) was the first to discover that the US 
stock market appeared to be characterised by day of the week effects since the Standard and 
Poor appeared to rise on Fridays but not on Mondays. In a later paper French (1980) found that 
average returns on a Monday were negative and statistically different to average returns during 
other days of the week. Meanwhile, returns on a Wednesday and a Friday were found to be 
significantly higher than returns on a Tuesday or Thursday. Similar results were also reported 
by Keim and Stambaugh (1984). Data snooping does not appear to be the cause of the day of 
the week effects since Lakonishok and Smidt (1985) confirm the finding for alternative data 
sets. It should also be noted that Board and Sutcliffe (1988) find evidence of a weekend effect 
for the UK in the FIF all share index over the period 1962 to 1986. This paper is unusual in that 
it actually tests a trading rule based on the weekend effect. Board and Sutcliffe (1988) find that 
by selling short one million pounds worth of shares on a Friday to buy back on a Monday provides 
an average profit before transaction costs of three thousand pounds. Choy and O'Hanlon (1989) 
also find evidence of day of the week effects in the UK. 
Rogalski (1984) argues that the so called weekend effect appears to be linked to both the 
size and the January effect. Rogalski reports that in January, average Monday returns are found 
to be positive, unlike Monday returns in other months. A comparison of average day of the week 
returns for ten capitalisation based portfolios over the period 1963-1982 indicated that a negative 
Monday effect failed to exist except for the smallest firms in the sample. 
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Although, it is clear that returns are not equal across the different days of the week, Harris 
(1986) disputes that this is caused by returns being lower on a Monday. Instead Harris argues 
that the fall in Monday prices may be caused by the behaviour of prices during the weekend, 
and therefore prior to the open of the market on a Monday. Studies which attempt to document 
the weekend effect invariably calculate returns as close to close returns which means it is 
impossible to gauge whether the weekend effect takes place before the market opens or after it 
opens. To clarify when the weekend effect takes place Harris calculates day of the week returns 
for ten equal-weighted capitalisation based portfolios for securities quoted on the New York 
Stock Exchange. Two sets of portfolio returns are compared, returns which are calculated from 
open to close prices and those which are calculated from close to open prices. The comparisons 
of the two sets of returns revealed that the Monday negative return was much stronger for large 
firms when returns were calculated from close to open prices but was larger for small firms 
when returns were calculated from open to close prices. This indicated that for large firms the 
Monday negative accrued before Monday trades began but for small firms the Monday negative 
accrued after the start of Monday trading. 
3.4.2 The Small Firm Effect 
The previous section demonstrated that returns appear to be predictable in certain calendar 
periods. An equally puzzling anomaly is the small firm effect, which recounts the fact that after 
accounting for systematic risk small firms appear to significantly outperform large firms. Work 
on the small firm effect was pioneered by Banz (1979) who found that over the period 1936-1975 
a portfolio of the smallest securities in the sample outperformed the Standard and Poor index 
by an average 8.4% a year, even after adjustments for differences in systematic risk had been 
made. Even more striking evidence of a size effect was provided by Reinganurn (1981,1982) 
who found that the difference between the return to a portfolio of small and large companies 
was as high as 30%. 
An interesting facet of the small firm effect is that the small firm premium varies 
significantly across the various months of the year. Work undertaken by Keim (1983) And Roll 
(1983) indicates that approximately half of the small firm premium accrues during the first five 
trading days of January. While, Reinganum (1982) reports that the difference between aportfolio 
of large and small firms on the first trading day of January is as high as 3%. 
The small firm effect has also been reported for a number of other major exchanges 
around the world, including the London stock exchange. Levis (1985) finds that a portfolio of 
the smallest firms in his sample provides a risk adjusted small firm premium of about 6%. In 
contrast to the US, the UK small firm premium does not appear to be linked to either the turn 
of the year, or the start of the new tax year. Typically, large firms perform better in both of these 
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months. This difference between the behaviour of small firms in the UK and the US is important 
because it might suggest that the underlying causes of the small firm effect in the UK are not 
the same as in the US. 
We do not have to resort to assuming that the market is inefficient to be able to explain 
the small firm effect. Stoll and Whaley (1983) have suggested that the higher transaction costs 
associated with trading small firms can account for the difference in the performance of large 
and small firms. Stoll and Whaley report that the bid-ask spread of small stocks in their sample 
is 2.93% but only 0.69% for large value stocks. Meanwhile, average broker commissions were 
reported to be 3.84% for the smallest firms but only 2.02% for the high valued stocks. 
A number of explanations for the small firm effect consider the possibility that either the 
Capital Asset Pricing model is not the appropriate asset pricing model to use or alternatively 
measurements of systematic risk which are used to estimate a portfolio expected returns are 
biased. A discussion concerning the recent lack of empirical support for the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model was undertaken in Chapter 2 and as we saw Chan (1985) et al find that the small firm 
premium can be explained within the context of an APT framework. 
It has been argued that the small firm effect arises because the betas of small firms tend 
to understate the true risk of small firms. In which case, expected returns of small firms are 
understated and excess returns overstated. In some studies the impact of the thin trading which 
exists is frequently understated which will introduce a bias in favour of finding a small firm 
effect. Levis (1985) for example, uses a three lag aggregate coefficient model to estimate the 
beta for a portfolio of small firms on the London stock market. Levis then appears to be surprised 
that the portfolio of small stocks is less risky than the portfolio of large stocks. In the UK market, 
it is not unusual for the smallest 10% of stocks to fail to trade for 5 or 6 months, considering 
the level of disaggregation that Levis considers (deciles) it seems likely therefore that three lags 
with monthly data is an insufficient ad ustment for thin trading. i 
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) draw attention to the importance of measuring returns 
correctly so that any potential bias in the calculation of returns is minimised. Blume and 
Stambaugh demonstrate that when an equally-weighted portfolio return is calculated there is an 
inherent source of bias caused by the bid-ask spread. For example, if a portfolio is constructed 
one year ago, so that the portfolio contains a large number of stocks. After the construction date, 
whenever the prices of securities within a portfolio change, so that at least some security returns 
are non zero, the portfolio ceases to be an equally-weighted portfolio unless the portfolio weights 
are re-aligned. This is the case because as prices change the weights attatched to each individual 
security must also change. The return from the equally-weighted portfolio is therefore biased 
because an equally-weighted portfolio would require that stocks are traded each period to re-align 
the weights, consequently a bid-ask spread cost would be incurred by investors. 
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Since the bid-ask spread tends to be substantially higher for small stocks, (see the work 
of Stoll and Whaley which was discussed earlier) then the returns of small stocks will be inflated 
relative to the returns of large firms. Blume and Stambaugh find evidence that about 50% of the 
small firm premium is due to this bias. In which case the small firm premium is substantially 
overstated. Fong (1992) tests the small firm premium to buy and hold portfolios (which in this 
case are portfolios which are forced to maintain equal weights) in the UK but finds that the small 
firm premium is about 6% and therefore very similar to the one reported by Levis (1985). 
More recently, the importance of the return intervalling effect has been reecognised in 
a number of studies. Handa, Kothari and Wasley (1989) for example, argue that the size effect 
is sensitive to the length of the return interval used to estimate betas, irrespective of the trading 
frequency of stocks and, the small firm effect becomes statistically insignificant when risk is 
measured using annual returns. 
3.4.3 Earnings Announcements 
Using the event study methodology22 , Ball and Brown (1968) discovered a puzzling 
anomaly associated with earnings announcements. Ball and Brown discovered that companies 
appear to suffer from "post announcement drift", i. e. after an earnings announcement has been 
made, stock returns appear to move in the same direction as the earnings announcement. This 
means that companies which announce good earnings figures appear to experience abnormally 
high returns, after the earnings announcement has been made, contrary to what we would expect 
if a market is semi-strong efficient. Meanwhile, companies which announce bad earnings figures 
appear to experience abnormally bad returns for several months after the earnings announcement. 
A review of the earnings announcement literature by Ball (1978) considers over twenty papers 
which had investigated and found evidence of the post announcement drift phenomenon. 
Watts (1978) studies a sample of U. S. firms during the period 1957-1968 and found that 
there was an average abnormal return of 3.2% following an earnings announcement. Watts 
argued that a trading rule on the basis of this apparent inefficiency would be unprofitable, 
assuming transactions costs of 4%, which was believed by Watts to be appropriate at the time. 
Rendleman, Jones and Latane (1982) showed that the magnitude of the post 
announcement drift appeared to depend on the magnitude of the abnormal earnings 
announcement. That is, firms which have the largest unexpected earnings have the strongest 
post announcement drift. Rendleman et al constructed ten portfolios of stocks for the twenty 
days prior and the ninety days following an earnings announcement. The first portfolio contained 
22. An event study investigates the return performance of a group of companies around the announcement of some information which has 
fundamental relevance. If a market is efficient then share prices should react to the new information on the day the announcement is made 
but on the days after the announcement the returns of the companies should not show signs of abnormal behaviour. 
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the firms which provided the highest unexpected earnings, down to portfolio 5, which contained 
firms with the lowest positive earnings announcement. Portfolio 6 contained firms with the 
lowest negative unexpected earnings, while portfolio 10 contained firms with the largest negative 
unexpected earnings figures. Rendleman et al found that the magnitude of the post announcement 
drift was monotonically associated with the size of the unexpected earnings figures. In this study 
the mean abnormal return of the extreme portfolios, i. e. portfolio I and 10, in the month following 
the earnings announcement was found to be 6%. This suggests that in order to maximise trading 
rule profits based on earnings announcements, investors should restrict the use of their trading 
rule to only firms which announce extreme earnings figures. 
Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) are among many that have subsequently replicated this 
phenomenon and tested a trading rule. Foster et al estimated that over the 60 trading days 
subsequent to an earnings announcement, a long position in stocks with unexpected earnings in 
the highest decile, combined with a short position in stocks in the lowest decile, yielded an 
annualised abnormal return of 25% before transaction costs. 
There are two competing explanations for the existence of post announcement drift. One 
class of explanations suggests that at least some portion of the abnormal performance is due to 
some delay in the way prices react to the new information. This would occur if traders failed to 
assimilate available information or if transactions costs introduced a wedge between the intrinsic 
price and the observed price following the release of new information. 
The transaction costs theory does not appear to be supported, alternative studies have 
shown an immediate price reaction to other types of news, see for example Fama, Fisher, Jensen, 
and Roll (1969) who investigated the reaction of share prices to stock splits. An alternative 
explanation is that estimates of market risk, which have been used are biased, so that abnormal 
returns are understated for firms which announce abnormally high earnings figures, but 
understated for firms which announce abnormally bad earnings figures. This possibility was 
first discussed by Ball (1978) who argued that a number of studies had measured market risk 
inadequately. 
Bernard and Thomas (1990) suggest that there is good reason to suggest that 
misspecification of CAPM might be causing the post announcement drift since there are a vast 
number of studies in existence which suggest that betas are time varying and sensitive to the 
arrival of new information (a detailed review of this literature is undertaken in Chapter 7). For 
example, Ball, Kothari and Watts (1988) suggested that betas shift upward for firms with high 
unexpected earnings and shift down for companies with low unexpected earnings. Assuming 
stationary betas in the post announcement period, under these conditions would give rise to a 
post announcement drift. 
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Bernard and Thomas (1990) attempt to discriminate between the two possible 
explanations. Using betas which are allowed to be time varying they find that risk 
mis-measurement can not explain fully the magnitude of the post announcement drift. Although 
there is extensive documentation regarding the post announcement drift its causations are not 
fully understood and therefore it remains an anomaly. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the most important empirical research which has addressed 
the question of whether stock market prices are predictable or not. Up until the end of the 1970's 
empirical research appeared to indicate that stock prices were unpredictable. The focus of the 
empirical work up until this time had been concerned with testing whether future stock prices 
could be predicted from their past behaviour. This was done chiefly by undertaking 
autocorrelation tests and testing trading rules. Generally the results provided from such tests 
indicated that stock prices were not predictable and therefore consistent with market efficiency. 
In the period from the end of the 1970's onwards it became clear that with the development 
of new, stronger ways of testing for stock price predictability, markets appeared to be far less 
efficient that they had first appeared. One factor which led to this discovery was a move away 
from testing the behaviour of short-horizon returns to long-horizon returns. The empirical work 
which has now been amassed suggests that long-horizon returns are much more predictable than 
short-horizon returns. A theoretical framework for this discovery was provided by the 
mean-reversion literature, which considered how stock returns would behave if prices contained 
transitory components. This literature predicted that long-horizon returns would be substantially 
(negatively) autocorrelated. Although, this was deemed by many to provide evidence of market 
inefficiency a competing explanation for this result is that expected returns are time varying. 
Furthermore recent work has shown that short horizon returns are characterised by time variation 
which appears to be able to explain a substantial amount of the variation in short horizon returns. 
Another important discovery which has put the efficient markets hypothesis under close 
scrutiny has been the discovery of the so called anomalies such as the size effect which has 
suggested that stock returns are more predictable for small firms, while the calendar anomalies 
have suggested that stock returns are characterised by regularities which allow investors to earn 
higher returns during certain periods within a calendar year. 
The findings of the tests, which have been surveyed in this chapter, have placed the 
efficient markets hypothesis close scrutiny. Although these tests are also important because they 
have caused research to focus on alternative, rational explanations for return predictability such 
as microstructure frictions and time variation in expected returns. The possibility that expected 
returns are time varying and autocoffelated so that realised returns are autocoffelated is 
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The findings of the tests, which have been surveyed in this chapter, have placed the 
efficient markets hypothesis close scrutiny. Although these tests are also important because they 
have caused research to focus on alternative, rational explanations for return predictability such 
as microstructure frictions and time variation in expected returns. The possibility that expected 
returns are time varying and autocoffelated so that realised returns are autocoffelated is 
investigated in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 of this study. A recurrent comment about the empirical 
work, which has been discussed in this chapter, is that many tests, which claim to be tests of 
market efficiency are really only tests of price or return predictability which does not necessarily 
in itself imply market inefficiency. 
This chapter is also important because it documents the extent to which the behaviour 
of small firm returns differs from that of large firms. Section 3.4 demonstrated that the returns 
of small firms tend to outperfon'n the returns of large firms but clearly this is not the only 
difference between small and large firms that has been identified. Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988,1990a) has shown that both the serial cross-correlation and the autocorrelation patterns 
of short horizon portfolio returns indicate that the returns of small firms are more predictable 
than the returns of large firms. Conrad and Kaul (1988) and Conrad etal (1991) provide evidence 
to suggest that small firms contain a more predictable component because their expected returns, 
at both portfolio and security level, are characterised by more time variation than the returns of 
large firms. Furthermore, as we saw from the work on long-horizons, a small firm effect also 
appears to exist here because much more of the variation in small firm long horizon returns can 
be explained in comparison with large firms. Although, they do not develop this issue, the pattern 
of results provided in this paper indicates that the expected returns of the small and the large 
firms appear to behave differently. The following chapters of this thesis will be concerned with 
extending the search for differences in the behaviour of small firm and large firm returns. In 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 this thesis will be considering the extent to which the small firm returns 
are more predictable than the returns of large firms. 
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Appendix 1: The Construction of the Series p, * in Shiller (1981a) 
The series p* which is the ex-post rational share price is constructed as follows. 
A terminal value, that is a value for p* is calculated for the last period of the sample being 
tested. In the Shiller tests this is calculated as the average value of the actual share price over 
the full sample period. 
A discount rate is then chosen. This discount rate should reflect the required return to 
investing in the stock market. Shiller calculates this as the average dividend divided by the 
average price. 
Using these values and actual dividend out-turns p* are estimated recursively working 
backwards from the terminal value. 
Appendix 2: Shocks to a Random Walk have a Permanent Effect 
When stock prices are driven by purely random factors a shock will have a permanent 
effect on the price. The current stock price p, is just the last periods price plus the current periods 
error. Assume that time starts in time 0, if p, is a random walk then 
po 
the price one period ahead is 
p, I =po+e, +1 +e, 
the price in T periods ahead is therefore 
P, +T,,,, ýpo+e, +et+, +... 
+e, 
+T 
(A. 21) 
(A. 22) 
(A. 23) 
If stock prices are driven by purely random factors then the current periods price is 
equivalent to 
I- I 
pt -= po +Ie, j j=o 
(A. 24) 
In this case a shock will have a permanent effect on the share price because as e, varies then so 
does p, If the stock price contained a transitory component then a shock would not have a 
permanent effect on the price. 
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Appendix 3: Proof that the Numerator of Equation (3.19) is --(3(z) 
Starting with the numerator of equation (3.19) in the text, 
COV (Z, 
+T -ZI3Zt -Zt-T) (A. 3 1) 
and using the properties of covariances, which permit the covariance to be written as a 
combination of its component parts, equation (A. 31) can be split up into the following four 
terms. 
COV (Zt + T, Zt) (A. 32) 
_COV 
(Z, 
+ Til 
Zt 
- T) 
(A. 33) 
COV(Zt'Zt-T) (A. 34) 
-cov (Z, 3 zt) 
(A. 35) 
Because the span between +T and -T is twice the span between +T and t, so the distance 
between +T and -T is 2T, equation (A. 33) therefore becomes -COV(Zt9Zt+2T). The terms 
COV (ZI + Ty Zt) in equation (A. 32) and (A. 34) andCOV(Z,, Zt-T) are equivalent, so together they 
represent 2cov(zt, Zt+T), and -cov(zt, z, ) in equation (A. 35) is equivalent to --(y2(z). Taking all 
four terms together it is possible to write the numerator covariance of equation (3.19) of the text 
as, 
--a 
2(Z) 
+ 2cov (zZ, +T) - COV (Z Zt+2T) (A. 36) 
Assuming that z, is covariance stationary then collecting terms provides the numerator of 
equation (3.19) --(y2(z) 
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Appendix 4: Proof that the Denominator of Equation (3.19) is 262(z) 
Again taking the denominator of equation (3.19) in the text 
G2(Zt 
+T- Zt) (A. 41) 
and using the fact that a variance of a process can be written in terms of a covariance 
with itself, gives 
COV RZI - ZI + T) 
(Zt - Zt + 
(A. 42) 
Because a covariance can be written in terms of its component parts, this equation can 
be decomposed by the properties of covariances into four constituent covariances, as follows. 
COV (Zt + T) Zt + T) (A. 43) 
_COV 
(Zt 
+ T3 Zt) (A. 44) 
cov (Z, z1) (A. 45) 
-Co V 
(ZV Zt + T) (A. 46) 
Taking equations (A. 43) to (A. 46) collectively, the denominator of equation (3.19) in 
the text can be written as 
-COV(Zt+P Zt +T) - COV(Zr+DZt) 
+ COV(Zti Zt) - COV(ZtlZt+T) 
and 
-COV 
(Zt 
+D ZI) 
+ COV (Zt +D Zt) --ý 
the denominator of equation (3.19) is therefore 
COV(ZI+T9Zt+T) + cov (z z, ) = 2a(z) 
(A. 47) 
(A. 48) 
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Appendix 5: Proof of Equation (3.21) 
If z, follows an AR(l) process, then the one period ahead forecast of z, is 
z, +, ýoz, +e, (A. 
5 1) 
E, (z, , 1) = Oz, (A. 52) 
The T period ahead forecast is 
Zt+T: -- OT zt + e, (A. 53) 
Et(Zt 
+ T) = 
OTZt (A. 54) 
EXZI 
+T - 
Z) = OT- 
lZt (A. 55) 
This is equation (3.21) of the text 
Appendix 6: Proof of Equation (3.23) 
The expected difference between (z,, T) and z, when z, follows an AR(l) process is as 
follows 
E, (z, +T - 
Zt )= OT(Zt) _ Zt = 
(OT 
_ 
I)Zt (A. 61) 
The numerator of the autocorrelation coefficient of equation (3.19) when z, follows an 
AR(l) process is 
COV(Zt+T - ZOZt - Zt-T) (A. 62) 
which is equivalent to 
COV(OT zt -ztýzt -0 
T 
zt) (A. 63) 
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Just as in the previous example, this can also be broken up into its component parts as 
follows 
COV (ýT z19 ZI) -ý 
T 
cy 
2 (Z) (A. 64) 
cov (-Z t' zt) --W(Z) 
(A. 65) 
COV (-Z eT, = _eTG2(Z) (A. 66) t Zt-T) 
COV (OT Z t' 
eTt) = (-_eT)2 a 
2(Z) (A. 67) 
Z 
Collecting terms gives 
(-1+20T _ 02T)02(Z) (A. 68) 
or, 
-(1-20T+02 
T)CY2(Z) (A. 69) 
Let OT = X, then 
- 2x +X2)var(z) 
(A. 610) 
x) (1 - x)var (z) (A. 61 1) 
_(I _X)2 var(, ) 
(A. 612) 
-(1-0 
T)2 
var(z) 
(A. 613) 
This provides us with the numerator of equation (3.22) of the text which is the numerator 
of the return autocorrelation when z, is an AR(l) process. 
The denominator is just the variance of z, This means that the coefficient P(z) of a 
regression of E, (z, +T - 
Zt)onZ, - Zt -Twill be 
_(y2Et(Zt +T - Zt) ßz =- 
G2 (Z ) 
this is equation (3.22) of the text. 
(A. 614) 
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Appendix 7: Proof of Equation (3.23) 
The slope of the regression of r, +Ton r, is 
COV (r, + T,, rl) PT 
G 2(r, 
This can be written as 
(y2(Zt 
+T- Zt) 
(Zt 
- Zt - T) cov (q, T- qt) (qt - qt- T) 
(Y 2(ZI 
+T- Zt) (Y 
2 (qt+ T- qt) 
Because cov(q, +T- q, ) (q, - q, T)= 
0 then 
P T(32(Zt +T- Zt) ßT 
- 
G2(Zt +T- Zt) + (y2 
(ql 
+T -'qt) 
This provides us with equation (3.23) of the text 
BT = --(ýEt(z, T - 
Zt) 
G 2(rt ) 
(A. 71) 
(A. 72) 
(A. 73) 
(A. 74) 
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CHAPTER FOUR' 
The Predictability of UK Portfolio and Security Returns. 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis will be concerned with investigating the empirical characteristics of a selection 
of UK securities and portfolios, primarily, with the aim of identifying differences between the 
behaviour of large and small firms. The beginning of this chapter describes the source and quality 
of the data used in this study, to assess its strengths and weaknesses. Section 4.2 examines in 
detail some important characteristics of the short-horizon portfolio and security returns which 
are used in this study. Particular attention in this section will be focused upon the return 
autocorrelation patterns. This section finds that the returns of portfolios appear to be 
autocorrelated, unlike the returns of individual securities. Furthermore, the Portfolio 
autocorrelation patterns also appear to be associated with firm size. The autocoffelation statistics 
when a portfolio contained small firms were found to be considerably higher than when a 
portfolio contained large firms. In contrast, the returns of individual companies, irrespective of 
size, did not appear to be autocorrelated. The final section of this chapter, Section 4.3, will 
investigate whether individual stock prices are predictable using co-integration tests. 
Co-integration offers an alternative way to the autocorrelation test of identifying predictability. 
This test is concerned with identifying long run relationships between stock prices and has the 
advantage of being able to capture both serial and cross serial 2 correlation between security 
prices in a single test. 
4.1.1 The Data 
The data used in this study have been obtained from two sources: the London Share Price 
Database (LSPD) and Datastream. An objective of this study is to investigate the behaviour of 
returns at different sampling intervals and for different sized companies. This requires more 
than one data source '. A set of monthly interval data was obtained from LSPD while a set of 
weekly interval data was obtained from Datastream. 
LA paper which was based on this chapter was published in Applied Financial Economics in December 1994. 
2. Serial correlation tests applied to stock returns investigates whether it is possible to predict the future value of a stock return to security i or 
portfolio i from its own previous values. In contrast, cross serial correlation tests applied to stock returns are concerned with whether it is 
possible to predict the future return of security or portfolio i from past values of the return to security or portfolio j. 
3. Although, it would have been possible to use Datastream to obtain both weekly and monthly prices which are used in this study, at the start 
of this thesis Datastream was not available to me. 
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4.1.2 LSPD Data 
The LSPD database provides monthly share price and return information for all stocks 
listed on the London Stock Exchange, a survey of the data held on LSPD is provided by Board, 
Pope and Skerratt (199 1). The LSPD tapes provide information on currently listed companies, 
and on de-listed companies (if they were previously included in the LSPD database). This means 
that it is possible to use the price or return information of a company even if a company no 
longer exists. This indicates a particular advantage for using the LSPD tapes, because samples 
can be created which are free of survivorship biaS 4. From the information available on LSPD 
a sample of return and price information, for randomly selected stocks which were listed on 
LSPD was collected, to provide a sample period ranging from January 1975 to December 199 1. 
The prices provided by LSPD are monthly transaction prices. These are the prices at 
which the last trade took place for a given month, irrespective of whether the trade was a buy 
or a sell trade. If a stock fails to trade on the last day of the month then the most recent transaction 
price before the month end is provided. LSPD returns are calculated as: 
ri, t ý In 
(pi, I di,, ) 
pi't -I 
where, 
ri,, = the return of security i in time t, 
p, the last recorded price in month t for security i, 
p, = the last recorded price in the previous month for security i, 
d, any dividends which might have been paid between t-1 and t. 
(4.1) 
Since, LSPD records transaction prices, if a stock trades at the bid(ask) price but next 
month trades at the ask(bid) price then as we saw in Section 2.7.1 of Chapter 2 as long as some 
securities move from the bid(ask) to the ask(bid), then in the absence of new information, negative 
autocorrelation will be introduced into the security returns. Although, for a monthly return series 
the bid-ask spread will be small relative to the return and therefore the magnitude of the spurious 
autocorrelation which might be introduced would be relatively small. Furthermore, since most 
of the empirical work in this thesis will consider portfolios the impact of the bid-ask spread bias 
is likely to be small. 
4. Survivorship bias is caused when only companies that have survived over a sample period are used in empirical tests. Survivorship bias, 
exists when such a sample behaves differently to a sample which also conuiins companies that have entered or exited 
during the sample period. 
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Information for two groups of individual securities were obtained from LSPD. No 
restrictions are imposed on the first cohort of companies, other than return and price information 
must be available for at least one calendar year, during the sample period. The second group 
contains companies which were continuously listed between 1975 and 199 1. For these companies 
there may be some survivorship bias, because the sample does not include companies that have 
gone bankrupt or have been taken over during the sample period. Using market capitalisation 
data (number of shares times share price) each of the companies were then ranked on the basis 
of market capitalisation, every January over the sample period. This allows the firms to be 
segregated on the basis of market value. 
Table 4.1 provides a return analysis of all companies listed on the London Share Price 
Database over the period January 1976 to December 1991 and for two sub-periods, January 
1976 to December 1984 and from January 1985 to December 199 1. 
As we can see from Table 4.1 the returns of the LSPD companies provided on average, 
an annual return of about 13% over the period 1976-1991. However, during the sub-periods 
1976-1984 and 1985-1991 the returns were strikingly different. The mean return during 
1976-1984 was approximately 16% but during 1985-1991 the mean monthly return to LSPD 
companies was only about 10%. The lower return in the second sub-sample reflects the influence 
of the stock market crash during October 1987 and poor stock market performance during the 
economic recession of 1988-199 1. The lowest return recorded for the LSPD group of companies 
was -0.4405 which was recorded for October 1987 and reflects the impact that the stock market 
crash of 1987 had on the London stock market. 
The volatility of the LSPD companies was slightly higher during the second sub-period, 
this is probably due to the influence of the stock market crash which increased volatility and 
therefore the dispersion of stock market returns for 1987. 
4.1.3 Datastream 
Some of the empirical work which will be undertaken in this study will require the use 
of high frequency data (weekly). Since high frequency data was not available from LSPD an 
alternative data source was used. Datastream can provide price information for all currently 
existing companies listed on the London stock market. This means that companies which start 
up during the sample period can be utilised but companies which exit during the sample period, 
for whatever reason, can not be included'. It is clear therefore that the chief shortcoming of the 
Datastream database is that there is an inherent source of survivorship bias. 
5.1t is possible to buy the de-listed codes from Datastrearn, but this facility is very expensive and was not used. 
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In this study the price information provided by Datastream are the weekly (Wednesday 
to Wednesday) closing mid-point prices for individual securities. The decision to select 
Wednesday to Wednesday prices reflected the need to ensure that the data set was not influenced 
by any day of the week effects, such as those identified by French (1980) for the US and Board 
and Sutcliffe (1988) for the UK, who found that share prices tend to be abnormally high on a 
Friday but abnormally low on a Monday. These closing values are calculated by the Stock 
Exchange reporting department. The Stock Exchange mid-price for a stock is the average of the 
bid and ask prices obtained from two market-makers selected daily on a "most suitable basis". 
The market-makers are unaware of whether their prices are being used in a particular day. 
Weekly security returns were calculated from the security prices as the change in the 
logarithm of successive Wednesday closing prices as follows 
ri, ,ý 
ln(pi,, ) - In(pi, ,- 1) (4.2) 
To provide comparability with the LSPD data, the securities selected from Datastream 
6 as far as possible, were consistent with those chosen from LSPD . 
Clearly, there is a difference between the way returns were calculated for the LSPD 
sample and the Datastrearn sample. The LSPD sample includes dividends, while the Datastrearn 
sample excludes dividends. This would be a problem if this study was to undertake tests of the 
small firm return premium using the Datastream sample. If dividends are ornitted from 
Datastream. returns, mean returns of the Datastream sample would be biased downwards because 
a positive component of returns is being excluded. If the large and small companies in the sample 
had different dividend returns then it would be impossible to make return comparisons across 
size based portfolios. 
In this study, Datastream returns are never used in chapters which are concerned with 
investigating first moments. It is unlikely that omitting dividends from the return series will 
have any impact on higher moments such as volatility. We know from the work of Lintner (1965) 
that companies tend to smooth dividends. Dividends are smoothed because managers dislike 
reducing dividends since this sends pessimistic signals to the market about future performance. 
Investors are thesrefore only likely to receive a dividend increase if managers feel confident 
that the dividend can be maintained. The smoothing of dividends in this way ensures that 
dividends do not contribute to return volatility. Consequently, using a log price difference return 
when investigating volatility should provide unbiased estimates about the behaviour of volatility. 
Confirmation of this is provided by Poon and Taylor (1992) who investigate the conditional 
variance of the returns to the FT all share index. The similarity in the results provided by Poon 
6. No outliers appeared in the LSPD data set, although, three outliers were deleted from the Datastrearn sample. These three companies were 
deleted because they appeared to have erroneous prices or returns. 
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and Taylor for two samples, the FF index which includes dividends and the FT index which 
does not include dividends demonstrates that volatility is not influenced by the exclusion of 
dividends. 
The Datastream companies are survivorship biased. In 199 1, the end of the sample period 
there were approximately 2,500 stocks listed on Datastream. Since 1976 approximately 2,600 
stocks have been de-listed from Datastream, which represents a de-listing rate of about 5% per 
year. The history of the dead companies, available from datastrearn suggests that the average 
beta of the dead companies was about 1.58 17 . The two extreme betas were provided by SEKONG 
which was the de-listed company with the lowest beta at 0.025. The company with the highest 
beta was DUALVES which had a beta of 2.88. The securities which were included in the 
survivorship biased sample were selected in 1992. Since 1992 a number of these companies 
have now been de-listed. For portfolios 1,2 and 3,4 and 3 and 5 securities have been de-listed 
respectively. For portfolio 4 however 8 securities have been de-listed. This suggests that for 
small firms there is a reduced liklihood that they will survive. 
4.1.4 Characteristics of Security and Portfolio Returns 
This section will consider the characteristics of weekly and monthly returns for portfolios 
and individual securities which have been grouped together on the basis of firm size. Considering 
first the monthly returns, four equally-weighted portfolios were formed from the individual 
securities as follows. Each year the returns of randomly selected securities were obtained from 
LSPD. Every January throughout the sample period each security was ranked on the basis of 
market capitalisation (share price times number of shares issued). The fifty smallest stocks each 
year were then sorted into a portfolio, the next smallest into another portfolio and so on until 
the final portfolio contained the largest fifty stocks. The same procedure was adopted for the 
weekly return portfolios '. In all four portfolios were created, portfolio P, contained the fifty 
smallest firms, P2 contained the fifty small-intermediate companies, P3 contained the fifty 
large-intermediate companies and P4contained the fifty largest firms. 
The return to each of the equally-weighted portfolios was calculated as an 
equally-weighted average of the weekly returns of the component stocks as follows. 
I /I 
Rp, t =I ri, t 
i= 192 ... 50 p=1,2,3,4 ni=i 
where, 
(4.3) 
7. The average beta is the average beta of all stocks contained 
in the dead files. 
8.1n this case weekly share price information was collected 
from Datastream, and the security return was calculated as the log price difference 
as explained in the previous section. 
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where, 
RP,, = the return of portfolio p in time t, and 
ri,, = the return of one of the i=1,2,3... 50 component stocks in the portfolio. 
4.2 Summary Statistics 
To provide information about the characteristics of the various data sets used in this study 
a selection of summary statistics, for both portfolio and individual security returns are provided 
in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 respectively. 
4.2.1 Mean Returns 
The mean monthly return for the four size-based portfolios ranges from 1.37 percent to 
1.04 percent. If these returns are annualised, large firms provide an annual average return over 
the sample period of approximately 12.48 percent but the portfolio containing the smallest firms 
provides an average annual return of about 15 percent. This suggests that the difference between 
the large and small firm returns provides an average small firm premium of about 2.5 percent 
per year. Although, it should also be noted that the small firm portfolio is not the portfolio which 
provides the highest return in this sample, this is provided byP3 the portfolio which contains 
the large-intermediate companies. This conflicts with the findings reported by B anz (198 1) and 
Levis (1985) who found that as firm size diminishes portfolio returns increase. 
A similar pattern is observed for the weekly returns of the four size-based portfolios. The 
portfolio containing the smallest firms provides a return of about 15.89 percent a year, whereas 
the portfolio containing the largest stocks provides a return of about 9.41 percent a year. The 
annualised small firm premium is therefore about 6.5 percent. Most of the difference between 
the performance of the two portfolios appears to be due to the lower performance of the portfolio 
containing the large stocks. 
In every year of this data set prior to 1987 the small firms outperformed the larger firms. 
In contrast from 1988 onwards, the small firms have always underperformed the large firms 
irrespective of whether returns are sampled at weekly or monthly intervals. 
The small firm premium reported here is smaller than has been reported for an earlier 
sample period in the UK, see for example Levis (1985), who also used monthly interval data 
and, reports that over the sample period 1958-1982 the smallest firms in the sample outperform 
the largest firms in the sample by an average annual 6.5 percent. The reason for the fall in the 
small firm premium appears to be due to the relatively weak performance of small firms during 
the last five years of the sample period studied here. In particular, during this period interest 
rates were very high. This had a prolonged adverse effect on the UK economy, especially on 
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small firms, which tend to be more heavily reliant on debt as a source of finance, see for example, 
The Wilson Committee Report (1980), Mitchell (1980) or Bannock (1981). At the same time 
that stock returns were low, because of the adverse effect that interest rates had on the profitability 
of small firms, small investors who proportionately invest more in small firms, were attracted 
away from stock investment to interest bearing investment because at this time interest bearing 
accounts provided relatively high returns for little risk. This was particularly true because of the 
introduction of new interest bearing accounts such as TESSA's (Tax Exempt Saving Accounts). 
These accounts not only provided high interest rates but also provided a tax break for small 
investors. It is not surprising therefore that the returns of small firms performed so badly during 
the period 1988-1991. 
4.2.2 Standard Deviations 
Comparisons of the return standard deviations for the portfolios, when returns are sampled 
at both weekly and monthly intervals can be made by looking at Table 4.2. The results presented 
in this table imply that the return standard deviation for the portfolio containing the smallest 
stocks appears to be lower than the return standard deviation of large firms for both weekly and 
monthly returns. This would suggest that the portfolio containing the small firms is less risky 
than the portfolio which contains the large firms. To illustrate, the standard deviation of monthly 
returns for the portfolio containing the smallest firms is 0.00449 but the standard deviation for 
the portfolio containing the largest firms is 0.00652. A similar pattern exists when returns are 
sampled weekly. The standard deviation of P,, the portfolio containing the smallest firms, is 
0.0149 while the standard deviation of P4, which is the portfolio containing the largest firms, is 
0.0238. Initially, this appears surprising because it is large firms not small firms which have the 
greatest scope for internal diversification 9. However, it is possible to reconcile the portfolio 
standard deviations to the relative thin trading characteristics of large and small firms. 
As Markowitz (1957,1959) demonstrated if a portfolio is well diversified, the variance 
of the portfolio will be determined by the average of the covariances between securities rather, 
than by the average of the security variances. When a stock is thinly traded there will be an 
abundance of zeros in the return time series, particularly, when the returns are observed at 
frequent intervals. The covariance between two random variables will be zero if one of the 
variables is a constant. The presence of constant segments within a time series of a random 
variable will reduce the measured covariance with another random variable. Thus, the average 
covariance between the returns of thinly traded stocks is likely to be understated relative to that 
9. Extemal diversification occurs when different securities are combined in a portfolio. The effect of this will be to reduce the amount of 
systematic risk in the portfolio. If a company diversifies by opcrating in different markets, or by aquiring different outlets for its business, 
internal diversification takes place. When internal diversification takes place, diversifiable risk is reduced because poor performance in one 
market is offset by superior performance in an alternative marke(. This will reduce the overall return variability of a companies stock. 
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of frequently traded stocks. Since small firms are characteriged by more thin trading than large 
firms, the average covariance of small stocks will be more downwards biased than the average 
covariance of large firms. A portfolio of small firms, which have identical virtual return 
distributions to a portfolio of large firms, except that the small firm stocks trade less frequently 
will have a lower standard deviation than the portfolio of large firms. The bias which is introduced 
into the covariances because of thin trading explains why the small firm portfolio in this sample 
appears to have a lower return standard deviation. This issue is also discussed in Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990a, 1990b) but rarely is it that in the US the bias is strong enough to indicate 
that the variances or standard deviations of small firm portfolios are lower than for large firms, 
see for example, Lo and MacKinlay (1990a). Although this is not surprising since US markets 
are not characterised by such acute thin trading as UK markets. 
Confirmation that thin trading has biased the portfolio standard deviations of the small 
firms is provided by comparing the average return standard deviations of the individual securities 
within each portfolio. These are presented in Table 4.3. For both weekly and monthly return 
intervals, the average standard deviations of the smallest firms in the sample are considerably 
larger than the average return standard deviations for the largest firms. When returns are sampled 
monthly the average return standard deviations for the smallest firms is 0.0305, but the average 
standard deviation for the largest firms is 0.0 189. When returns are sampled at weekly intervals 
the average standard deviations are 0.0739 and 0.0468 respectively. This indicates, that counter 
to what the portfolio standard deviations suggest the small firms are indeed more risky than the 
large firms. Meanwhile, it should also be noted that the average standard deviation of the 
individual securities is substantially larger than the portfolio standard deviation. This is to be 
expected as each of the portfolios is fully diversified and should therefore be less risky because 
most of the idiosyncratic which is risk present in the individual stocks would have been 
diversified away at a portfolio level. 
4.2.3 Autocorrelations 
The estimated autocorrelations for the portfolios are reported in Table 4.2. These 
autocorrelations mirror the findings of previous studies such as those undertaken by Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988) which have shown that short-horizon portiono returns are nigrily 
autocorrelated. Although the first order autocorrelations are large for all of the portfolios, an 
obviouspattern associated with firm size appears to exist. The first order portfolio autocorrelation 
coefficient for the smallest firms in the sample, wlien returns are sampled weekly is about 40 
percent but only 14.8 percent for the portfolio containing the largest firms. This pattern is also 
reflected in the portfolios where returns are sarnpled monthly. This time the first order 
autocorrelations are 48 percent and 17 percent respectively. Since thin trading introduces 
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autocorrelation into portfolio returns the high autocorrelations associated with the small firm 
Portfolios is not surprising. This issue was discussed in detail in Section 2.7.2 of Chapter 2 and 
Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3. 
An examination of autocorrelations for lags greater than one period suggests that the 
autocorrelation decays fairly rapidly, especially when returns are sampled monthly. For monthly 
returns, the second order autocorrelation coefficient is insignificant for all but the portfolio 
containing the smallest firms. For P, which is the portfolio containing the smallest firms, the 
autocorrelation takes substantially longer to decay than is the case for the other portfolios, for 
example, the sixth order autocorrelation coefficient of the small firm portfolio when returns are 
sampled weekly is still significant. 
The average of the autocorrelations of the component securities in each of the four 
capitalisation-based portfolios are presented in Table 4.3. These are calculated as 
50 (4.4) 
PT Pi, l 
where, pi,, are the e order autocorrelations for component security i. 
Examining the average of the first order security autocorrelations, reveals that for all four 
groups, at both weekly and monthly return intervals the autocorrelations of individual securities 
are very small. For monthly returns the average of the security first order autocorrelations for 
the small firms is only 0.008 and -0.040 for the largest group of firms. For weekly returns the 
average of the security first order autocorrelations are 0.055 and 0.039 respectively. For every 
size grouping the average of the security autocorrelations appear to be substantially smaller than 
is the case for the portfolios. It is possible to conclude that, although, portfolio returns appear 
to be autocorrelated individual security returns are not. This is an important empirical 
characteristic to identify because it indicates that portfolio returns are much more predictable 
than security returns. This does not imply that the UK stock market is inefficient, what the results 
suggest is that there are important differences between securities and portfolios. If this 
predictability was due to market inefficiency then at least some of it should be able to be identified 
in the security returns. This suggests that the predictability in the portfolio returns is more likely 
to have been caused by microstructure frictions and time variation of expected returns. 
"Volatility clustering" describes what Fama (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) identified as 
the tendency for small returns to follow small returns and large returns to follow large returns. 
Both Fama and Mandelbrot found that the unconditional distribution of returns had a 
leptokurtotic appearance. Such a distribution can be identified by the fat tailed and peaked 
appearance of the distribution. The fat tails capture the tendency for large returns to follow large 
returns, while the peaked appearance captures the midency for small returns to be followed by 
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small returns. Autocorrelation in the squared and absolute returns may be indicative of "volatility 
clustering" which would imply a changing conditional variance. Meanwhile, as Granger and 
Anderson (1978) demonstrate autocorrelation of squared returns may suggest that the conditional 
variance of returns is autocorrelated. 
For monthly portfolio returns, the autocorrelation in the squared and absolute returns are 
all very close to the autocorrelations in the pure return series. For the weekly portfolio returns, 
the autocorrelations of all the portfolios are substantially greater than the autocorrelations of the 
return series. For example, for the portfolio containing the smallest firms the first order 
autocorrelation coefficient of weekly squared returns is 0.604. For the portfolio containing the 
largest firms the first order autocorrelation coefficient for squared returns is 0.428. In the weekly 
return series strong support exists for a changing conditional variance and or variance persistence. 
This issue will be investigated in detail in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
Interestingly, in the case of the individual securities there appears to be no evidence of 
autocoffelation in either the squared or the absolute values of monthly returns. The average of 
the autocoffelations for the squared and absolute security returns provide autocorrelations which 
are all close to zero. In contrast, for weekly security returns, the average first order security 
autocorrelation is strikingly larger for both the squared and absolute returns than is the case for 
the pure return series. First order autocorrelation in the absolute weekly returns for each of the 
four portfolios lies between the ranges of 15.2 percent and 18.5 percent. For weekly individual 
returns there may be enough evidence to suggest that the conditional variance may be time 
varying. The possibility that second moments are time varying is important, because, it suggests 
that expected risk premiums rather than being a constant may be time varying which provides 
additional support for the possibility that the autocorrelation in the portfolio return series is at 
least partially reflecting a time varying expected return, which is autocorrelated. 
4.3 A Predictability Test of Share Prices using Co-integration Analysis 
In the previous section it was demonstrated that some of the variation in the return of a 
portfolio can be predicted from its most recent values, although, this did not appear to be the 
case for individual securities. This section will examine the predictability of individual stock 
prices by applying co-integration tests. Co-integration tests provide an alternative way, to the 
autocorrelation test of capturing predictability in prices. The chief advantage of undertaking 
co-integration tests is that this approach allows two sources of predictability, that is serial and 
cross serial correlation, to be captured in a single test. This will be demonstrated in Section 4.2. 
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4.3.1 Co-integration and Stationarity 
Many examples of a time series may be non-stationary, displaying the absence of a 
constant mean or variance, but some examples of such a time series move together. If there is 
a linear relationship between a set of non-stationary variables but they are related to each other, 
so that in the long run they do not drift too far apart, they are said to be co-integrated. In this 
case the non-stationarity is due to a common factor. A detailed explanation of the co-integration 
methodology and its applications can be found in Engle and Granger (199 1), B anerjee, Dolado, 
Galbraith and Hendry (1993) and Charemza and Deadman (1993). 
A key consideration in the discussion of co-integration is stationarity. A stationary 
stochastic process is one where the conditional distribution of the random variable is invariant 
with respect to displacement in time. Weak stationarity, which is less restrictive, implies that 
the mean, variance and covariance of the process are invariant to displacement in time as follows. 
The mean of this process must be constant, so that 
E(x, ) = E(x,,. ) t=1,2... m=1,2,3; (4.5) 
the variance of the series, 
a21 = E(x, _ g, )2 (4.6) 
must be constant, so that 
E (x, - gýj 2= E(x,,. - g, ) 2 (4.7) 
the covariance of the series 
COV (Xt, Xt + 
J= E(xt- 9. x) (Xt + k-gx) k=1,2,3... (4.8) 
must also be invariant with respect to displacement in time, so that 
--2 COV (Xt +m9 Xt +m 
COV(Xtj, Xt+k)'" (4.9) 
If a time series has ajoint probability distribution and conditional probability distribution 
which are both invariant to time, the time series is said to be a strictly stationary series. The 
opposite of a stationary process is one which is said to be non-stationary. In which case the 
series will have a time-varying mean, variance and covariance so that it becomes impossible to 
refer to the mean, variance or covariance of the time series without knowing a particular time 
period for reference. 
The most straight forward example of a non-stationary variable is a random walk without 
drift which is represented by equation (4.10), and was discussed earlier in Section 2.2 of Chapter 
2. 
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+ e, 
E(e) =0 
which can be expressed as 
2 E(e, e, ) =0t#s E(e, ) = a2 
t-1 
x, =xo+ Z F-, 
-j t=1,2, ..., j=O 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
so that if xO =0 then x, is the sum of its own past innovations. The variance of x, is to2and 
therefore becomes infinitely large as t --> oo. Under these conditions x, has little meaning as a 
time series. Such a series would have a different mean, variance and covariance at different 
points in time. 
A time series is said to be I(d) if it is integrated of the order d, so that the time series is 
non-stationary in its level but becomes stationary after differencing d times. Thus, a series jxj 
is I(d) if x, is non-stationary but Yx, is stationary. Usually, if we take a linear combination of 
two non-stationary series such as jxj and jyj; each integrated to a different order, then the 
resulting series will be integrated at the highest of the two orders of integration. This can be 
demonstrated below. Assume x, -I(d), y, -I(e) where e>d. If z, is a linear combination of the 
two series x, and y, such that. 
Zt = oxt + (Xyt 
where, z, is a linear combination of x, and y, while (x and P are scaling constants. 
If z, is differenced d times the resulting series would be 
AdZ, = ßA 
d 
x, + aAdyt (4.13) 
PYx, is stationary, since x, -I(d) but the second term on the right hand side ocYy, is not 
- differenced e times, and e>d. It therefore requires further since to make it stationary it must b. 
differencing. Since Yz, is the sum of a stationary series PAd x, and a non-stationary series c&y, 
then Adz, will also be non-stationary. 
In general any linear combination of stochastic time series variables has an order of 
integration equal to the highest order of the component series. The exception to this rule are 
co-integrated variables. We would normally expect a linear combination of two I(l) variables 
such as x, and y, to be I(l) also. 
zt = P-v, - ay, 
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If, however, the linear combination is stationary such that z, in equation 4.14 is 1(0), and 
therefore stationary, x, and y, are said to be co-integrated. If this is the case, oc is known as the 
constant of co-integration, and is unique in the two variable case when 0 is normalised to equal 
1. This means equation (4.14) can be written as follows. 
zt --.: Xt - (Xyt (4.15) 
In the case of more than two variables, (x becomes the co-integrating vector. 
The concept of co-integration captures the long run properties of a stochastic time series. 
More specifically, co-integration indicates that in the long run x, and y, can not drift too far apart 
since z, the difference between x, and y, is stationary with zero mean and therefore due to a 
common factor. Co-integration therefore implies a long run, or equilibrium relationship, such 
that x will return to the value (xy in the long run and y will return to the value oC-'x in the long 
run. A lack of co-integration suggests that variables have no long run link and in principle they 
can wander arbitrarily far away from each other. 
4.3.2 Co-integration and Error Correction Mechanisms 
An error correction model exists when the value of a series such as JxJ adjusts to 
equilibrium at a rate proportional to the degree of disequilibrium in the previous period. An 
important relationship between co-integrated variables and error correction processes was 
introduced in Granger (1983) and more formally discussed in Engle and Granger (1987). The 
so called Granger Representation Theorem demonstrates that if two variables are co-integrated 
then the following error correction process must also exist. 
ý(L) (I - L)Xt = --aAt -I+ 
O(L)F-t (4.16) 
where, O(L) and ý(L) are finite polynomials. The L is the lag operator, X is an NxI vector, 
and (x is the co-integrating vector such that (x'X, -l'(0)- 
More specifically, for the two-variable case, where x, and y, are co-integrated of the order 
(1,1) the following error correction model must exist. 
TT (4.17) 
Ax, = ax + p., z, -I+ 
YjAyt -T+ 
8iAx, + e.,,, r=1,2,3.... T 
TT (4.18) 
Ayt = b. v + pyzt -I+I 
OjAyt 
-T+It, 
AAt 
,+e.,,, tc=1,2,3... 
T 
, r= I T=l 
where, z, -I=x, -I- 
(xy, -, 
Ax, and Ay, are the lagged first differences of x, and y, The term 
p, + p, #0 which requires that their sum is non zero. This implies that z, must have an influence 
over at least one of the variables x, or 
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The error correction model specified above indicates that the current change in at least 
one of the variables x, or y, can be predicted from x, -I- OCY, -, which means that changes 
in 
either x, or y, can be predicted from past values of at least one of the series. This implies that 
if two variables are co-integrated then they must either be cross-serially correlated or serially 
correlated. For speculative assets such as stock prices the error correction representation has an 
important application. If x, and y, are two share prices, then the existence of an error correction 
model of this form suggests that at least one of the share prices is predictable from the extent 
to which the two prices were away from their long-run relationship in the previous period. In 
which case co-integration can be used as a test of stock market predictability because 
co-integration between share prices implies that the current value of a share price can be predicted 
from past values of at least one other price. In the case of stock prices, which are likely to be 
characterised by predictability for reasons unassociated with market inefficiency, this test is not 
a test of market inefficiency but is a test of price predictability. 
4.3.3 Testing For Co-integration 
In a bi-variate co-integration test the first step is to establish that the two variables being 
tested are both I(l) variables. This can be done using the Dickey-Fuller (1979) test. For a 
stochastic time series such as jxj Dickey-Fuller tests are concerned with discovering whether 
the value of (x in equation (4.19) 
xt = ocx, -, +e, 
(4.19) 
is equal to one (which implies x, is non-stationary) or less than one (in which case x, is stationary). 
If a is assumed to equal I equation 4.19 becomes a random walk. Since the variance of a random 
walk tends to infinity as t increases, the assumptions underlying the standard t-tests for least 
squares will not be valid. In this case equation (4.19) must be transformed as follows, 
-x, -, = 
«x - 1)x, -I +e, 
(4.20) 
Such a transformation is necessary if the variance of x is assumed to be constant. This 
equation can be re-paramaterised to provide 
Ax, = Pxt- I+e, (4.21) 
where P= (x - 1, the test is now valid using least squares but the test is now a test of whether 
P is zero. If P is negative then it implies that oc is less than one and then x is stationary. The 
critical values for this test, which are non standard, are provided by Fuller (1976). A modification 
of this test, which adapts the test for autocorrelated variables is provided by Dickey-Fuller 
(1981). The modification requires introducingthe laggeddependant variable into equation (4.21) 
to eliminate autocorrelation in x, so that the residuals in equation (4.21) are white noise. The 
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appropriate order of this test, is determined by the number of lags of x, which must be introduced 
to eliminate the autocorrelation which is present. These tests, have as the null hypothesis that 
x, is non-stationary. Alternative unit root tests which can be used when x, is autocorrelated are 
provided by Phillips and Perron (1988). The sensible approach, is to first of all test the data in 
its level. If the data appears to be non-stationary, the data should then be differenced and tested 
for stationarity once again. This will identify whether after differencing the series becomes 
stationary which would provide confirmation that the undifferenced series is I(l). 
One way of testing for co-integration is to use the two step regression technique proposed 
by Engle and Granger (1987). The first step requires the estimation of the following regression 
for two variables which are both I(I). 
xt = (Y-yt + zt (4.22) 
where, x, and y, are both I(l) variables, so that after differencing once they become stationary. 
The term z, is the residual from the co-integrating equation. This can be interpreted as the extent Zý 
to which x, and y, are away from their long-run equilibrium relationship. 
The second step is then to test the residuals z, from the co-integration regression in order 
to establish whether they are stationary. If these residuals are stationary then the series is said 
to be co-integrated. A serious problem with this procedure is that a finding of co-integration or 
no co-integration may depend on the order in which the variables x, and y, are regressed. 
In this chapter all the co-integration tests which have been perfonned have been bi-variate 
Johansen (1988) co-integration tests. A brief description of this procedure follows. 
Consider an Nx1 vector of I(l) variables so that the elements in P include the share 
prices of N companies. The Johansen approach to co-integration begins by expressing the data t) 
generation process of P as an autoregressive process. In the tests which are performed here 
seven lags have been included, although, the results do not appear to be sensitive to the number 
of Lags chosen in the autoregressive representation. 
PC= ICA- I 
+n2pt-2+... ickPt 
-, + e, r= 
1ý2,3 7 (4.23) 
wherejck, are coefficient matrices, and e, is an NxI vector which has zero mean and constant 
variance. 
The long-run equilibrium corresponding to 4.23 is FIP = 0, where the long run co-efficient matrix 
1-1 is defined as 
I-' =1 -7r 1- TC2 - 7U3 -*'* ICk (4.24) 
where, 
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IFI = an NxI matrix whose rank'O determines the number of distinct co-integrating vectors 
between the variables in P, I= the identity matrix. 
If the matrix 1`1 has rank r<N, then it is possible to define two Nxr matrices (x, and 0, 
such that 
rI = (Xp 
/ 
(4.25) 
The rows of 0 form the r distinct co-integrating vectors and (x is called the "loading" or 
"adjustment" variable whose value reflects the speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium. 
Although, the values of (x and 0 cannot be estimated directly, since they are over-parameterised, 
r can be identified in the following way. The residuals from two regressions are collected. These 
are the residuals from regressing both Pt -k and AP, on lagged differences. The squares of the 
residuals of the canonical correlation coefficients between the two sets of residuals are 
computed. " Then, Johansen shows that the likelihood ratio LR statistic or trace test for the 
hypothesis that there are at most r co-integrating vectors is 
N 
ý2 LR -T I In(I - i=r+l 
(4.26) 
where, 
ý, 
+ 13, .... , 
ýNare the smallest N-r squared canonical correlation coefficients. Johansen 
shows that this statistic will have a non-standard distribution under the null hypothesis and 
provides approximate critical values for the statistic which have been generated from Monte 
Carlo simulation. 
4.3.4 Previous Work 
Copeland (1991) tested the extent to which a sample of foreign exchange spot prices 
were predictable by using the co-integration methodology. No co-integrating relationships were 
found to exist between any of the spot markets investigated. The paper therefore concluded that 
the foreign exchange spot prices which were investigated appeared to be unpredictable and 
therefore efficient. In a later paper, Copeland (1993) uses the same methodology to test the 
efficiency of the forward market. These tests were concerned with whether the forward market 
rate was an unbiased predictor of future spot rates, as we would expect if the forward prices 
were set efficiently. This time the forward prices tested were found to be predictable and therefore 
seemingly inefficient. Co-integration tests have also been applied to metal prices on the London 
Metal Exchange. MacDonald and Taylor (1988), for example, use the co-integration approach 
IO. The rank of a matrix is the number of linearly independent rows or colunills. 
1I. Cannonical correlations may be defined in the following manner. Gi\ cii two sets of data defined by the matrices Y= [Y,, Y,,.. Y, ] and 
x= [x,, x2,. X,. ] where i 2t k, the object of the procedure is to find those 1wcar combinations of Y and X which show the highest degree of 
correlation. 
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to confirm that metal prices on the London Metal Exchange are unpredictable. Because most 
of these studies claim that the prices investigated are unpredictable the authors conclude that 
the markets investigated must be efficient. 
Although, co-integration tests have been used extensively in the foreign exchange market 
they have been used less extensively as a way of testing the predictability of share prices. 
Essentially, there are two ways of testing for predictability in stock market prices using 
co-integration. Either, the predictability of the stock prices can be tested directly by ascertaining 
whether one stock price can be predicted from another. MacDonald and Power (1993) have used 
co-integration to test for stock price predictability in this way for a selection of security prices. 
In this paper they argue that some of the prices which are tested must be inefficient because in 
multiple co-integration tests some evidence of cointegration is found to exist. Clearly, in view 
of the microstructure work which was discussed in Section 2.7 of Chapter 2 this is not the case. 
The paper of MacDonald and Power has unrealistic aims, they suggest 
flunit root and co-integration techniques are to test the concept of static efficiency for 
individual share prices" 12 MacDonald and Power (I 993, p25 1) 
The co-integration test can not indicate whether markets are efficient of inefficient, they 
can only indicate whether there is a serial or cross-serial relationship between share prices. Such 
a relationship need not exist because of market inefficiency but can be introduced by 
non-synchronous trading. This possibility is not even discussed by MacDonald and Power and 
seems a much more likely explanation for their resLi Its. No other study has investigated whether 
stock markets are predictable using co-integration in this way. 
Alternatively, co-integration techniques can be used to test the validity of some model 
of stock price behaviour, such as the present value model. Tests of the present value model such 
as those conducted by Campbell and Shiller (1987,1989) were concerned with finding a 
stationary difference between stock prices and dividends (or some other measure of fundamental 
cash flows such as earnings). Since stock prices, in an efficient market, represent an optimal 
forecast of future expected dividends, stock prices and dividends should move together in the 
long run. The two series should therefore be co-integrated. If they are not co-integrated, it 
suggests that there is an unstable differential between the two series, that is they are not moving 
together so prices could not be an optimal forecast of future expected dividends. Campbell and 
Shiller (1987) conclude that stock prices do not appear to be consistent with the dividend 
valuation model, prices appear to react to factors other than changing expectations about 
dividends, stock prices therefore appear to be inefficient. 
12. Static market efficiency is described as share prices refleciing all avaikible 
inforniition but assuming that expected returns are constant. 
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4.3.5 Stock Price Predictability, Co-inteý-. --ation and Firm Size. 
The aim of this section is to test for predictibility in a sample of UK individual stock 
prices using the Johansen (1988) co-integration aplýi-oach. The tests which are conducted in this 
section are concerned with whether stock prices caii be predicted from past share price values. 
The primary objective when undertaking the tests 1,, to identify whether the prices of small or 
large firms are more predictable using the co-intep-ation methodology. 
The monthly share price data which is used i ii this section has been collected from LSPD. 
Price data for eighteen individual companies, whic1h were selected randomly from the LSPD 
database, for the sample period January 1975 to December 1989 were utilised in this stud Y13 . 
On the basis of the market capitalisation of the coi-iipanies in January 1975, the stocks were 
ranked on the basis of firm size. The eighteen firms used in this study are listed in Table 4.4 
along with their capitalisation values at the start of tlie sample period. For ease of reference the 
companies have been coded from Ll which signifies the largest company in the sample to L18 
which signifies the smallest. 
All of the co-integration tests which have been conducted in this chapter have been 
bi-variate co-integration tests. A finding of co-integration would indicate that in the long run 
stockprices are predictable, meanwhile, a finding of, ýubstantially more co-integration associated 
with small firm stocks would imply that small firni stocks are more predictable than those of 
large firms. 
4.3.6 Results 
The security prices were transformed into the logarithm of the price 14 and then using 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (198 1) approach both the logarithm of the share prices and the 
first difference of the logarithm of the share prices were tested for stationarity. 
The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are reported in Table 4.5. In every case 
it is clear that we can not reject the null hypothesis HO that the share prices are I(1) against the 
alternative HAthat the share prices are 1(0). Since Nve can not reject that the share prices are I(l) 
we can now test whether the log prices, once differenced are I(l) against the alternative that 
they are 1(0). If the null hypothesis is rejected then it would indicate that the differenced share 
prices were 1(0) but prices in their levels were I(1). 
B. The aim of these tests is not to provide evidence of market efficiencý or 
inefficiency, as discussed previously co-integration tests can not 
provide this evidence. The tests here are used as a diagnostic to 
indicate diat sorne predictability in the individual share prices does exist. Even 
when only 18 share prices are tested, 153 co-integration tests are perforilled. 
Testing a larger number of share prices might therefore obscure 
any pattern which might emerge. 
A. This was done because the log price difference in the error correction %\ 
ill be a return. 
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The results of this second set of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are provided in Table 
4.6. The results indicate that in every case we can not accept the null hypothesis HO that the 
differenced log prices are I(l) and therefore reject the null hypothesis HO that the share prices 
once differenced are I(I). Since the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that all of the share 
prices are I(I) it is possible to go ahead and test for co-integration between the share prices. 
Since there are 18 share prices in this sample, bi-variate tests require that each of these 
18 prices are tested against each of the other 17 share prices. This means that in all 153 
co-integration tests are performed. The results from these tests are summarised in Tables 4.7(a), 
4.7(b) and 4.8. Out of the 153 tests performed it was found that 41 of the tests provided a Johansen 
trace statistic which was significant at a 95 percent confidence level, Meanwhile, at a 90 percent 
confidence level 55 examples of co-integration were found to exist. The very large number of 
examples of co-integration which appear to exist suggest that many of the stock returns are 
predictable although this can not be taken as evidence of market inefficiency. 
An aspect of interest in this chapter is whether there is a link between the predictability 
of the share prices and firm size. If Table 4.7(a) and Table 4.7(b) are studied it is possible to see 
that there are more co-integrating vectors identified for the small companies than for the large 
companies. Looking at Table 4.7(a), for the nine largest firms there are only 24 cases where a 
co-integrating vector has been identified, out of a maximum of 117 possible cases. 
For the smallest six firms, out of eighty-seven possible examples of co-integration 35 
co-integrating vectors were identified. In 40 percent of all cases at a 95 percent confidence level 
share prices appear to be predictable, rising to 44 cases and over 50 percent, at a 90 percent 
confidence level as we can see from Table 4.7(b). This appears to suggest that the stock prices 
of individual small firms are more predictable than is the case for the large firms. 
Since proportionately small investors are more heavily represented in small firms the 
results presented here may suggest that small investors are less well informed. If small firm 
investors are less well informed than investors in large firms (this is possible because relatively 
little information is published about the performance of small firms) then the return behaviour 
of large firms provides information about the future return performance of small firms. If the 
behaviour of large firms provides information about the performance of small firms then current 
small firm returns will be related to the past returns of large firms, which could lead to a 
co-integrating relationship between small and large firms. 
This pattern is further substantiated when the larger firms are investigated more closely. 
Most of the examples of co-integration which are identified for large firms arise because the 
large firm prices are co-integrated with small firm prices. Out of a possible 66 examples of 
co-integration between two companies that are both in the top twelve largest companies only 
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six were found to exist which represents only 9 pei-cent. In, contrast, of the seventy-two possible 
examples of co-integration between the smallest ý, ix companies and the largest companies twelve 
26 cases (36%) are identified at the 90 percent ck)!!: 'idence level. 
4.3.7 Identifying the Direction of Caus! 
The presence of co-integration has been ide! ifified for a number of the stock prices used 
in this sample, although, the direction of causal has not been established. The pattern in the 
co-integration appears to indicate that the prices W'the small firms are more predictable than is 
the case for the large firms, although it is worthwhi! c to carry out further tests to obtain additional 
information. 
Causality can be identified by undertaking Granger (1969) causality tests which take the 
form of an augmented unrestricted vector autoregressa C in represented 
by equation (4.27) and 
(4.28) 
22 
APk, 
t j, t 
1ý2 
(4.27) 
++e APi, t (Xj + 
PlPi, 
t -I+ 
P2Pk, 
t -I+I 
OiAPj, 
t -T i=l 
22 (4.28) 
APk, 
t = (Xk + 
P3Pj, 
t -I+ 
P4Pk, 
l -I+ 
OiAPi, 
t -T 
+ 8iAPk, t-, +ek, t 
1,2 
where, 
Apj, l = the change in the logarithm of the share price of stock j in time t. Because stock prices 
are tested in their log form Apj,, is the return of stock 
APk, t = the change in the share price of stock k in time t. Stock k is a stock which is co-integrated 
with stock 
0, and Oi capture the effect that the past share price and returns of stock j have on the current 
return of stock 
P2andyj capture the effects that the past share price and the past returns of stock k have on the 
current return of stock 
P3and Oi capture the effect that the past share price and returns of stock j have on the current 
return of stock k, and 
04and 8i capture the effect that the past share price and the past returns of stock k have on the 
current return to stock k. 
in this model only one lag in the price level and two lags in the price difference series 
were chosen because higher order lags were never found to be significant in preliminary testing 
which is not reported here. 
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2 
The Granger test requires testing the restriction in equation (4.27) thatP2 +Y, yj = 0. This 
2 
establishes whether collectively Pk, t- I and APk, t-., has a causal influence over Apj,,. In 
2 
equation (4.28) the restrictionP3 +1 ýj =0 is tested to establish whether collectively pj,, or i=1 
has a causal influence over APk, t. 
For each pair of co-integrated price series Granger causality tests were performed in the 
manner described above. The results of both an F test and a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) variable 
addition test for each of the examples of co-integration are reported in Table 4.9. Looking at 
the results presented in Table 4.9 we can see that quite a weak pattern emerges. Typically, it 
seems that when there is evidence of co-integration, the prices of large firms appear to be able 
to predict the prices of small firms. In 19 of the causality tests the results indicate that the prices 
of small firms can be predicted from the past behaviour of large firm prices. Although, it should 
also be noted that the results of 9 of the causality tests indicate that the prices of small firms 
appear to predict the prices of large firms, and in 13 cases the predictability is so weak it can 
not be identified in the causality test at all. Broadly speaking the results from the causality tests 
appear to confirm the pattern which was suggested by the co-integration results that is, the prices 
of small firms are more predictable than the prices of large firms. In a large number of cases 
causality does not appear to have been identified in either direction. This appears to suggest that 
co-integration is a more powerful test of the existence of causality than procedures which use 
Ordinary Least Squares. The tests which have been performed in this section indicate that the 
individual security prices of small firms appear to be more predictable that the security prices 
of large firms. 
A caveat to the results presented here should be noted. The aim of the co-integration tests 
which have been performed in this chapter has been to establish whether a stationary difference 
between two non-stationary sets of share prices exists. Over time, this means that if for example, 
the stocks L, and L. 2were co-integrated and furthermore that stocks L, and 4 were co-integrated, 
then L, and 4, should also be co-integrated. In the results presented here this is not the case. A 
triangular relationship between the co-integration results fails to hold in many cases as Table 
4.7(a) and Table 4.7(b) suggests. The probable explanation for the lack of a triangular relationship 
may be due to the existence of Type I and Type H errors. The existence of Type I and Type 11 
errors suggests that co-integration is being accepted sometimes when it should be rejected and 
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in other cases co-integration is being rejected when it should be accepted. If co-integration is 
being accepted when it should be rejected and vice versa a triangular relationship will fail to 
hold. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter a preliminary discussion of the empirical characteristics of short-horizon 
UK security and portfolio returns was undertaken. This chapter tested the autocorrelation 
properties of four capitalisation stratified portfolios and for four groups of individual securities 
which had been organised on the basis of firm size. It was found that the portfolios of small 
firms are much more autocorrelated than portfolios of large firms. Not only were the first lag 
autocorrelations found to be larger for small firms but the autocorrelations also tended to be 
significant for longer lags than was the case for the large firms. This suggests that the returns 
of portfolios which contain small firms are more predictable than portfolios which contain large 
firms. 
When the cross-sectional averages of autocorrelations for the individual securities were 
estimated it became obvious that the portfolio autocorrelation patterns were not shared by 
individual securities, even for the small firms. This suggests that inefficiency is probably not 
the cause of the return predictability at a security level because we would expect to observe 
some of this predictability at a portfolio level also. This suggests that the predictability may be 
due to some other cause such as non-syncronous trading or time variation in expected returns, 
or both. 
The squared and absolute autocorrelations for the portfolios, and for individual returns 
when they were sampled at weekly intervals suggested that the conditional variance was 
changing. This provides some support for the possibility that expected returns are time varying 
which will be investigated more fully in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
In the second set of predictability tests, which were undertaken in this c'napter, a set of 
individual security prices were tested using the co-integration approach. The co-integration test 
provides an alternative way of testing for predictability. The co-integration tests which are 
performed here concentrate on identifying whether there is an equilibrium relationship between 
two share prices. In which case, if the equilibrium relationship is disturbed temporarily at least 
one of the share prices must react in a predictable way to restore the equilibrium relationship. 
The results of the co-integration tests suggested that the securities which were tested 
were in some cases predictable. Furthermore, the predictability appeared to be associated with 
firm size. The conclusion of this chapter is that the share prices of small firms appear to be more 
predictable than the share prices of large firms. Although, the nature of this predictability does 
not appear to be detectable in'traditional autocorrelation tests. The results from these 
107 
co-integration tests are not assumed to provide evidence of market inefficiency, as was stated 
in the previous chapter predictability does not necessarily assume that markets are inefficient, 
a higher burden of proof is required than is provided by these tests. 
Further research should be directed at investigating the causation of portfolio and 
individual security return autocorrelation. Although, Conrad and Kaul (1988) (1990) have 
attempted to estimate the causes of predictable variations in expected returns, caused by time 
variation of expected returns and other factors in US portfolio and security returns, a detailed 
analysis of UK portfolio returns or UK individual security returns has never been undertaken. 
Further research should also be directed at ascertaining the role that firm size has to play in 
determining the magnitude of autocorrelation introduced by microstructure considerations and 
reconciling any relationships to theoretical microstructure models. 
One study has attempted to gauge the magnitude of negative autocorrelation introduced 
by bid-ask bounce. Pagano and Roell (1990) investigated stocks which were listed on both the 
London stock exchange and the Paris Bourse. In order to estimate the magnitude of the bid-ask 
spread on the London stock exchange Pagano and Roell (1990) estimated the first order serial 
correlation coefficient for dually listed stocks. They found evidence of strong negative 
autocoffelation, negatively related to firm size. 
As this chapter has shown co-integration is not always a very useful test to be employed 
if markets are being tested to ascertain whether they are efficient or not. Despite this the use of 
co-integration tests has been widespread. Further research needs to investigate whether the 
information provided by co-integration analysis can be used in a trading rule. Only if the 
information provided by co-integration can be used in a trading rule which provides profits in 
excess of buy and hold returns can we be sure that the existence of co-integration has provided 
evidence of market inefficiency. 
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Table 4.1 
Summary Statistics for the LSPD Companies 1976-1991 
where, Mean is the mean monthly return for all stocks listed on the LSPD database, cy refers 
to the standard deviation of the LSPD returns. Min and Max refer to the minimum and the 
maximum return experienced during a given sample period. Skewness is the skewness 
statistic. 
Sample Mean (T Min Max Skewness 
1976-1991 0.111 0.06 -0.441 0.151 -2.61 
1976-1984 0.013 0.05 -0.217 0.140 -0.95 
1985-1991 0.008 0.07 -0.441 0.113 -3.50 
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Table 4.2 
Summary Statistics for Portfolio Returns 1976-1991 
This table contains summary statistics for monthly realised returns, squared returns, and absolute returns for four 
equally weighted portfolios of the 50 smallest, 50 small -intermediate, 50 large-intermediate, and the 50 largest 
shares on the UK stock exchange, formed by rankings of market value of equity outstanding at the beginning of 
January of each year, January 1976 to December 1991. %T is the mean percentage return and (Y(R) is the return 
standard deviation, but because this is a small value to prevent confusion this has been raised by three decimal 
places. ýTare the estimated autocorrelation coefficients at lag c. Under the null hypothesis that these coefficients 
are zero their standard errors are ý=0.035 for weekly returns and 0.0722 for monthly returns. Tn 
Monthly Returns 
%R (T(R) x 10 
3 
P, P2 P3 N P5 
ý6 
R, 1.25 4.493 0.476 0.141 0.011 0.031 0.072 0.106 
R2 1.09 3.992 0.361 0.112 0.019 -0.020 -0.072 0.029 
R3 1.37 5.420 0.228 -0.005 -0.091 -0.067 -0.040 -0.023 
R4 1.04 6.516 0.169 -1.00 -0.154 -0.071 0.027 -0.056 
(R 1)2 0.22 0.517 0.419 0.010 0.236 0.387 0.185 -0.007 
(R2 )2 0.17 0.347 0.253 -0.052 0.051 0.253 0.069 -0.039 
(R3 )2 0.31 0.650 0.314 -0.005 0.107 0.226 0.135 -0.023 
(R4 )2 0.43 1.06 0.172 0.049 0.002 -0.007 -0.009 -0.037 
1 R, 3.41 3.17 0.345 0.027 0.137 0.217 0.217 -0.019 
1 R2 3.13 2.29 0.265 -0.019 -0.009 0.152 0.047 -0.053 
R3 4.10 3.38 0.218 0.073 0.049 0.163 0.120 -0.024 
R4 4.83 4.49 0.194 0.047 0.030 0.027 0.041 -0.035 
Weekly 
Returns 
%R (T(R) x 10 
3 P, 
ý2 ý3 ý4 ý5 ý6 
R, 0.3046 14.886 0.401 0.258 0.145 0.118 0.134 0.095 
R2 0.3130 16.865 0.386 0.216 0.136 -0.127 -0.058 0.056 
R3 0.3331 22.047 0.298 -0.164 -0.052 -0.095 -0.016 -0.036 
R4 0.1809 23.765 0.148 -0.109 -0.021 -0.059 -0.039 -0.004 
(R 0.23 0.752 0.604 0.343 0.134 0.062 0.052 0.048 
(R2 )2 0.29 0.889 0.465 0.233 0.112 0.056 0.074 0.031 
(R3 )2 0.49 1.363 0.379 0.150 0.052 0.058 0.007 0.004 
(R4 )2 0.56 1.693 0.428 0.077 0.014 0.049 0.020 0.046 
R, 10.55 10.924 0.344 0.282 0.146 0.090 0.069 0.077 
R2 11.97 12.319 0.379 0.261 0.163 0.115 0.092 0.053 
R3 15.83 15.651 0.305 0.203 0.067 0.106 0.030 0.040 
R4 17.35 16.329 0.194 0.124 0.035 0.124 0.057 0.098 
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Table 4.3 
Summary Statistics for Individual Returns 1976-1991 
This table contains cross-sectional average summary statistics for weekly realised returns, squared returns, and 
absolute returns for four groups of securities, where each group of individual securities contains the 50 smallest, 
50 small- intermediate, 50 large -intermediate, and the 50 largest stocks on the UK stock exchange. These groups 
were formed by ranking stocks according to market value of equity outstanding at the beginning of January of 
each year, January 1976 to December 1991. cy(R) are the cross-sectional averages of the security return standard 
deviations. The p, are the average autocorrelations at lag r for the component securities within a portfolio. The 
standard errors for the weekly autocorrelations are approximately 0.035 for the monthly autocorrelations the 
standard errors are approximately 0.0722. 
Monthly Returns 
ý-(R) x 103 
-PI 
P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
R, 30.51 0.008 0.002 0.019 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 
R2 25.79 0.037 0.011 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.021 
R3 21.38 0.015 -0.041 -0.025 -0.019 -0.013 -0.006 
R4 18.88 -0.040 0.025 0.049 -0.008 -0.028 0.029 
(R 1)2 0.008 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.010 
(R2 )2 0.095 0.073 0.060 0.067 0.069 0.053 
(R3 )2 -0.042 -0.046 0.090 -0.055 -0.075 -0.061 
(R4 )2 0.037 0.043 -0.003 -0.026 -0.002 0.024 
I R, 1 0.002 -0.009 0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
1 R21 0.121 0.041 0.041 0.047 0.051 0.031 
1 R31 0.098 0.055 0.043 0.051 0.034 0.043 
1 R41 0.049 0.030 -0.012 -0.041 -0.014 0.028 
Weekly Returns 
jj(-R) X 103 Pi P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
R, 73.91 0.055 0.032 0.006 0.029 0.003 0.015 
R2 69.90 0.066 0.024 0.008 0.001 0.011 -0.003 
R3 50.05 0.106 0.045 0.001 0.010 -0.008 -0.014 
R4 46.81 0.039 0.031 -0.034 -0.018 -0.034 0.004 
(R 1)2 0.051 0.037 0.029 0.030 0.109 0.055 
(R2 )2 0.085 0.046 0.054 0.035 0.037 0.019 
(R3 )2 0.122 0.076 0.045 0.037 0.031 0.032 
(R4 )2 0.185 0.105 0.067 0.065 0.049 0.059 
R, 0.179 0.111 0.090 0.078 0.072 0.0711 
R2 0.168 0.115 0.098 0.081 0.080 0.067 
R3 0.185 0.125 0.086 0.076 0.066 0.071 
R4 0.152 0.113 0.084 0.092 0.065 0.071 
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Table 4.4 
Companies Used in The Co-integration Study 
The names of the companies which were used in the co-integration tests are provided below. 
Company refers to company name. Code refers to the code no given to each company name, 
LI is the largest company at the start of the sample period while L18 is the smallest. Market 
capitalisation refers to the market capitalisation of companies in pounds as recorded for January 
1976. 
Company Market Capitalisation Code 
Hawker Siddeley Group 62,831,700 Ll 
Rugby Group PLC 31,390,835 L2 
Blue Circle Industries 20,597,880 L3 
Pilgrom House Group 9,382,680 L4 
Kalon Group 6,826,100 L5 
Silentnight Holdings 6,375,795 L6 
Manders (Holdings) 3,465,486 L7 
Hunting Assoc Pl. Ind 2,543,620 L8 
Wholesale Fittings 1,308,720 L9 
Reylon Group PLC 1,107,111 L10 
Clarke (T) and Co LTD 863,635 L11 
Fortnum and Mason 825,000 L12 
Toothill(R and W) LTD 688,512 L13 
Dewhurst PLC 295,000 L14 
Arlen PLC 260,000 L15 
Craig and Rose 197,917 L16 
Bulgin (A and F) and Co 176,820 L17 
Elys (wimbledon) LTD 139,841 L18 
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Table 4.5 
The Results of the Stationarity Tests on The Share Prices 
This table provides the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root tests which were 
conducted to establish the order of integration for each of the share prices. Tests are conducted 
using the logarithm of the share price. ADF(I) is the Augmented Dickey Fuller test with one 
lag, ADF(3) is the Augmented Dickey Fuller test with three lags. The critical value at a 95% 
confidence level is -3.4373 for trended variables. An ADF(1) and an ADF(3) test was used to 
ensure that all of the autocoffelation in the return series was purged from the residuals. 
Code ADF(I) ADF(3) 
Ll -3.0565 -2.6704 
L2 -3.1711 -3.4489 
U -2.1438 -1.8492 
L4 -1.8532 -1.6093 
L5 -3.2880 -2.7116 
L6 -2.2055 -1.2892 
L7 -2.5206 -1.8964 
L8 -2.3424 -2.0536 
L9 -3.0682 -2.4505 
L10 -2.5164 -2.4323 
Lll -1.0397 -0.4389 
L12 -1.9293 -2.2402 
L13 -1.3022 -1.8492 
L14 -2.3162 -2.0391 
L15 -2.9444 -3.8836 
L16 -2.2207 -2.3082 
L17 -2.7544 -3.1349 
L18 -1.9321 -1.8390 
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Table 4.6 
The Results of the Stationarity Tests for The Differenced Share Prices 
This table provides the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root tests which were 
conducted to establish the order of integration for each of the differenced share prices. Tests are 
conducted using the logarithm of the share price. ADF(I) is the Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
with one lag, ADF(3) is the augmented Dickey Fuller test with three lags. The critical value at 
a 95% confidence level is -3.4373 for trended variables. An ADF(I) and an ADF(3) test was 
used to ensure that all of the autocorrelation in the return series was purged from the residuals. 
Code ADF(I) ADF(3) 
Ll -9.6748 -7.1989 
L2 -9.7852 -7.6961 
L3 -9.3293 -7.4045 
L4 -12.1810 -6.9559 
L5 -8.2548 -7.9448 
L6 -8.0128 -6.6362 
L7 -9.6625 -8.5151 
L8 -11.5020 -6.1666 
L9 -10.9101 -6.9915 
LIO -9.2598 -6.8586 
L11 -11.8111 -8.6698 
L12 -9.0675 -6.6493 
L13 -10.9940 -5.7979 
L14 -9.5126 -8.0270 
L15 -6.2707 -7.3150 
L16 -11.0002 -6.7165 
L17 -10.1004 -7.7728 
L18 -9.8947 -7.9059 
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Table 4.7(a) 
Summary of Co-integration Results at a 95% Confidence Level 
The following table provides a summary of the co-integration tests at a 95% confidence level. 
y indicates the existence of a co-integrating vector, n indicates the absence of a co-integrating 
vector. 
1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
I n n n n n n n n n n n y n y n y n 
2 y n n n n n n y n y y n y n n n 
3 n n n y n n n n n n n y n n n 
4 n n n n n n n n y n n n n n 
5 n n n y n n n y n y y y n 
6 n n n n y n y n y n n n 
7 n n n n n y n y n n n 
8 n n n n y n n n n n 
9 n n n y n y n n n 
10 n n y y y n y n 
11 n y n y n y n 
12 n n n n y n 
13 y y y y y 
14 n n y n 
15 y y y 
16 n n 
17 
18 
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Table 4.7(b) 
Summary of Co-integration Results at a 90% Confidence Level 
The following table provides a summary of the co-integration results at a 90% level. y indicates 
the existence of a co-integrating vector, n indicates the absence of a co-integrating vector. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 n n n n n n n n n y n y n y n y n 
2 y n n n n n n y n y y n y n n n 
3 n n y y n n n n n y n y n y n 
4 n n n n n n n n y n y n n n 
5 n n n y n n n y n y y y n 
6 n n y y y n y n y n y n 
7 n n y n n y n y n n n 
8 n n n n y n y n n n 
9 n n n y n y n y n 
10 n n y y y n y n 
11 n y n y n y n 
12 y n y n y n 
13 y y y y y 
14 y n y n 
15 y y y 
16 n n 
17 n 
18 
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Table 4.8 
Results of the Johansen Trace Test 
This table provides the results of the Johansen trace test for a bi-variate regression between the 
share price of the firm in the stub of the table to those above the statistic. Critical values are 
15.410 at a 95% confidence level and 13.325 at a 90% confidence level. The Johansen tests 
were undertaken with 7 lags specified in the vector autoregression. It was also assumed that the 
stock prices tested here are trended variables. 
1 13 15 11 17 
25.9736 16.4112 13.9543 17.9212 
2 3 10 12 13 15 
15.7379 23.2114 15.4901 18.8758 18.0270 
3 6 7 13 15 17 
14.7270 18.8048 13.7257 21.3953 14.2408 
4 13 15 
18.9494 14.1360 
5 9 13 15 16 17 
16.9185 19.5082 20.2320 17.5422 17.5301 
6 9 10 11 13 15 17 
13.5836 14.6818 18.7870 18.6738 17.9024 14.3987 
7 10 13 15 
14.3031 15.8704 16.3303 
8 13 15 
21.9544 14.5934 
9 13 15 17 
18.1801 19.6248 15.1195 
10 13 14 15 17 
17.7806 16.0474 17.2387 15.5903 
11 13 15 17 
32.1172 19.8873 17.7189 
12 13 15 17 
14.5464 13.8123 15.7254 
13 14 15 16 17 18 
23.3913 28.5183 16.7457 23.8169 17.7380 
14 15 17 
13.5997 18.4038 
15 16 17 18 
19.6330 21.9558 15.9565 
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Table 4.9 
Results of the Granger Causality Tests 
The results in the following table relate to a variable addition test for the following unrestricted vector autoregression 
model. 
22 
Apj, (Xi + PIPi, 
t- I+ 
P2Pk, 
l- I+. 
' Yi'6Pk, 
t_., 
+ej,, 1,2 
22 
'Ok, t= 
CCk + P3Pj, 
t-I+ 
P4Pk, 
t-I+ OiApj, t-, c+ 
8iAPk,, 
-, 
+ek,, 1,2 
where pj refers to the logarithm of the share price of stock j. Pk refers to the logarithm of the share price of stock 
k. F refers to the results from an F variable addition test. LM refers to the results from a Lagrange Multiplier, LM 
variable addition test. The F, and LM, refer to the results of the variable addition test where Pk, t -I 
APk, 
t -1 and 
APk,, 
-2 
are tested to see if they have a causal influence over Apj,,. Meanwhile, F2 and LM2 refer to the results of the variable 
addition test where pj,, -I 
Apj,, 
-I and 
8Pj,, 
-2 are 
tested to identify whether they have a causal influence over APk, t. 
The superscript 1 adjacent to the LM probability indicates that large firms predict the price of a smaller company, 
while the superscript s indicates that a small firm price predicts a large firm price. 
22 
P2 + Yi : -- 0 P3 + 
F, LM, F2 LM2 
Ij =Ll Ik =LI3 5.73 11.0is 1.095 2.221 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.35) 
Ij =Ll Ik =L]5 2.459 7.362 0.291 0.599 
(0.06) (0.06)' (0.75) (0.75) 
Ij =Ll Ik =L]7 0.068 0.140 3.01 5.99 
(0.93) (0.93) (0.05) (0.05)' 
Ij = L2 Ik, = L3 2.603 7.78 5.483 15.615 
(0.05) (0.05)' (0.00) (0.00), 
Ij =L2 I,, =LIO 3.080 9.19 0.784 2.414 
(0.03) (0.03)' (0.505) (0.49) 
Ij = L2 Ik = L12 1.52 3.09 9.831 18.150 
(0.22) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00), 
Ij = L2 Ik = L13 1.621 4.933 0.13 0.26 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.88) (0.88) 
Ij = L2 Ik, = LJ5 3.45 6.898 0.16 0.301 
(0.03) (0.03)8 (0.85) (0.85) 
Ij =L3 Ik= L7 1.05 0.51 3.72 7.34 
(0.59) (0.60) (0.02) (0.02)' 
I, =L3 Ik= L15 1.05 0.51 21.743 49.082 
(0.59) (0.60) (0.00) (0.00), 
Ij=L4 Ik= L13 0.349 0.692 3.11 6.15 
(0.70) (0.71) (0.04) (0.04)' 
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Table 4.8 (cont. ) 
2 
P2+ Yi P3 + '= 0 
F, LM, F2 LM2 
Ij =L5 Ik= L]7 0.290 0.59 0.24 0.49 
(0.75) (0.75) (0.78) (0.78) 
Ij = L5 Ik. = L9 0.252 0.519 0.113 0.232 
(0.77) (0.77) (0.89) (0.89) 
Ij =L5 Ik. = L]3 0.204 0.419 11.411 22.751 
(0.82) (0.81) (0.00) (0.00), 
I, =L5 Ik= L15 0.22 0.45 0.010 0.021 
(0.80) (0.79) (0.99) (0.04)' 
I, = L5 Ik, = L16 0.315 0.645 0.474 0.969 
(0.73) (0.72) (0.62) (0.62) 
I, =L6 I,. = Lll 7.902 14.894 0.969 1.973 
(0.01) (0.01)" (0.38) (0.37) 
Ij =L6 Ik= L13 2.521 5.04 0.109 0.225 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.89) (0.89) 
IJ =L6 Ik= L15 2.222 4.457 3.120 6.161 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04)' 
Ij =L7 Ik= L13 0.574 1.173 0.151 0.312 
(0.56) (0.56) (0.86) (0.86) 
Ij = L7 Ik, = L15 0.477 0.976 0.31 0.65 
(0.62) (0.61) (0.72) (0.73) 
I, = L8 Iý = L13 0.102 0.209 11.399 22.691 
(0.90) (0.90) (0.00) (0.00), 
Ij =L9 Ik= L13 0.785 1.60 0.035 0.072 
(0.46) (0.45) (0.97) (0.97) 
I, =L9 Ik= L15 0.362 0.74 3.11 6.15 
(0.70) (0.69) (0.04) (0.04), 
I, = L9 I,, = L]7 0.835 1.70 1.74 3.51 
(0.44) (0.43) (0.18) (0.17) 
Ij = L 10 Ik = LJ3 1.406 2.847 8.629 16.141 
(0.24) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00), 
Ij= LIO I,, =L]4 6.165 11.84 2.99 5.95 
(0.00) (0.00)-' (0.05) (0.05)' 
I, = LIO I,, =LI5 0.824 1.681 0.065 0.135 
(0.44) (0.43) (0.94) (0.94) 
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Table 4.9 (cont. ) 
22 
P2 + Yi 0 P3 + 
LM, F2 LM2 
1, =LIO Ik =L]7 11.44 20.79 3.73 7.35 
(0.00) (0.00). ' (0.03) (0.03)1 
I, =Lll Ik = L15 0.025 0.051 5.782 11.121 
(0.98) (0.98) (0.00) (0.00), 
1, =Lll Ik =L]7 0.824 1.556 0.721 1.472 
(0.44) (0.44) (0.49) (0.48) 
Ij =LI2 Ik =L]7 0.969 1.974 6.377 12.22 
(0.38) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00), 
Ij =LI3 Ik = LM 0.021 0.042 1.091 2.218 
(0.98) (0.98) (0.34) (0.33) 
Ij =LI3 
lk = L15 2.063 4.146 2.079 4.18 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Ij =LI3 Ik = L16 2.811 5.991 8.341 16.512 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00), 
Ij =LI3 Ik =L]7 1.462 2.96 1.44 2.92 
(0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Ij =LI3 Ik = L18 0.517 1.06 1.5 3.13 
(0.59) (0.59) (0.21) (0.21) 
I, =LI4 I,, =L]7 0.150 0.309 5.580 10.111 
(0.86) (0.86) (0.00) (0.00), 
Ij= LI5 I,, = L]6 0.256 0.525 5.081 9.874 
(0.77) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00), 
I, = LI5 I,. = L]7 1.597 3.227 1.144 2.324 
(0.21) (0.19) (0.31) (0.31) 
1, = L15 Iý. = L]8 5.700 10.99 1.514 3.060 
(0.00) (0.00)s (0.22) (0.22) 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Mean Reversion in Short Horizon Returns 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will be concerned with examining whether forecasts of future monthly 
portfolio returns, which are made from a weighted sum of past weekly return observations can 
predict future monthly returns better than past monthly returns. This chapter is therefore 
concerned with whether there are rapidly decaying predictable components in UK short-horizon 
portfolio returns so that short-horizon returns are mean-reverting'. 
Section 3.3.3 of Chapter 3 indicated that as much as 45 percent of the variation in 
long-horizon returns appears to be predictable, because, share prices contain transitory 
components that are very persistent. In contrast, the conclusion of studies that seek to gauge 
predictability in short-horizon returns (such as daily, weekly, or monthly frequencies) indicate 
that predictable components of short-horizon returns can only explain a small fraction of the 
variation in realised portfolio returns. For example, short-horizon autocorrelation tests, such as 
those undertaken by Lo and MacKinlay (1988,1990a), which were performed on capitalisation 
based portfolio returns, showed that at most only about 6 percent of the future return to a portfolio 
could be predicted from its previous value. 
However, Conrad and Kaul (1988) demonstrate that like long-horizon returns, weekly 
portfolio returns are also characterised by substantial predictability, which had been understated 
in other studies. More importantly, the predictable component in weekly expected returns seemed 
to dissipate rapidly (within a few weeks) and therefore appeared to be quite different from, and 
perhaps unrelated, to the slow movements in long-horizon expected returns which had been 
documented by Fama and French and Porterba and Summers. 
A uniting characteristic of the work undertaken by Conrad and Kaul, on short-horizon 
returns and the work of Fama and French, on long-horizon returns was the discovery that there 
was a relationship between the size of firms within a portfolio and the extent to which portfolio 
returns were predictable. Both sets of studies found that as firms within a portfolio became 
progressively smaller, the portfolio return became increasingly more predictable. To illustrate 
this, the tests performed on short-horizon returns by Conrad and Kaul found that for the portfolio 
containing the largest firms only 0.7 percent of the variation in portfolio returns was predictable. 
I In Chapter 3 long horizon mean-reversion was discussed in detail. As this chapter pointed 
out share prices are mean reverting if they are away from their fundamental value but 
reverting towards their fundamental value. A stock return which is moving towards its 
fundamental value as an AR(l) process will be positively autocorrelated over short horizons 
even though over long horizons returns will be negatively autocorrelated. 
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However, as the firms within a portfolio got progressively smaller, the proportion of the variation 
in a portfolios return which could be explained increased. For the portfolio containing the 
smallest firms as much as 26.5 percent of the portfolio realised weekly return was found to be 
predictable. Similarly, Fama and French (1988) found that for a portfolio of small firms, 45 
percent of the variation of five year portfolio returns was predictable but, for the largest firms 
in the sample, only 7 percent of five year returns was predictable. 
To demonstrate that short-horizon returns were highly predictable Conrad and Kaul 
(1989) developed a simple model of monthly expected returns that relied on the rapidly decaying 
structure of weekly expected returns. They proposed, that because of the rapidly decaying nature 
of the autocorrelations in short-horizon returns, the most recent weekly returns, will have more 
information about the subsequent month's return than the most recent monthly return. 
If short-horizon returns contain predictable components that decay rapidly, then the most 
recent weekly return will provide more information about the subsequent return performance 
of a security than is provided by less recent weekly return observations. Monthly return 
autocorrelation statistics can be used to forecast monthly returns from past monthly returns, in 
such a test equal weights are given to the previous four weekly realised returns of a month. In 
this case, the forecast based on the autocorrelation pattern will understate the rapid decay in the 
predictable component and will therefore be a poor forecast of the future monthly return. 
Conrad and Kaul (1989) successfully test a model which utilises the information in the 
most recent weekly returns of a month to predict future monthly returns to capitalisation based 
portfolios, which comprise of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange. They find that 
the first order autocorrelation statistic of monthly returns could explain less than 4 percent of 
the variation in monthly returns. Meanwhile, a forecast of monthly portfolio returns based on a 
weighted sum of the past four week's realised returns which attaches greater weight to the most 
recent return observations, is able to explain substantially more of the variation in realised 
portfolio excess returns. This indicated that short-horizon portfolio returns contained predictable 
components, which were mean reverting. 
Conrad and Kaul found that for the smallest firms in a portfolio the autocorrelation pattern 
of monthly returns could only explain approximately 4 percent of the variation in realised 
monthly returns. In contrast, their model which forecasted the future month's return from a 
weighted sum of past weekly returns, where greater weight was given to the most recent weekly 
returns was able to explain up to 25 percent of the variation in realised portfolio returns for the 
portfolio containing the smallest firms. The proportion of the variation in the portfolio return 
explained by past weekly returns was found to decline with firm size. In the case of the large 
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firms, none of the monthly variation in the portfolio return could be explained by the behaviour 
of the expected return series. This suggests that as firm size gets smaller the magnitude of the 
predictable component in the portfolio return gets progressively larger. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. In Section 5.2 the time series model 
which forecasts future returns from prior weekly returns will be described. Since this model 
forecasts monthly returns from prior weekly returns the procedure for identifying the weights 
to be attached to previous weekly returns is also described. In Section 5.3 the data used in this 
study is examined. In Section 5.4 the results from the estimation of the ARMA(l, 1) model of 
returns will be explored to establish how to calculate the weights which are to be imposed on 
past weekly returns. This section also provides results which indicate that the model of expected 
returns tested here predicts future monthly returns better that the autocorrelation pattern of 
monthly returns. Section 5.5 modifies the tests to take account of the turn of the year effect. 
Section 5.6 will provide a summary and some conclusions to the chapter. 
5.2 The Model 
5.2.1 The ARMA(1, I) Model of Realised Returns 
Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 showed that realised returns can be written in terms of the 
expected return and a random error as follows 
E, I(R') t 
w 2) et -iid N(O, (Te 
(5.1) 
Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3 discussed the work of Conrad and Kaul (1988) which showed 
that weekly expected returns are well represented by the following first order autoregressive 
process. 
Et 
-1 
(Rtw) OEt-2(Rt-l)+Mtw-l w 
2) 
u~iid N(O, (5u 
(5.2) 
where, R' is the realised return of a security for week t and E, (R ') is the expected return tt 
for a security at time t-I for a return due in time t, where 0<0<1. 
As Appendix I demonstrates, if expected returns follow an AR(l) process then realised 
returns can be written in the following way. 
Rt = ORt' I+e, ' + Oet. + ut' 1 
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which, because of the properties of e, and u, above, can be written as a familiar ARMA(l, 1) 
process. 
OR' I+ a' - Oa' t- t t-I 
5.2.2 Characterising Monthly Expected Returns 
(5.4) 
Let us define the one month realised return R' as the sum of the four weekly realised t 
returns which occur during a given month 2. 
,r=3 
Rm =R'+R' +R w +Rw ttt-I t-2 t-3 =1 Rt' 0,1,2,3 
, 1=0 
(5.5) 
where, R' is the weekly return which is realised during the last week of the month, RW 3 is the t t- 
weekly realised return for the first week of the month, and R, '-, is the return for week t -, T. 
Since weekly expected returns follow an AR(l) process, and weekly realised returns 
follow an ARMA(l, 1) process, the conditional expected monthly return which exists at the end 
of the previous month for the following month's return, that is, E, t -4(R') can 
be written in terms 
of the four expected weekly returns which make up the following month's expected return as 
shown in Equation (5.6), which is derived in Appendix 2. 
3w 
(1 +0+02 
(5.6) 
1w0,1,2,3 Et-4(Rtm) ý= 
Et-4 
(T=O 
Rt + 0')Et-4(Rt-3) 
If expected returns follow an AR(l) process and realised returns follow an ARMA(l, 1) 
process then the expected weekly return for the following week can be written as an infinite 
order autoregressive process as follows. 
E, wwww 
- I(R, 
)= WIR, I+ 
AV2R, 
-2 
+ WA-3 + (5.7) 
where, ig, are the weights which are attached to each of the past realised returns, these are derived 
in Appendix 3. This means that the infinite AR representation for monthly expected returns can 
be written in terms of the four weekly expected returns of a given month, as shown in the 
following equation, which is derived in Appendix 4. 
Et m= 7E w+Rw 
-4(Rt I t-4 2 t-5 
71i =0-1 (0-0)(1 +0+0 
2 +0 
3)i= 1ý213 ... 00 
(5.8) 
(5.9) 
2 Although monthly returns usually refers to the return which accrues over a calendar month 
in this study monthly return will be synonymous with a four weekly return. 
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where, ni are the weights to be attached to the past realised weekly returns, such that 7r, is the 
weight given to the most recent weekly return when predicting the following month's return. 
Equation (5.8) demonstrates that as long as short-horizon expected returns contain 
predictable components, which decay rapidly, then a better prediction of monthly returns can 
be obtained from past weekly returns, than can be obtained from past monthly returns. The 
intuition is that the quality of the time-series forecasts are a function of the weights placed on 
past observations, and monthly time-series models put the same weights on all weeks within a 
particular month. However, if there is rapid mean-reversion in weekly expected returns, the 
weights placed on past weeks should decay exponentionally (and rapidly) because the most 
recent weeks of a particular month contains a disproportionately large amount of information 
about the subsequent month's return. This means that when you are trying to forecast future 
monthly returns the degree to which future monthly returns are predictable will be understated, 
unless greater weight is given to the most recent weekly return observations. 
If expected monthly returns are to be forecast from past weekly returns the forecasting 
model to be used will contain the four expected weekly returns which coincide with a given 
month as follows. 
Et-4(Rtm) = wRtw-4 + W2Rtw Rw 6+W4R' 5+W3 t- t-7 (5-10) 
In this example, the expected future monthly return at the end of the previous month Et t -4(R') 
is forecast from the previous four weekly return series' which are 
Rtw- 
4, 
RtW-5, RtW-6, RtW-7- Since 
the monthly conditional expected return is a weighted average of the four past weekly returns 
the sum of the weights WI, W2ý W3, w4 which are attached to the previous four weekly returns must 
sum to unity so that only the past four weekly returns are used in the forecast. The weights 
attached to each of the previous weekly realised returns so that the weights sum to unity will be 
as follows 
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i=1 i=1 
()i-1(0_0)(I +0+02 +01) 
(I +0+ 02 + 03) 
=I 
(5.11) 
so that wi = 0'-'(1 - 0), a derivation of this is provided in Appendix 5. 
5.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
5.3.1 Data 
Over the sample period January 1976 to December 199 1, weekly Wednesday share prices 
of randomly selected companies were obtained from Datastream. Every January the companies 
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which had been selected were ranked on the basis of market capitalisation (share price times no 
of shares issued) and then sorted into four portfolios, stratified on the basis of capitalisation 
value. Each portfolio contained fifty stocks. From the weekly security prices, four equally 
weighted portfolio returns were calculated in the manner described in Section 4.1.4 of Chapter 
4. Portfolio P' contains the smallest firms, P' contains the small-intermediate firms, PW contains 123 
the large -intermediate firms and P' contains the largest firms in the sample. The portfolio 4 
excess return was then calculated as the portfolio weekly return less the weekly Treasury Bill 
Rate. It should be noted that in this study returns will be synonymous with excess returns. In 
this chapter excess returns have been tested to ascertain whether there is predictability in the 
realised risk premium as well as the pure return series. 
A set of monthly (that is four weekly) returns was then calculated for each of the individual 
securities. These monthly security returns were calculated as the log price difference over a four 
week period as follows. 
Rt' = ln(P, ) - In(P, - 
(5.12) 
From the security returns an equally weighted portfolio return was calculated for four 
capitalisation based portfolios in the same manner as described for the weekly returns. Portfolio 
P, "I contains the portfolio containing the smallest firms, P2.. contains the small-intermediate firms, 
P' contains the large-intermediate firms and P4"' contains the large firms. 3 
5.3.2 Autocorrelations 
Table 5.1, presents the autocorrelation statistics from for the weekly and monthly excess 
returns obtained for the period January 1976 to December 199 1. As expected, the 
autocoffelations for excess returns mirror those reported in Table 4.1 of Chapt. --r 4 which were 
estimated for the pure return series. For weekly returns the autocorrelations are large and 
significant and the higher order autocorrelations, although, significant decay at longer lags. The 
weekly autocorrelation structure is characterised by a consistent pattern as we move from the 
smallest portfolio P, to the largest P4 . The magnitude and persistence of the autocorrelations 
decline monotonically. In the case of the weekly autocorrelations the previous periods' return 
for the portfolio containing the smallest firms' explains about 16 percent (0.4 1)' of the variation 
in portfolio returns. For the portfolio containing the largest firms the first order autocorrelation 
can only explain about 2 percent (0.15)2 of the variation in portfolio returns. 
A similar pattern is displayed by the monthly return series since the autocorrelations are 
also large and significant. In all cases the first order autocorrelation is significant. The monthly 
autocorrelations decline much more quickly, the second order autocorrelation is insignificant 
for all but the portfolio containing the smallest firms. 
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5.4 Parameter Estimates of the Model 
This section will provide the results from the estimation of the ARMA(l, I) model of 
expected returns. From the estimates of 0 and 0, weights are calculated and attached to the 
previous weekly returns. Using these weights, forecasts of the following month's return are 
made. This section shows that the monthly return autocorrelation test understates the extent to 
which monthly returns can be predicted from the previous four weekly returns. 
5.4.1 Weekly Estimates of the ARMA(1,1) Model of Weekly Realised Returns. 
In this section an ARMA(l, l) model of realised weekly returns is estimated using the 
non-linear procedure of Box and Jenkins (1970) for each of the four portfolios. 
Rwwww 
P"t = 
OPRP, t-, +ap't -Opap't-, p= 1ý2,3,4 
(5.13) 
where, R' are realised returns in time t, OP is the autoregressive coefficient which captures the P't 
relationship between the previous weekly return and the current weekly return of portfolio p, 
OP is the moving average coefficient for portfolio p which captures the relationship between the 
previous periods error and the following periods weekly return. The term ap, t is a white noise 
error. 
Diagnostic tests which are performed on the residuals obtained from the estimation of 
the ARMA(l, l) model are presented in Table 5.2. A stationary autoregressive process for 
expected returns appears to be well specified. The residuals from the ARMA(l, 1) model, for 
three of the portfolios, behave like white noise (the fourth is close to being white noise). For all 
four portfolios there is an absence of autocorrelation in the residuals obtained from the estimation 
of the ARMA(l, 1) model, for example the first order autocorrelations are all less than I percent. 
Further support for the model is provided by the Ljung-Box (1978) Q statistic, which tests the 
hypothesis that all the autocorrelations up to lag 6 arejointly zero. For all three of the portfolios 
this is insignificant and is only marginally significant for the fourth. The ARMA(l, 1) model for 
realised excess returns therefore appears to be well specified. 
Estimates of 0 are significantly different from zero and unity for all portfolios. The 
magnitude of the 0 is monotonically associated with the size of firms in the portfolio. As we 
move from the portfolio containing the smallest firms, that is P,, to the portfolio containing the 
largest firms P4 the size of 0 diminishes. For the portfolio containing the smallest firms the 
estimated value of 0 is 0.668 but for the portfolio containing the largest firms 0 is only 0.488. 
This pattern is entirely consistent with the autocorrelation pattern of the portfolio returns, since 
we would expect the size of 0 to reflect the magnitude of the first order autocorrelation. The 
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estimated values of 0 presented here are consistent with those presented by Conrad and Kaul 
(1988) who estimated an ARMA(l, 1) model for portfolios which contained stocks listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange. 
So far it has been established that there are predictable components in short-horizon 
returns which dissipate quickly, this has implications for the relative importance of different 
weeks within a particular month when predicting the subsequent month's return. The pattern 
discussed here suggests that the most recent week's realised return contains more information 
about the subsequent month's return than is provided by more distant returns. This means that 
when forecasting the future month's return from the previous weekly return more weight should 
be given to the most recent weekly return as this contains more information about next month's 
returns. 
5.4.2 Calculating the Weights 
Using equation (5.10) and estimates of 0 which are provided in Table 5.2, it is possible 
to construct the weights to be attached to each of the four weekly returns of the previous month. 
The procedure for calculating the weights was outlined in detail in Appendix 5, this procedure 
is followed exactly in this section. As Table 5.3 indicates, to predict monthly portfolio returns 
a disproportionately large weight should be given to the fourth, and therefore the most recent 
week of the previous month when attempting to forecast future monthly returns. 
For example, in the case of the smallest portfolio the weights given to the return of the 
fourth, third, second and first week of the previous month are as follows 0.68 0.23 0.07 and 
0.02. This means that the monthly expected return series for the small firm portfolio can be 
calculated as 
E, 
- 4(R' 
)=0.68(R', (5.14) 
P't p, -4)+0.23(Rpwt-5)+0.07(Rpwt-6)+0.02(Rpwt 1 -7) 
where, 4(Rp', ) is the monthly conditional expected return of portfolio p which is expected at 
the end of the previous month, that is, week t-4 of the previous month, and ep't is a random 
error. 
For all four portfolios the weights attached to the previous weekly returns decline rapidly, 
actually the rate of decline in all four portfolios is very similar. For example, for the large firms 
the weights are 0.66 0.23 0.08 and 0.03 and are therefore very similar to the weights of P, which 
is the portfolio containing the smallest firms. This reflects the changing values of 0 across the 
four portfolios because as 0 gets smaller, a greater weight is attatched to the most recent weekly 
return of the previous month. 
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5.4.3 Forecasts of Monthly Returns 
To establish whether the expected monthly return obtained from the weighted sum of 
expected weekly returns predicts future monthly returns better than the previous month's return 
the regression which is described by equation (5.15) is estimated. This is a regression of the 
following month's realised return on a constant and the expected monthly return which is 
anticipated in week t-4. Where the monthly expected return is calculated as a weighted sum 
of the previous four weekly realised returns using the weighting scheme outlined in the previous 
section. 
Rm ni 
p"'t 
"': (Xp + PpEt-4(Rp, 
t)+ np,, (5.15) 
M 
where, RP, t is the realised monthly return for portfolio p, Et-4(Rp', ) is the expected monthly 
return for portfolio p which is expected at the end of the previous month, while np, t is a white 
noise error. 
The k2of this regression will indicate the proportion of the variation in realised returns 
explained by the model of expected returns. Of course, if the k2indicates that more than about 
10 percent of the variation in portfolio returns can be explained, confirmation will be provided 
that the model of expected returns tested here has more predictive power than the autocorrelation 
patterns which could explain no more than about 10 percent of the variation in a portfolios return. 
For all portfolios the slope coefficients are close to one and the constant is close to zero. 
This indicates that expected returns are an unbiased predictor of future realised returns. Although 
in some cases the t-statistics associated with the constant are significant, when the constant is 
significant the magnitude of the coefficient is far too small to have any predictive power. The 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals appears to be ruled out. In all cases the ARCH(6) 
statistic, which can detect up to sixth order heteroscedasticity indicates that the null hypothesis 
of no heteroscedasticity in the residuals can not be rejected in all four cases. 
-2 
TheR of this equation indicates that a much higher proportion of the variation in realised 
monthly returns can be explained from the model of expected returns than can be explained by 
using past realised monthly returns. The k2 Of PI, P2andP3 are all approximately 15 percent. 
This means that the model of expected monthly returns which attaches greater weight to the 
most recent weekly expected returns can explain substantially more of the variation in portfolio 
returns than can the previous realised monthly return. This indicates that there is mean-reversion 
in the portfolio returns for all but the portfolios containing the largest firms. 
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In the case of the large firms the k2is only 0.008 percent which suggests that the model 
tested here does not predict any of the variation in realised monthly returns. This suggests that 
for the large firms short-horizon returns do not contain predictable components and are therefore 
not mean-reverting over short-horizons. 
-2 In this study, the R is very similar for all but the portfolio containing the largest firms. 
As such, the results presented here for the UK contrast with the findings of Conrad and Kaul 
who found that for US stocks the k2became progressively larger as the size of firms within a 
portfolio declined. 
5.5 The January Effect 
In an attempt to improve the explanatory power of expected returns a second model of 
expected returns was tested, which takes account of the calendar anomalies which are a 
characteristic of the UK stock market. This model not only takes advantage of the time series 
properties of the ARMA(1,1) model but also exploits any seasonal patterns which exist, but are 
not already accounted for. The two most important seasonalities for the UK stock market occur 
in January and April. For example, Levis (1985) reports that returns for stocks listed on the 
London stock exchange are higher in both of these months. Seasonality work which will be 
presented in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6 confirms this pattern over the sample period used in this 
study. If the time series coefficients obtained from the estimation of the ARMA(l, 1) model fail 
to capture the presence of these seasonalities then expected returns will understate realised 
returns during these months. 
To improve the forecasts of realised returns a number of models with seasonal dummies 
were estimated. Initially, in order to establish which seasonals might provide an additional source 
of predictability an ARMA(l, 1) model with dummies for each of the weeks in January (to capture 
the turn of the year effect) and dummies for each of the first two weeks in April(to capture the 
effect of tax loss trading) was estimated. Once the model was estimated it became clear that the 
only dummies which provided additional explanatory power were the three dummies which 
represented the first three weeks of January. Consequently, the ARMA(l, 1) model was 
re-estimated, this time with the inclusion of only the dummies which represented each of the 
first three weeks of January. 
Rp, t= 
81, 
p 
+ 82, 
pJan, +83, pJan2+84, pJan3+ORP, t-, -Oap, t- I +ap't 
(5.16) 
where, 
Rp, t is the return to portfolio p 
in time t. 
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Jan, is a dummy variable which takes on the value of I if it is the first week of January but a 
zero otherwise. 
Jan2 is a dummy variable which takes on the value of I if it is the second week of January but 
a zero otherwise. 
Jan3 is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if it is the third week of January but a 
zero otherwise. 
6,, 
p is the constant coefficient. 
82, 
p 
63, 
p 
84, 
pis the coefficient attached to the January dummies, which indicates how much above 
or below the constant returns are in January. 
The coefficients obtained from this model are presented in Table 5.5. In the case of the 
portfolio of large firms the addition of the January dummies makes a considerable difference 
to the estimated coefficients. The coefficient of the autoregressive component declines from 
0.488 to 0.064. Meanwhile, for the large firms, the moving average coefficient also declines 
from 0.344 to 0.254. In the case of the large firms, the January dummies are economically 
meaningful. For example, the dummies for January reveal that average returns for the portfolio 
of large firms is approximately 0.75 percent higher if the month is a January, although, most of 
this accrues during the first week of January. The inclusion of the January dummies is likely to 
improve the forecasting ability of the model for the large firm portfolio. This is not the case for 
the other portfolios. For all of the other portfolios the magnitude of the coefficients associated 
with the January dummies are very small. For the other three portfolios the addition of the 
January dummy is therefore likely to add very little to the forecasting ability of the ARMA 
model. 
Expected returns for the large firm portfolio were calculated as follows. 
EP, M (RP, W W, $p =4 (5.17) t-4(RP, t): = 
811p + WI(RPWIt 
- 4) 
+ W2 t-5) 
+ W3(Rp, 
t-6) 
+ W4(Rp, 
t-7) w 
EP, t-4(R 
ni 
t)=0.002+0.75RPwt +0.19RPwt +0.05RP"t +O. 
OlRw p=4 (5.18) P, -4 -5 -6 p, t -7 
Additionally, if the future month's return falls during January expected returns will be 
inflated by approximately 0.0064,0.0004 and 0.0008 to reflect that the future month's return 
coincides with the first second or third week of January. A similar procedure was followed to 
estimate the expected returns for each of the three other portfolios. 
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The results of undertaking a regression of realised returns on expected returns derived 
from this model are presented in Table 5.6. It is clear that for the portfolio of large firms the 
inclusion of the January dummies substantially improves the forecast of future monthly returns. 
Expected returns can now explain almost 8 percent of the variation in the returns ofP4. This 
confirms results which will be presented in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6 which suggests that the 
January effect in the UK is more pronounced for the returns of large firms. For the other three 
portfolios no additional explanatory power is obtained by including the January dummies. This 
indicates that the ARMA(l, 1) model, for these three portfolios, captures very well the seasonal 
behaviour of the portfolio returns. In some cases the inclusion of a constant January premium 
reduces the performance of expected returns slightly. In all cases except one, the results from 
an ARCH(6) test for heteroscedasticity revealed that the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects 
could not be rejected. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This study has shown that short-horizon returns, in this case monthly returns are more 
predictable than is suggested by the autocorrelation pattern of realised monthly returns. 
Exploiting the autocorrelation patterns of realised monthly returns allows no more than about 
10 percent of the variation in portfolio returns to be predicted. Autocorrelation tests assume that 
each weekly return within the previous month contains the same amount of information. This 
will not be the case if short-horizon returns contain predictable components which dissipate 
very rapidly so that they display a mean-reverting pattern. In this case, the most recent week 
may say a lot more about the future monthly return than is suggested by less recent weeks. In 
which case, when predicting future monthly returns more weight should be given to the most 
recent weeks of the previous month, because, the most recent weekly returns provide the most 
information about the subsequent months performance. 
In this study an ARMA(l, 1) model of weekly portfolio returns was estimated, in order 
to derive weights which can be attached to previous weekly returns. These weights indicate that 
more importance should be placed on the most recent weekly return, when trying to predict 
future monthly returns. It is found that the model tested in this chapter, which gives greater 
weight to the most recent return information, can predict up to 15 percent of the variation in the 
future month's portfolio return. Which is a substantial improvement over the proportion which 
can be explained by autocorrelation tests. 
This chapter finds that there is only a weak relationship between the size of firms within 
a portfolio and the extent to which portfolio returns are mean-reverting. For all but the portfolio 
containing the largest firms the model of expected returns tested here performs very well. This 
suggests that for all but the largest firms in the sample there is evidence of mean-reversion in 
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short-horizon returns. For the largest firms in the sample this was not the case because almost 
none of the variation in portfolio returns could be explained by the model of expected returns 
tested here. This suggests that for large firms there is no evidence of mean-reversion in 
short-horizon returns. 
The results presented here are consistent with at least two competing hypotheses. Firstly, 
it is possible, but unlikely, that these predictable components reflect market inefficiency. As 
this study has suggested previously predictability in stock returns does not suggest that markets 
are inefficient unless time variation in expected returns and the presence of microstructure 
frictions can be ruled out. An alternative hypothesis is that the returns in this sample are time 
varying and autocorrelated, which introduces the predictable component into realised returns. 
This amounts to saying that if expected returns rise today the effects of this rise will influence 
future returns but will decay rapidly so that the predictability has a short life-span. The results 
for the large firms are not inconsistent with this hypothesis, although, the nature of the time 
variation would have to be such that there is very little variation over a period of about a month 
in the expected returns of large firms. In which case, the information provided by the most recent 
weekly return will not be any better than the information provided during other weeks of the 
month. The results of an investigation into the time varying properties of the systematic risk 
premium which is undertaken in Chapter 7 suggest that differences in the characteristics of the 
time varying systematic risk premium are consistent with this hypothesis. 
The aims of further research should be directed at determining whether, out of sample, 
the autocorrelation patterns and the associated weights provide any real predicative power. This 
could be achieved by testing this model during the sample period 1992-1996. This would suggest 
whether such models really do allow us to predict ex-ante the behaviour of portfolio stock returns. 
Since this chapter has suggested some interesting differences between the predictability 
of UK and US stock returns a detailed comparative study which investigates the UK and US 
stock markets might be able to suggest reasons for why in the UK there is much weaker evidence 
of short horizon mean reversion. 
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Appendix 1, Proof Of Equation (5.3) in the text. 
Taking equation (5.1) of the text 
Rw = E, (Rw) + ew (Al. 1) Itt 
and lagging this equation by one period 
R, ' Et t-I 
(Al. 2) 
-2(Rtw- + e' 
adding 0 to both sides 
W (Al. 3) ORt 
-I 
OEt-2(R' 
1) + Oe' t- t-I 
Since expected returns follow an AR(l) process 
E, t= 
OEt 
- 2(R' 1) + u' (A 1.4) -, 
(R') t- t-I 
rearranging equation (A 1.4) gives 
"": Et (Al. 5) 
OEt-2(Rtw- 
1) "-I (Rtw) - Utw- I 
Taking equation (Al. 3) and substituting in E, tt- -2(R' 1) provides. - I(R') - u' 1 
for OE, t- 
O(R' 1) = E, -I 
(R') - u' + Oe' 
(Al. 6) 
t- tt t-I 
Then subtracting equation (Al. 1) from (Al. 6) gives 
Rw-ORt' I =E, -j(Rtw)-Et-j(Rt)+etw+Oet' -ut' 
(A 1.7) 
t 
which simplifies to 
Rw - ORw ew + Oe' uw 
(A 1.8) 
tt-tt- t-I 
or 
RW =ORw I+ew+oe' 1-uw 
(A 1.9) 
tt-tt- t-I 
Equation (Al. 9) is equation (5.3) of the text. 
Appendix 2, Proof of Equation (5.6) in the text. 
The following month's return which captures returns from time t-3 to time t will include 
R'R'1, RW2, Rw3 but at time t-4 these are expected returns. If expected returns follow an ttt-t- 
AR(l) process then 
w OEt (A2.1) Et-4(Rt-3) 
-5(Rtw- 4) 
"': 02 tw- 3) 
(A2.2) Et-4(Rtw- 
2) 
Et-, (Rtw- 
4) 
OEt-4(R 
Et-4(Rtw- 
1) 
03Et 
-5(Rtw- 4) 
02 Et-4(Rt-3) (A2.3) 
Et-4(R') = 04Et w)= 03Et (A2.4) t -5(Rt-4 -4(Rtw- 3) 
-4(R') which 
is the sum of the four expected weekly This means that the monthly return E, t 
returns can be written as the sum of equations (A2.1) to (A2.4), that is 
ww2w 03 (Rw 3) Et-4(R') Et-4(R 3) +Et-40(R 3) +Et-40 tt-t- 
(Rt-3) +Et-4 
t- 
Collecting terms gives us Equation (5.6) in the text, that is, 
3 
Et 4 -, t 'r =(j+0+02+03)Et -4(Rt 
Et 
- 4(Rt -I 
Rw W- 3) 
T=o 
(A2.5) 
(A2.6) 
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Appendix 3, Proof of Equation (5.7) in the Text 
Taking an ARMA(l, 1) model such as that of equation (5.4) in the text 
xt =ox, -, +a, -Oat-, 
(A3.1) 
where xt is a variable which follows an ARMA(l, 1) process, and a, is a white noise error process. 
Writing this equation in terms of the lag operator L gives 
(I - OL)x, = (I - OL)a, (A3.2) 
Divide by (I - OL) gives 
(I - OL) (A3.3) 
(I - OL)x, 
which can also be written as 
(1 - OL) (I - OL)-l x, = a, 
(A3.4) 
Expanding the term in the second bracket provides 
(1 - eL) (1 + 
OL +o2 L 2+ 
... )x, = at 
(A3.5) 
Rearranging gives 
Xt+(O-O)Xt- I +oi(O- 
O)Xt- 
2+ + at (A3.6) 
Xt = WlXt 
-I 
+Nf2Xt 
-2+* - +at 
(A3.7) 
The ARMA(l, 1) model thus leads to an autoregressive representation having an infinite number 
of weights. The Nf weights converge for 10 j< 1. 
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Appendix 4, Proof of Equations (5-8) and (5.9) in the Text 
As Appendix 2 demonstrated we can express the following month's return in terms of 
the four component weekly returns so the sum of the four weekly expected returns Provides the 
monthly expected return 
T=3 
Et-4(Rt') = 
Et-4 I R, ' 07 1ý2,3 
, r=O 
(A4.1) 
If expected returns follow an AR(l) process then the following week's expected return 
is 0 times the previous week's return while the n period ahead forecast is 0" times the previous 
weekly return so that 
WW+ 02Et W+ 03Et (A4.2) Et-4(R') -- -4(R t- t ..: 
Et 
t- 3) 
+ OEt 
-4(Rt - 3) -4(Rt - 3) -4(Rw 3) Since the following month's return can be expressed in this way each of the four expected weekly 
returns can be expressed as an infinite order moving average process as follows. 
Et 
-4(Rtw- 3)= 
xV, (Rtw-4) + Nf2(Rtw )+- (A4.3) 
WWW (A4.4) Et-4(Rt 
- 2) 
WARt 
- 4) 
+ VAA-5) + 
Ew --ý VIO 
2 (R + 02 (A4.5) t-4(Rt-1) -' tw- 4) V2 (RtW-5) + 
Et-4(Rw) = W103 (RW- 4+ W2 03 (Rw (A4.6) tt t-5) + 
Taking equations (A. 4.3) to (A4.6) and collecting terms it is possible to ni as the weight 
attached to each of the weekly returns when trying to forecast future monthly returns as follows. 
Ici =0. -1 (0 - 
0) 0+0+02 +0 3 (A4.7) 
which is equation (5.9) in the text. 
Appendix 5. Proof Of How The Weights Are Calculated 
We know that the weight 7ci for a particular past weekly return is 
TCi = 0' 
.-1 (0 - 
0) (1 +0+02 +0 3)i=1,2,3,4 (A5.1) 
Because information in only the previous four weekly returns is to be used to predict 
monthly returns the optimal weight to be attached to the four weekly realised returns must sum 
to unity . This requires calculating the weights proportional to the sum of the weights. 
wt. (A5.2) 
Substituting equation (A5.1) and simplifying gives 
oi-I (A5.3) 
(1+0 +02+.. ) 
which can be written as 
wi =oi-1(1 -0) (A5.4) 
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Table 5.1: 
Autocorrelations of Excess Portfolio Returns 
This table contains the autocorrelations for the excess portfolio returns. Excess portfolio returns 
are calculated as the portfolio return less the risk free return (the Treasury Bill Rate). Excess 
returns are calculated for four equally-weighted portfolios of the 50 smallest, 50 
small-intermediate, 50 large-intermediate, and the 50 largest shares listed on the London stock 
exchange in the sample. The portfolios were formed from the rankings of market value of equity 
outstanding at the beginning of January each year for the sample period January 1976-December 
1991. RI is the return of the small firm portfolio and R4 is the return of the portfolio which 
contains the largest firms, ý,, are the estimated autocorrelation coefficients at lag T. Under the 
hypothesis that these coefficients are zero, their standard errors are approximately 0.035 for the 
weekly autocoffelations and approximately 0.0722 for the monthly autocorrelations, Q are the 
Ljung-Box statistics testing the hypothesis that all autocorrelations up to lag 6 are jointly zero 
their p values are shown in parentheses. 
Weekly autocorrelations 
Pi P2 P3 P4 P5 ý6 
R, 0.407 0.266 0.545 0.277 0.143 0.104 242.54 
(0.00) 
R2 0.391 0.225 0.143 0.345 0.066 0.0633 198.95 
(0.00) 
R3 0.301 0.166 0.055 0.098 -0.013 0.039 109.06 
(0.00) 
R4 0.148 0.109 -0.021 0.060 -0.038 0.004 33.03 
(0.00) 
MontWy autocorrelations 
Pi P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 Q 
R, 0.321 0.183 0.012 0.008 -0.01 -0.049 29.29 
(0.00) 
R2 0.288 0.054 0.039 -0.016 -0.024 0.011 18.53 
(0.00) 
R3 0.200. -0.026 -0.008 -0.038 -0.014 0.019 9.03 
(0.15) 
R4 0.148 -0.155 -0.074 -0.041 0.010 -0.049 11.68 
(0.08) 
Table 5.2: 
Coefficients from the Estimation of the ARMA(1,1) Model. 
This table contains the autocoffelations' of the residuals which are obtained the estimation of 
the following ARMA(l, 1) model of realised excess returns for four equally-weighted portfolios. 
Where P, is the portfolio containing the smallest firms while P4is the portfolio which contains 
the largest companies in the sample. 
Rp, t = ORP, t -I- 
Oap,, 
-I+ ap', 
Under the hypothesis that these coefficients are zero, their standard errors are approximately 
0.035. The Q are the Ljung-Box statistics which test the hypothesis that all autocorrelations up 
to lag 6 are jointly zero, their p values are shown in parentheses. 0, And 0, are the estimated 
AR and MA coefficients respectively which are obtained from the estimation of the ARMA(l, 1) 
model, t-statistics for these coefficients are reported in parenthesis. 
I P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 Q 
P, 0.003 0.001 -0.047 -0.010 0.068 0.046 7.7 0.668 -0.318 
(0.25) (2.91) (-1.90) 
P2 0.005 -0.027 -0.017 0.056 -0.012 0.029 4.367 0.613 -0.264 
(0.63) (6.06) (-2.58) 
P3 
-0.001 0.011 -0.055 0.079 -0.059 0.054 13.34 0.539 -0.264 
(0.04) (9.29) (-3.58) 
P4 -0.009 0.045 -0.069 0.059 -0.046 0.020 10.86 0.488 -0.344 
(0.09) (11.53) (4.31) 
Table 5.3: 
The Weights Attached to Past Weekly Realised Returns. 
This table provides estimates of the weights to be attached to each of the previous four weekly portfolio realised 
returns which are to be used to forecast the future monthly portfolio return. As explained in Section 2 of the text 
and in Appendix 5 these are calculated as 0'(1 - 0). 
Et-4(R, ') = w, 
(R, wv-4) + W2(R'- +w (R' W t53, -d+w4(R, - 7) 
(D -0 WI W2 W3 W4 
1-0 
P, 0.22 0.68 0.23 0.07 0.02 
P2 0.74 0.74 0.19 0.05 0.02 
P3 0.38 0.74 0.19 0.05 0.02 
P4 0.22 0.66 0.23 0.08 0.03 
Table 5.4: 
Estimates from Regressing Monthly Realised Returns on Expected Monthly Returns 
The following table provides estimates obtained from the regression of realised monthly returns (R, m) on 
expected monthly returns E, -4(R, 
') over the sample period January 1976 to December 199 1. (x is the coefficient 
for the constant, P is the coefficient which captures the effect that a I% increase in expected returns will have on 
realised returns. T-statistics are provided in parenthesis. An ARCH(6) test on the residuals captures the effect of 
sixth order heteroscedasticity in the residuals from this model, p values for this statistic are shown in 
parentheses. In all cases the null that there are no ARCH effects can not be rejected. 
W RP' 
P) + np,, 
r ap + PpEr-4(Rp 
cc R2 ARCH(6) 
P, 0.005 1.19 0.148 11.72 
(1.97) (6.05) (0.68) 
P2 0.006 1.27 0.153 6.71 
(2.1) (6.19) (0.34) 
P3 0.007 1.17 0.150 4.94 
(2.09) (6.02) (0.55) 
P4 0.009 0.98 0.008 5.34 
(2.50) (1.63) (0.50) 
Table 5.5: 
Estimates from the ARMA(1, I) model with January Dummies. 
This table reports the coefficients obtained from the estimation of the ARMA(l, 1) model which has dummies to 
capture the effect of the month of January on a portfolio return. 
RP" I= 
81, 
p 
+ 82, 
pJan, + 
83, 
pJan2+84, PJan3+ ORP,, -I- 
Oap,, 
-I+ 
ap, 
8P, , is a constant, Jan,, Jan2, Jan3are dummies which take on a value of one if the weekly return occurs in the 
first, second or third week of January respectively but a zero otherwise. 8p, 2, Sp, 35p, 4are the coefficients for the 
dummies and indicate how much above the constant returns are in either of these weeks in January. Because 
these coefficients are very small in magnitude, in the tables they have been raised by five decimal 
placesm,, W2, w3w4are the new set of weights to be attached to the previous four weekly returns respectively. 
These are calculated as 0'(1 - 0) as explained in Section 2. 
81XIOI 82X 105 83X 105 84X 105 00 W1 W2 W3 W4 
P, 2.10 2.16 5.31 3.04 0.428 -0.193 0.81 0.16 0.03 0 
(5.28) (16.36) (4.54) (-15.07) (0.048) (2.18) 
P2 1.79 6.57 5.34 9.27 0.338 -0.156 0.84 0.13 0.03 0 
(3.97) (10.17) (-3.90) (-21.24) (2.23) (1.48) 
P3 2.46 8.24 8.84 5.73 0.235 -0.272 0.72 0.21 0.06 0.01 
(3.81) (6.59) (-5.37) (-20.67) (1.67) (2.54) 
P4 199.5 643.8 41.4 78.1 0.064 -0.254 0.75 0.19 0.05 0.01 
(2.07) (1.43) (4.36) (-20.41) (1.99) (2.03) 
Table 5.6: 
Estimates from Regressing Returns on Expected Monthly Returns with Dummies 
The following table provides estimates obtained from the regression of realised monthly returns (R, n) on 
expected monthly E, -4(R, 
') returns over the sample period January 1976 to December 199 1. Expected returns 
this time are a weighted sum of the weekly returns from each of the previous four weeks, if the monthly return 
interval falls in a January then the expected weekly return will be inflated by the return predicted by the January 
dummy. (x is the coefficient from the constant. 0 is the coefficient from the expected return, t values are 
indicated in parenthesis. An ARCH(6) test on the residuals captures the effect of sixth order heteroscedasticity 
in the residuals from this model, p values for this statistic are shown in parentheses. In all cases (except one) the 
null that there are no-ARCH effects can not be rejected. 
ARCH(6) 
P, 0.005 1.07 0.148 14.41 
(2.07) (6.05) (0.03) 
P2 0.006 1.17 0.155 (8.61) 
(2.1) (6.21) (0.20) 
P3 0.007 1.17 0.121 5.15 
(2.05) (5.96) (0.52) 
P4 -0.000 0.79 0.090 2.52 
(-0.58) (4.6) (0.86) 
CHAPTER SIX 
Risk, Seasonality and the Asymmetric Behaviour of Stock Returns' 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will be concerned with investigating the seasonal properties of returns, for 
portfolios which have been formed on the basis of market capitalisation. This chapter will provide 
evidence to suggest that for both large and small firms stock returns are abnormally high during 
the months of January and April. The focus of this chapter will be on testing whether abnormally 
high returns during these months can be explained by the pricing of systematic risk. This chapter 
finds that risk is not priced every month of the year but instead investors receive a systematic 
risk premium in only three months of the year, January, April and July. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the systematic risk premium appears to be closely associated with firm size, when 
systematic risk is priced large firms always provide a higher systematic risk premium than small 
firms. It is also found that the risk premiums associated with total and residual risk are 
significantly different from zero for a number of months, including January. This provides little 
evidence in support of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, at least on a month by month basis. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 6.2, provides some background 
information concerning the return behaviour of small firms. Section 6.3, examines the data set 
which is used in this study and discusses the month by month performance of the different 
portfolios. Section 6.4, examines the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology which is used in 
this study to test the relationship between risk and return. Section 6.6, provides the results which 
are obtained when the relationship between systematic risk and return is tested for each month 
of the year. Section 6.5, investigates the relationship between non-systematic risk and return. 
Section 6.7, provides a summary and offers some conclusions to the paper. 
6.2 Background 
6.2.1 The Small Firm Premium 
The existence of a small firm premium has now been established on considerably more 
than half a century of US and UK data. Empirical support for a size premium was first discovered 
by Banz (198 1) who found that the average return from holding small firms long but executing 
a short position on large firms provided a return of about 19.8 percent a year. The small firm 
1. The work presented in this chapter is the basis of two published papers appearing in Journal of Business Finance and Accounting and 
European Journal of Finance respectively. 
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premium has now been identified empirically for a large number of countries, for the UK; by 
Levis (1985,1989) and Fong (1992), Canada; Berges McConnell and Schlarbaum (1985), 
Australia; Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1983) and Japan Kato and Shallheim (1985). 
6.2.2 Return Seasonality and The Small Firm Effect 
A thorough analysis of the size premium has been clouded somewhat by the issue of 
return seasonality, which has been closely linked to the size issue. For example, Keim (1983) 
and Roll (1983) find that in the US, half of the small firm prem ium can be explained by the 
behaviour of returns during the last trading day of December and the first five trading days of 
January. Because of the surge in prices, experienced at the start of the new tax year, the US 
small firm effect has inevitably been linked to tax-loss trading, see for example, Roll (1983), 
Reinganum (1983) and Ritter (1988). Interestingly, the small firm premium in the UK is 
dominated neither by the behaviour of January returns or the new tax year rally. Indeed, counter 
to the US experience large firms rather than small firms appear to perform slightly better in both 
of these months. For example, over the period 1958-1982 Levis (1985) reports that the difference 
between the return of the smallest and the largest firms in the sample is only significant during 
the month of May, Levis finds that small firms outperform large firms on average by about 2.4 
percent during this month and therefore termed this the May effect. There is little evidence of 
this persisting for later samples, see for example Limmack (1995). It is possible therefore that 
the May effect previously observed for small firms was really an April effect, but, because thin 
trading exists for many small firms, the April return rise was not observed until MaY2 . 
6.2.3 Explaining Return Seasonality 
An important contribution to our understanding of the causes of the January effect in the 
US market was made by Tinic and West (1984,1986) and Corhay, Hawawini, and Michel 
(1987,1989). Tinic and West (1984) investigated whaher monthly return seasonalities could be 
linked to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This was done by testing whether monthly 
return regularities could be accounted for by month to month variations in the pricing of 
systematic risk. When Tinic and West (1984) re-estimated the Fama and MacBeth (1973) CAPM 
regressions which were discussed in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2, they found that the positive 
trade-off between systematic risk and return was exclusively due to what happened in the month 
of January. When the eleven months, other than January were tested separately, no positive 
2. In recent years and particularly since big bang volume of trading on the London Stock Exchange has increased substantially, see for 
example Thomas (1989). 
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relationship between systematic risk and return was found to emerge in any period. Initially, 
these findings were interpreted as an indication that investors obtained a systematic risk premium 
in only one month of the year, January. 
In a later paper Tinic and West (1986) extended their work to examine the relationship 
between monthly returns and other forms of risk such as unsystematic (residual) and non-linear 
systematic risk. The results reported in this second paper suggest that the positive relationship 
between January returns and systematic risk, found in the earlier paper was not robust to the 
inclusion of alternative forms of risk. When they tested the relationship between monthly returns 
and risk, for a four parameter model which included alternative measures of risk, a negative, 
but insignificant relationship between systematic risk and return was found for January. They 
report instead that residual risk is positively priced during January. 
Corhay, Hawawini and Michel (1987,1989) reported similar results for the UK. Their 
1989 paper tested the relationship between monthly returns and the systematic risk of securities 
traded on the London Stock Exchange. They found that the systematic risk premium was only 
significantly different from zero and positive during the month of April. Like Tinic and West, 
Corhay, Hawawini and Michel (1987) also investigated the relationship between monthly returns 
and other forms of risk. Their results also appeared to be sensitive to the precise specification 
being tested. Interestingly, like Tinic and West (1986) they also found when January was 
excluded from the tests a negative relationship between systematic risk and return appeared to 
exist for the other eleven months of the year. Although the ability of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model to predict expected returns has been questioned there is nothing to explain why a negative 
relationship between systematic risk and return should exist. 
Although, these papers made a very important contribution to our understanding of both 
the causation of monthly return seasonalities and, the month by month relationship between risk 
and return in the US and the UK, it is important to extend the work of Tinic and West and Corhay 
et Al and investigate the effect that firm size might have on the monthly relationship between 
risk and return. 
Surprisingly, the contribution that firm size might have on monthly risk premiums has 
not previously been investigated. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the monthly relationship 
between risk and return for firms of different capitalisations. The Chapter will seek to establish 
whether firm size contributes to the magnitude of monthly risk premiums and whether monthly 
return seasonalities can be linked to the pricing of risk for both large and small firms. 
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6.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
Monthly return data was obtained from the London Share Price Data Base covering the 
period 1976 to 199 1. Monthly returns were used to minimise the effect that microstructure biases, 
such as those described by Roll (1983) Dimson (1979) and Cohen, Maier and Schwartz (1986), 
might have on the results 3. These were discussed at length in Section 2.7 of Chapter 2. 
Companies selected are those which existed in 1976 and survived until the end of the 
sample period. In all return information for 150 stocks was utilised. In 1976 all 150 companies 
were ranked on the basis of their January market value. From these 150 stocks three portfolios 
were constructed, The first portfolio P, contained the 50 smallest firms, the second portfolio P2 
contained the 50 medium sized companies, and portfolio three P3 contained the 50 smallest 
companies. The average market value of companies contained in the largest portfolio was 
approximately f-85m but the average value of companies in the smallest portfolio was only fI M4. 
In this Chapter only three portfolios have been tested in order that differences between the 
behaviour of large and small firms can be isolated in the empirical tests which are performed. 
It should be noted that this sample uses a survivorship biased sample of companies. As 
Chapter Four noted, a survivorship biased sample of companies may not behave in the same 
way as a sample of companies which contain survivors and non-survivors. The most obvious 
problem associated with the use of survivor companies is the possibility that the returns of 
surviving companies may be biased upwards. This problem would arise if non-survivor 
companies experienced lower returns, perhaps because they were experiencing financial distress. 
In this case bankruptcy would be the probable cause of their de-listing. However, companies 
might also disappear if they merged with another company or were the subject of a takeover, 
in this case we might expect the non-surviving companies to perform better, not worse, than the 
surviving companies at the time of the takeover. 
It is possible that small firms are more influenced by the survivorship problem. Small 
firms are more likely to be taken over because financing a takeover or merger when a company 
is small is easier than when the company is large, extensive resources are necessary to fund a 
takeover/merger of a large firm. It is also true that small firms are more likely to experience 
financial distress, see for example the work of Castanias (1984) which shows that as firm size 
decreases companies are more likely to experience failure. The corporate finance literature, for 
example see Harris and Raviv (1992) suggests that this is due to small firms having to rely more 
heavily on debt finance as a source of finance. 
3. Using monthly observations will reduce the effect of the bid-ask bias, it is also important to use monthly data so that the effect of thin 
trading on estimates of security P'S is minimised. 
4. This is the average market value of companies over the period 1976 to 1991. 
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Although this chapter does undertake a comparison of the returns of large and small firms 
the difference between the large and the small firm returns, over the same sample is robust even 
when a non survivorship sample is used. This appears to suggest that the survivorship problem 
does not have a large impact on the returns of UK companies, at least over the period 1976-199 1. 
The chief aim of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between risk and return. 
This study is therefore more concerned about the impact that the survivorship properties of the 
data has on the betas, other risk estimates and their relationship to returns. A sample of companies 
which are survivorship biased may have lower(higher) betas than a similar set of non survivorship 
biased companies, furthermore, the relationship between risk and return for survivorship biased 
companies may be different. Unfortunately, in a study such as the one undertaken in this chapter 
it is impossible to use a sample of companies which are entirely survivorship free. It is necessary 
for a company to exist for at least five years to allow enough time to calculate betas and then 
test the relationship between risk and return. However, as Chelley-Steeley (1996) demonstrates 
the results presented in this chapter are substantially unchanged, even if the only requirement 
placed on companies is that they must exist for at least five years. This suggests that the results 
presented in this chapter are not an artifact of using a surviving sample of companies. 
Table 6.1 reports the mean monthly return for the three portfolios. The mean monthly 
return over the full sample period was found to be 1.54 percent for small firms, 1.1 percent for 
the medium sized firms and 1.13 percent for the large firms. This can be converted into a small 
firm annualised premium relative to the large firms of about 3.0 percent. This small firm premium 
is considerably lower than the premium reported in the US or the premium reported for an earlier 
sample period by Levis (1985). The reason for this is that small firms have substantially 
underperformed large firms during the period 1988-1990, which has been a period of very 
unusual economic activity. 
The mean monthly return, for both large and small firms associated with each month of 
the year individually are also reported in Table 6.1. There is considerable evidence of variation 
in the mean monthly returns both between the largest and the smallest portfolio and across the 
different months of the year. January, which provides a return of about 5 percent in all cases, is 
the month which provides the highest mean return. Returns are also found to be relatively high 
for all three size-based portfolios in February, March and April. 
During April the mean monthly return for the largest firms is approximately 3 percent 
but only 1.7 percent for the smallest firms which indicates that large firms outperform small 
firms by a statistically significant average of 1.3 percent during this month. This is in conflict 
with results reported by Keim (1983) and Roll (1983) for the US who both document a strong 
small firm premium during the start of the new tax year. The conventional tax-loss trading 
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small firm premium during the start of the new tax year. The conventional tax-loss trading 
framework, which suggests that small firms earn a premium because small investors are more 
heavily engaged in tax-loss rebalancing, Ritter (1988), does not therefore appear to be consistent 
with the UK evidence. 
Generally, the pattern of monthly returns reported for the UK in this paper are similar to 
those which are presented by Levis (1985) for an earlier observation in the UK. A distinguishing 
characteristic of the results presented here, however, is what appears to be a strengthening of 
the January effect, particularly for large firms, this has also been noted by Limmack (1995). 
During the 1980's there has been an increased internationalisation of stock markets, encouraged 
by the removal of exchange controls, see for example, Taylor and Tonks (1987) and Chelley, 
Pentecost and Steeley (1994). This has encouraged an increased co-movement between national 
stock markets because of the additional pressure foreign investors now put on domestic markets. 
The strengthening of the January effect in the UK is therefore consistent with an increased 
comovement between the UK and US stock market. 
6.4 The Fama and MacBeth Methodology 
The procedure used to test the relationship between systematic risk and return is based 
on the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology which requires the estimation of equation (6.1) 
below. Each year using the preceding two years of data, each of the three size-based portfolios 
are divided into a further five portfolios, stratified this time on the basis of security beta, in all 
this provides fifteen portfolios, five for each size grouping. In the next two year period security 
betas are re-estimated, from these the mean sub-portfolio beta is then calculated, one for each 
of the fifteen portfolios. This is done by taking the arithmetic average of the betas for the 
individual securities making up a portfolio. The relationship between the preceding years 
portfolio beta and the following years' realised monthly return is then tested. This entire 
procedure is updated each year to provide a time series ' with which to test the risk-retum 
relationship as follows, 
Rp, t = Y, t+ 
ý2, 
tOp, t -I+ 
ap, 
t p=1,2 ... 15 
(6.1) 
where, RP', is the realised return on the ph sub-portfolio of stocks within one of the three size 
groupings in month t, and OP, t-, is the average of the estimated Ws associated with the stocks 
contained within each sub-portfolio. The individual component betas are calculated from the 
market model, which was described in Section 2.7.2.1 of Chapter 2, using the preceding two 
years of data. The ý,,, and ij are coefficients, -y,,, is an estimate of the constant return (return 
5. It should be noted that the data which is used to test this model has twelve years of time series observations and fifteen cross-sectional 
observations each year. 
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unassociated with systematic risk) for portfolio p in time t, while Y2,, is an estimate of the 
systematic risk premium for portfolio p in time t. i7p,, is the error or unexpected return in time 
t. 
Since this study aims to discover whether both calendar and size effects exist in the 
risk-retum relationship, the following extended version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model was 
tested. This model, which is represented by equation (6.2), will allow us to identify specific 
months of the year in which systematic risk is priced, and establish whether the risk premium 
for large, medium and small firms is equivalent. 
3~3 (6.2) RP, 
t=71, t+72,10p, t-I+ 
Y-'i, 
t5j, t+ 
EXi, 
t(8j, 10p, t-I)+ap, t j=2,3 p=1,2,... 15 j=2 j=2 
where, 'yjIjj,, Xj,, are all coefficients. The Op, t -I are the average 
beta of stocks within portfolio p. 
To control for the effects of thin trading6' the Dimson (1979) estimator for 0 has been used 
throughout7 . This was discussed fully in Section 2.7.2.1 of Chapter 2. The j, t are dummy 
variables representing firm size. The first, 82, takes on a value of I if the phportfolio consists 
of medium sized firms, but a value of zero otherwise. The second, 83, takes on a value of I if 
the p th portfolio consists of small firms but a zero otherwise. The terms ii, t are coefficients which 
indicate how much above or below they, of the large firms this coefficient is for the medium 
and small firms respectively. The (5j, top,, ) are a set of slope dummies. These represent the beta 
of the pthportfolio times each of the two size dummies in turn. The coefficient ;. i will capture 
differences in the systematic risk premium of the medium or small firms relative to the systematic 
premium of the large firms. This coefficient will therefore tell us whether the systematic risk 
premium for the medium and small firms differs to that of the large firms. 
Using the Farna and MacBeth approach, this model is then tested, for all three portfolios, 
for each individual month of the year. This means that the time series of return and beta 
observations are segregated on the basis of calendar month. For a given year the beta of a portfolio 
is regressed against the monthly return for a given month. Although the betas during the course 
of the year are the same, the returns over the different months are vary. The results of the 
cross-sectional tests then allow us to gauge if on average the beta of a portfolio is related to the 
portfolio returns of a given month and whether this relationship is stronger for some months in 
6. Thin trading associated with the smallest companies in the cohort is substantial. A detailed analysis of the data reveals that on average 
28.6 percent of the returns in the portfolio containing the smallest stocks are stale. 
7. A Dimson model with five lags for the smallest portfolio has been used, this ensures that thin trading durations of up to five months will 
be captured by beta estimates. To illustrate the importance of adjusting 
for thin trading in this way, the estimated contemporaneous portfolio 
beta for the smallest firms was estimated and compared to the beta estimate obtained 
from a five lag aggregate coefficient model. The 
contemporaneous portfolio beta was found to be 0.531, meanwhile the aggregate coefficient beta was found to be 1.07. Since thin trading is 
less severe in medium firms a model with only three lags was utilised 
for this group of firms and no lags for the largest firms. 
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comparison to others. This will allow individual months of the year, when systematic risk is or 
is not priced to be identified. Furthermore, the model will also allow us to establish whether 
firm size influences the magnitude of the risk premium in any of the months. 
6.5 The Results 
The results from the estimation of this model, which are provided in Table 6.2 suggest 
that both the month of the year and firm size have an important influence over the systematic 
risk premium. In only January and April does systematic risk appear to be priced. For the other 
ten months of the year no persistent relationship between systematic risk and return appears to 
exist. 
Focusing on the coefficients associated with the two slope dummies (8j,, Pp,, ), these 
coefficients indicate that the systematic risk premium is not equal for large and small firms. 
Both slope dummies are tound to be significantly negative in both January and April. This 
suggests that large firms earn a higher systematic risk premium than either the medium or small 
firms. Therefore, not only is the systematic risk premium dependant on the month of the year 
but it is also dependant on firm size. For a given amount of risk, large firms will on average 
earn a higher systematic risk premium, than investments in small or medium sized companies. 
Actually, the results indicate that both the medium and the small firms obtain a small negative 
systematic risk premium during these two months. Strong and Xu (1994) also find some evidence 
to indicate that betas are negatively priced cross-sectionally in the UK, although, they do not 
investigate whether this finding is related to firm size. 
The results for July suggest that during this month yet again small and medium firms 
earn a lower systematic risk premium than the large companies. Sincey2 is only significant at 
a 10 percent level, but 8j,, Pp,, is significant in both cases at a5 percent level, it is possible that 
the systematic risk of large firms is not priced in this month, but that the systematic risk of small 
and medium firms is priced. 
In Table 6.2 the results of an ARCH(6) test are presented. This tests for up to sixth order 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals and except for the month of May and August the 
null-hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity can not be rejected. The results of a Ljung-Box (1978) 
Q test for up to sixth order autocorrelation are also reported in Table 6.2. In a number of cases 
the Q statistic is found to be significant. This is not surprising, since the CAPM model being 
tested here appears to be misspecified, at least for the months other than January, April and July. 
The k2for all months is quite low which indicates that this model can not explain much 
of the variation in the returns of a given month. As we can see from Table 6.2 when all months 
are estimated together the k2 indicates that no more than about 2 percent of the variation in 
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realised portfolio returns can be explained by the model tested here. When the months are 
estimated separately, the k2in a number of months is much higher. The month for which the 
model explains the greatest proportion of the variation in monthly returns is August, during this 
month the model explains about 8 percent of the variation in realised portfolio returns, in April 
5.5 percent can be explained and in January approximately 4 percent. 
The findings reported in this section appear to shed a little more light on monthly calendar 
and size effects which were reported in the previous section. April and January are the two 
months which provide the highest returns for the UK stock market. These are also the only two 
months for which there is a relationship between systematic risk and return. The return profile 
of stocks during this month may be related to the systematic risk premium. Since the systematic 
risk premium is higher for large firms it is not surprising that large firms outperform small firms 
in these months. Although, it is puzzling why the returns of small firms do not appear to be more 
closely related to systematic risk. 
6.5.1 Seasonality in the Systematic Risk Premium 
Having found that systematic risk provides a persistent risk premium in only two months, 
it is also important to determine whether the magnitude of the risk premium varies across the 
months of the year by examining a second model which is represented by Equation (6.3). The 
aim of the model is to discover whether the magnitude of the coefficients yj andy2are significantly 
different across the months of the year. Each year the coefficient y, and 72for each individual 
month, was estimated annually over the sample period 8. These coefficients were then tested for 
the existence of monthly seasonalities using the following model. 
(6.3) 
12 12 12 
D+ ýj, j(D 
I Oj, 
i(D j=1,2 'i i't i, t52, t) 
+iIi, 
t 3, t) 
+ l7i, t 
i #7 i: p, 7 i#7 
where, DI-D, 2are a set of dummy variables one each for the months of the year January to 
December, but excluding July9. The (-xj, i are coefficients which are estimates of the difference 
between the monthly means of ýj from that of July. The (Dj,, 82,, ) are a set of dummies, each one 
represents the month dummy times the medium firm size dummy, while (Di, 183,, ) represents 
each of the month dummies in turn times the small firm size dummy. The coefficients associated 
with these dummies, ýj, j and 
6j, 
j, will capture differences in for month i which are related 
to firm size. This will allow us to determine whether the systematic risk premium y2which is 
associated with medium and small firms is different to that of large firms in any month. 
8. This required taking estimates y, and y,,, from equation (6.1) so that it was possible to test for size effects in specific months. 
9. This test was performed using a selection of control months. The results seem to be robust whatever month is used as the control month. 
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Taking the coefficient associated with the intercept yj first, there is little evidence to 
suggest that 'y, displays a seasonal pattern associated with the months of the year. The only 
month dummy found to be significant was that of June, since the sign is a negative one this 
indicates that the June intercept of the large firms is below that of July. The results also suggest 
that the medium firms obtain a premium unrelated to risk in January which is significantly higher 
that the July constant of the large firms. 
When the test is performed on y2 a number of interesting results are uncovered. Even 
after controlling for firm size a positive January seasonality in y2is found to exist. The systematic 
risk premium in January for the large firms is significantly higher than the risk premium for 
July. The magnitude of the systematic risk premium for large firms also appears to be higher 
during June than for July, suggesting that the risk premium in this month is also on average 
higher than for July. Although, as the previous section indicated no persistent relationship existed 
between risk and return for this month. For April, the month dummy is insignificant, this indicates 
that the magnitude of the risk premium for large firms in April is not higher than in July. Although 
there is a persistent relationship between risk and return for large firms during April the size 
of the premium is modest. In contrast, the months of October and December provide systematic 
risk premiums for the large firm portfolio which are lower than during the month of July. These 
results appear to indicate that not only is systematic risk priced during January but the premium 
paid for systematic risk is also higher during this month. 
6.6 Non-Systematic Risk and Return Seasonality 
Since this chapter is concerned with identifying the causes of return seasonality, an 
extended version of equation (6.3) is also tested. This model investigates whether alternative 
sources of risk such as residual or total risk are priced by the market, and if they are, can they 
account for any return seasonality. These tests are also important to undertake because, as Section 
6.2.3 of this chapter outlined, the work undertaken by Tinic and West (1986)'found that the 
positive pricing of systematic risk, in certain months of the year, does not appear to be robust 
when extended versions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model are tested. 
The full model tested in this section is represented by equation (6.4) below. This model 
is tested each month separately, providing twelve different estimates of each of the risk 
premiums, one for each month of the year. 
3 (6.4) 
Rp, t ar res P, r+ 
it+'Y2, 
tOp, t-I+Y3, tV p, t-1+74, t -1 
1 xi, 
t 
(Op, 
t-Iý 
8j, 
t) j=2 
333 
+ J:, Oi 
t(vclrp, l -I, 
5j, 
t) 
+I Oi 
t(ris pt-1,5j, t) 
+ Y, ii 
t 
8j 
t+ up, t 
j=2 ' j=2 ' j=2 ' 
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1,2 ....... 15 i=2,3 
where, (Op,, 
- 17 
8j,, ) is the estimated systematic risk premium of the PIh portfolio in time t-I 
times each of the two size dummies in turn. In this model X2is an estimate of the difference in 
the systematic risk premium of medium firms from that of large firms, while, X3 will provide 
an estimate of the difference in the systematic risk premium of the smallest firms from that of 
large firms. The term res is the estimate of unsystematic risk for the phportfolio and is measured 
as the mean, standard deviation of the security residuals extracted from the aggregate coefficient 
market model, which was used to estimate security betas. The term var is the estimate of total 
risk for the ph portfolio and is measured as the average return variance of securities within 
portfolio p. Security variances were calculated using the previous two years of data. The 
coefficients ý4,, and ~y3,, can be interpreted as the residual and total risk premium for large firms 
in time t respectively. The term (resp,, - , 
8j,, ) represents the estimated residual risk of portfolio 
p in time t-I times the medium firm size dummy and the small firm size dummy in turn. This 
allows 62,, to capture the difference in the unsystematic risk premium of medium firms from 
that of the large firms in time t. The coefficiento3,, captures the difference in the unsystematic 
risk premium of the small firms from that of the large firms in time t. (varp, ,- 19 8j,, ) represents 
the estimate of variance risk for portfolio p times the size dummy for medium and small firms 
in turn so that ka can be interpreted as the difference in the estimated total risk premium of 
medium firms from that of the large firms while03,, can be interpreted as the difference between 
the estimated total risk premium of small firms from that of the large firms in time t. 
The results from the estimation of equation (6.4), for each individual month of the year 
are reported in Table 6.4. The ARCH(6) test statistic for up to sixth order heteroscedasticity 
appear to rule out the presence of heteroscedasticity except during the month of August, but 
again the Q statistic reveals that there is significant autocorrelation in the residuals for some 
months, suggesting that the model is still not fully specified. 
Looking at the results associated with systematic risk first it can be observed that 
systematic risk is only ever priced during the months of January, April and July. In no other 
months of the year is there a positive relationship between systematic risk and return. The results 
presented here indicate that unlike previous studies the positive pricing of the systematic risk 
premium is robust to the inclusion of other risk variables such as variance or residual risk. One 
possible reason for this difference is that aggregate coefficient betas have been used in this study, 
Tinic and West (1984,1986) and Corhay et Al (1987,1989) only use contemporaneous betas, 
which might have biased their estimates because biased downwards estimates of beta will bias 
downwards the estimated risk premium. 
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The coefficients )ý and X3are both significantly negative in the months of January, April 
and July which suggests that in these months the systematic risk premium of the large firms is 
greater than the premium for either small or medium firms. In January, the systematic risk 
premium for large firms is approximately 25.6 percent but only 15.8 percent for the medium 
firms and 20.5 percent for the smallest companies. In April, the systematic risk premium for the 
large firms is 16.4 percent, but only 6.7 percent for the medium firms and 11.8 percent for the 
smallest firms. In July, the systematic risk premium for the large firms is 16.4 percent, but only 
6.1 percent and 13 percent for the medium and small firms respectively. As we can see, the 
findings which were reported in Section 5 are robust to the inclusion of other risk variables. 
These results show that the monthly systematic risk premium of large capitalisation firms is 
higher than for firms with medium to low capitalisation values. This finding is therefore 
consistent with the higher raw returns of large firms in the months of January and April. 
Residual risk is found to be negatively priced for large firms during the months of January, 
February, June and July but positively priced during the month of October. For medium sized 
firms, the premium to unsystematic risk is only significantly different from the premium 
associated with the large firms in April. Small firms earn a less negative residual risk premium 
than large firms during the month of February and June, a slightly positive premium in July and 
October. Although, the premium is positive in October it is lower than the premium associated 
with large firms. 
The results also indicate that during January and September for large firms variance risk 
is positively priced. Small firms earn a January variance risk premium which is lower than the 
premium to large firms. Meanwhile, during the month of April the medium firms obtain a 
variance risk premium which is lower than the premium of large firms. 
The size dummies reveal that, on a month by month basis, firm size is frequently priced. 
During January and April, even after controlling for differences in the size of the risk premiums 
of small and medium firms, firm sizze still appears to be an important factor determining returns 
in these two months. In both January and April the smallest firms earn a size premium of 
approximately 4.7 percent and 3.6 percent respectively. 
January is the month which stands out as being different from other months of the year. 
In this month all three forms of risk investigated provide a positive risk premium, the only month 
in which this happens. The positive systematic and variance risk premium during this month 
appears to be able to explain some of the January return regularity observed in the UK. 
To isolate the impact January has on the risk-return relationship the same model was 
tested across all months of the year, and then tested again with the exclusion of January. The 
results from these tests are reported in Table 6.4. Looking at the results for all the months together 
first. It is found that there is a systematic risk premium for large firms which is positive and 
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significantly different from zero. Small firms are found to earn a systematic risk pren-iium which 
is significantly below that of the large firms. The systematic risk premium for large firms is 
found to be 6.7 percent a month but only 4.7 percent for medium firms and 5.1 percent for the 
smallest firms. 
If we look at the results for the sample which excludes January then the systematic risk 
premium of large firms is only significant at a 10 percent level. This time the systematic risk 
premium is only found to be significant for the smallest firms. This demonstrates the dominating 
effect that the month of January has on the relationship between systematic risk and return. 
When all months are tested variance risk is found to be positively priced for large firms which 
becomes insignificant when January is excluded from the tests. The size premium to the smallest 
firms in the sample is found to be approximately 0.14 percent when January is included but fails 
to be significant at a5 percent level when January is excluded from the sample. 
The jFfrom these equations are also reported in Table 6.4. Again, over the full sample 
the jF of the model is very low. In these tests the highest explanatory power for the model occurs 
in July, during this month the k2 is over 20 percent, there is also a considerable increase in 
explanatory power during January and April, in both cases the k2is approximately 10 percent. 
6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the monthly return behaviour of capitalisation based 
portfolios. It has been shown that there is a great deal of variation in the mean monthly returns 
both between the largest firms and the smallest firms and across the different months of the year. 
Although, it is clear that the month which provides the highest return to each of the portfolios 
is January. 
This chapter has explored one possible explanation for this high January return. The 
Capital Asset Pricing Model has been tested on a month by month basis to identify whether the 
high January return is related to the systematic risk premium. The novelty of the work undertaken 
in this chapter is that this study has focused on whether differences in the size of the risk premiums 
for firms of different capitalisations can account for differences in the return behaviour of large 
and small firms. 
Consistent with the findings of Tinic and West (1984,1986) for the US and Corhay 
(1987,1989) for the UK, this chapter has demonstrated that systematic risk is not priced every 
month of the year. Actually systematic risk is only ever priced consistently in two months of 
the year, January and April, which are also the months which provide the highest raw returns. 
High returns in January and April may therefore be related to the behaviour of the systematic 
risk premium. 
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- This asymmetric relationship between risk and return across the different months of the 
year appears to be supported for both large and small firms. Firm size is found to make an 
important contribution to the magnitude of the systematic risk premium. When systematic risk 
is priced, the largest firms always receive a higher risk premium than smaller firms. For small 
firms only a very weak relationship between systematic risk and return appears to exist. 
An analysis of the behaviour of the relationship between risk and return during all months 
of the year and all months excluding January reveals that the positive systematic risk premium 
found when all months are tested together is the result of the dominating effect that January has 
on the results. When all months are tested with the exclusion of January then no significant 
relationship between systematic risk and return is found to emerge, except for the smallest firms 
in the sample. 
This chapter also finds that in several months of the year variance and residual risk is 
priced by the markets. This provides evidence against the validity of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model at least on a month by month basis. 
In light of the results presented in this chapter a number of avenues for future research 
present themselves. Firstly, perhaps now that the size and seasonality are well documented 
research should focus on the possible causation of size and calendar anomalies in the UK. Perhaps 
such research should focus on institutional portfolio behaviour during the various months of the 
year. Clearly, in the UK a substantial Proportion of stock turnover is instigated by institutional 
portfolio holders. To understand return seasonality and/or size anomalies we have to understand 
the trading behaviour of the institutional investors. 
Clearly, the way in which beta is estimated is important if betas are to provide unbiased 
estimates of market risk. As Chapter 7 will demonstrate the assumption of constant betas is 
unrealistic. Currently there exist an array of ways in which beta estimates can be obtained. 
Research needs to be employed to provide a definitive way of estimating betas and suggesting 
which method should be employed to measure accurately the cross-sectioin of expected returns. 
Finally, Fama and French (1992) have demonstrated that in the presence of the book to 
market ratio there is no relationship between beta and return. It would be interesting to discover 
whether the relationship between book to market and return is influenced at all by the calendar 
month. Since the existence of return seasonality is usually identified within a capital asset pricing 
model framework it would also be interesting to see whether the relationship between risk and 
return in alternative models such as the arbitrage pricing theory framework leads to seasonal 
relationships between risk and return. 
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Table 6.1 
Mean Monthly Returns 1976-1991 
P, is the mean return for month i accruing to the portfolio of small firms, P, and P, is the mean portfolio return for month i accruing to the portfolio of medium 
and large firms respectively. P, - P, Is the mean return in month i accruing to largest portfolio less the smallest portfolio. FrA is the monthly return to the FF 
All-Share index, the representative market portfolio used in this study. * indicates significance at a 10% level, ** indicates significance at a 5% level. 
Month P3 P2 P3 P3-PI 
All Months 0.0133* 0.0113** 0.0154** -0.0025 
(1.97) (2.8) (4.36) (1.83) 
January 0.058** 0.051** 0.051** 0.007 
(4.64) (4.20) (3.60) (0.84) 
February 0.014** 0.033** 0.036** -0.022 
(3.9) (2.5) (2.07) (-0.84) 
March 0.034** 0.036** 0.024** 0.010 
(3.0) (3.03) (2.2) (0.35) 
April 0.030** 0.010** 0.017** 0.013** 
(3.5) (2.26) (3.5) (2.5) 
May 0.020 0.009 0.004 0.016 
(1.35) (0.85) (0.01) (1.35) 
June 0.010 0.003 0.013 -0-003 
(1.52) (0.28) (0.87) (-0.09) 
July 0.005 0.004 0.018 -0.013 
(0.98) (0.42) (0-9) (-0.66) 
August 0.019 0.006 0.004 0.015 
(1.11) (0.44) (1.26) (0.87) 
September -0.005 -0.002 0.009 -0.014 
(-0.98) (-0.12) (0.90) (-1.28) 
October -0.030 -0.017 -0.002 -0.028** 
(-0.11) (-0.02) (- 1.1) (-2.08) 
November -0.005 -0.009 -0.000 -0.005 
(-0.59) (-0.56) (-0.89) (-1.5) 
December 0.010 0.011 0.0 11 ** -0.001 
(1.36) (1.17) (2.25) (-1.31) 
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Table 6.2 
The Monthly Relationship Between Systematic Risk and Return 
This table provides the results from the estimation of the following model 
33 
il, 
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Where and y, are the average coefficients associated with the intercept and systematic risk, respectively. 12 and -t3 are the average coefficients associated with 
the two size dummies ie 6, and 83 12 and 13 are the average coefficients associated with the two slope dummies. * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates 
significance at 5%. ARCH(6) is the statistic from an Arch test which tests for up to sixth order heteroscedasticity in the residuals from this model. Q is the 
Ljung-Box test for up to sixth order autocorrelation, the p values from these tests are given in parentheses. 
Month 71 t2 t3 
?2 ý-3 Q ARCH(6) jV 
All Months -0.050** 0.068** -0.022** -0.017** 0.02 1 ** 0.0148** 7.7 3.56 0.019 
(-2.45)*" (2.78)** (-5.43)*" (-3.56)** (3.45)"* (2.08)** (0.24) (0.80) 
January -0.1482** 0.2021 0.1999** 0.1936** -0.2078** -0.2061** 8.6 3.31 0.038 
(-2.36) (3.10) (3.11) (3.03) (-3.14) (-3.13) (0.19) (0.76) 
February -0.0660 0.0931 0.1090 0.1090 -0.0971 -0.1060 31.3 6.98 0.011 
(-0.94) (1.27) (1.51) (1.52) (-1.32) (-1.44) (0.00) (0.32) 
March 0.0537 -0.0281 -0.0374 -0.0269 0.0364 0.0185 35.13 5.82 -0.001 
(0.79) (-0.40) (-0.54) (-0.39) (0.51) (0.26) (0.00) (0.44) 
April -0.0978** 0.1246** 0.1314** 0.1168** -0.1409** -0.1357** 10.51 9.29 0.055 
(-1.91) (2.35) (2.51) (2.24) (-2.61) (-2.53) (0.10) (0.16) 
May 0.0832 -0.0871 -0.0694 -0.05712 0.0789 0.0669 26.46 16.52 0.032 
(1.31) (-1.32) (-1.07) (-0.88) (1.18) (1.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
June -0.0412 0.0626 0.0712 0.0569 -0.0730 -0.0736 15.44 2.8 0.012 
(-0.59) (0.87) (1.00) (0.81) (-1.00) (-1.01) (0.02) (0.83) 
July -0.1157 0.13 10* 0.1459** 0.1497** -0.1373* -0.1536** 18.46 1.44 0.050 
(-1.63) (1.78) (2.01) (2.07) (-1.84) (-2.07) (0.005) (0.96) 
August -0.0915 0.1072 0.1060 0.1235* -0.1269* -0.1383* 63.64 21.34 0.081 
(-1.35) (1.53) (1.53) (1.78) (-1.78) (-1.94) (0.00) (0.00) 
September -0.0491 0.0310 0.0254 0.0654 -0.0197 -0.0523 32.71 11.90 0.012 
(-0.62) (0.38) (0.31) (0.81) (-0.24) (-0.63) (0.00) (0.06) 
October -0.0519 0.0494 0.0433 0.0571 -0.0503 -0.0649 20.78 7.27 0.002 
(-0.45) (0.41) (0.37) (0.49) (-0.41) (-0.54) (0.002) (0.29) 
November -0.0191 0.0304 0.0260 -0.0046 -0.0440 -0.0153 6.15 6.77 0.005 
(-0.22) (0.34) (0.30) (-0.05) (-0.48) (-0.17) (0.41) (0.34) 
December 0.1158 -0.1033 -0.1387 -0.0865 0.1179 0.0769 5.54 0.04 0.028 
(1.03) (-0.89) (-1.21) (-0.77) (0.99) (0.65) (0.48) (0.99) 
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Table 6.3 
Seasonality and the Magnitude of the Risk Premium 
This table provides the results from the estimation of the following model. 
12 12 12 
I-D+I ýjjDj, I 6j, j(Dj, t83, t) + ai, t Yi, t (Iij i, t+ 
i=2i= 12 i= 12 
i*7 i*7 i*7 
Where, y, and ý2 are the coefficients estimated from equation (1) for each month, annually over the sample period. d Is the constant and represents the mean 
return accruing to portfolios in July which is the control month. %- are the average coefficients associated with the eleven month dummies. $j are the average 
coefficients associated with the eleven month dummies times the dummy for medium firms. 6i are the coefficients for eleven month dummies times the small 
firm dummy. ** indicates significance at a 5% level while * indicates significance at a 10% level. 
y1 72 
Month (XIj ki 61'i (hi ki 62J 
aj, 1 0.0031 0.0113 
(-0.62) (-0.39) 
January -0.0449 0.0939** 0.0494 0.0780** -0.0895** -0.0591 
(-0.50) (4.0) (1.20) (2.210) (-2.38) (-0.74) 
February -0.0022 0.0528 0.0394 0.0066 -0.0285 -0.0252 
(-0.70) (1.20) (1.60) (1.50) (-0.47) (-0.46) 
March -0.0259 0.0365 0.0118 0.0406 -0.0369 -0.1200 
(-0.25) (0.20) (1.80) (1.29) (-0.42) (-0.27) 
April 0.0155 -0.0168 -0.0017 -0.0098 -0.0152 -0.0097 
(0.55) (-0.54) (-1.32) (-0.41) (-0.93) (-0.47) 
May -0.0273 0.0328 0.0255 0.0152 -0.0353 -0.0133 
(-0.33) (0.31) (0.14) (0.53) (-0.33) (-0.27) 
June -0.0835** -0.0925 0.0851 0.0882** -0.0947 -0.0906 
(-2.07) (-0.58) (0.19) (2.20) (- 1.1) (-0.93) 
August 0.0160 -0.0132 0.0063 -0.0195 0.0260 -0.0065 
(-1.37) (-0.48) (1.73) (-0.24) (0.61) (-0.37) 
September -0.0259 -0.0053 0.0247 -0.0085 0.0213 0.0064 
(-0.94) (0.20) (1.10) (-0.63) (0.67) (0.99) 
October -0.0618 -0.0869 -0.0647 -0.0862 0.0799 0.0764 
(-0.38) (-0.97) (1.32) (-0.96) (1.11) (0.24) 
November -0.0354 -0.0378 -0.0579 -0.0436 0.0247 0.0334 
(-0.52) (-0.14) (-0.90) (-1.23) (0.99) (0.37) 
December 0.0676 -0.0669 -0.1373 -0.0718** -0.0684** 0.1071 
(0.30) (-0.40) (-0.20) 1 (2.43) (2.28) (2.63) 
159 
Table 6.4 
The Monthly Relationship Between Risk and Return 
The average coefficients from the estimation of the following model over the 
sample period 1980-199 1. 
3333 
Y- 7- ýj., (vdrp., 
-., 
5j. )+ Y- I Ii. A. 
8 
+ up 
j=2 j=2 j=2 j-2 
Where R,, is the return to the p' portfolio. 0 Is the estimate of systematic risk for the p'portfolio, rFs is the estimate of unsystematic risk for the p" portfolio. 
wir Is the estimate of variance risk for the p' portfolio. 82 and 83 are dummies which take on a value of one if the firm is a medium or small firm respectively, 
but a zero otherwise. ý, Is the constant of large firms, 72,73 and j, are the systematic, variance and unsystematic risk premiums of the large firms respectively. 
Xj, $j and 6i capture the difference between the respective risk premiums of the medium or small firms from that of the large firms. t-i captures the difference 
between the constant of the medium and small firms respectively from the constant of the large firms. t statistics are reported in parenthesis. * indicates significance 
at a 10% level while ** indicates significance at a 5% level. ARCH(6) is the statistic from an ARCH test which tests for up to sixth order heteroscedasticity in 
the residuals from this model. Q is the Ljung-Box test for up to sixth order autocorrelation, the p values from these tests are given in parentheses. All refers to 
all months, and XJan refers to all months excluding January. 
Q ARCH(6) T2 71 72 73 T4 ki X2 12 1, 
All -0.055 
(- 1.92)* 
0.067 
(2.28)** 
0.692 
(2.11)** 
-0.049 
(-1.94)* 
-0.020 
(-1.57) 
-0.017 
(-2.76)** 
-0.822 
(-1.35) 
-0.145 
(-1.70)* 
-0.675 
(1.13) 
0.044 
(2.18)** 
0.023 
(1.67)* 
0.014 10.76 
(2.35)** (0.10) 
3.27 
(0.77) 
0.013 
Van -0.042 0.059 0.304 -0.045 -0.017 -0.015 -0.659 -0.070 -0.675 0.043 0.018 0.011 18.49 2.85 0.008 
(-1.30) (1.77)* (0.81) (-1.72)* (-1.19) (-2.2 1)** (-1.07) (-0.76) (1.13) (2.13)** (1.18)* (1.72)* (0.00) (0.85) 
Jan -0.219 0.256 2.880 -0.130 -0.098 -0.051 -1.528 -0.501 1.64 0.098 0.098 0.047 7.52 2.42 0.101 
(-2.86)** (3.23)** (3.29)** (- 1.99)** (-2.87)** (-3.15)** (-0.94) (-2.25)** (0.64) (1.81)* (2.90)- (2.97)" (0.28) (0.87) 
Feb -0.088 0.120 -0.158 -0.139 -0.052 -0.025 -0.191 -0.361 0.352 0.125 0.068 0.026 26.23 6.42 0.056 
(-1.05) (1.39) (-0.16) (-1.99)** (-1.39) (-1.44) (-0.11) (-1.45) (0.19) (2.06)** (1.65) (1.49) (0.00) (0.38) 
Mar 0.079 -0.033 -1.276 -0.041 0.019 0.005 0.145 0.250 -0.844 0.054 -0.001 -0.014 35.28 8.29 0.000 
(0.95) (-0.39) (-1.34) (-0.55) (0.54) (0.29) (0.08) (1.01) (-0.49) (0.92) (-0.84) (-0.58) (0.00) (0.21) 
Apr -0.137 0.160 0.744 0.019 -0.031 -0.042 -3.364 0.077 3.967 -0.033 0.031 0.358 8.99 6.03 0.098 
(-2.22)** (2.54)** (1.06) (0.36) (-2.19)** (-2.78)** (-2.59)** (0.410) (2.85)** (-0.76) (1.14) (2.43)** (0.17) (0.42) 
May 0.118 -0.103 -1.526 -0.049 0.046 0.016 0.706 0.342 -0.253 0.067 -0.023 -1.434 25.60 7.64 0.000 
(1.52) (-1.30) (-1.67)* (-0.72) (1.37) (1.02) (0.43) (1.50) (-1.58) (1.22) (403) (-0.69) (0.00) (0.27) 
Jun -0.529 0.086 0.827 -0.276 -0.024 -0.021 -3.21 -0.088 2.906 0.219 0.004 0.088 12.00 1.73 0.082 
(-0.62) (0.98) (0.85) (-3.69)** (-1.65) (4.19) (- 1.77)* (-0.35) (1.64) (3.63)** (2.03)** (0.35) (0.61) (0.95) 
Jul -0.143 0.164 1.277 -0.352 -0.103 -0.034 -1.89 -0.166 -0.238 0.035 0.157 0.017 22.72 1.86 0.213 
(-1.81) (2.12)** (1.44) (-5.17)** (-2.40)** (-1.99)** (4.12) (-0.72) (-0.14) (6.51)** (3.23)** (1.3) (0.00) (0.93) 
Aug -0.139 0.140 1.912 -0.054 -0.065 -0.034 -0.261 -0.418 -1.712 0.054 0.049 0.033 54.38 14.45 0.068 
(-1.65) (1.79)* (1.88)* (-0.74) (-2.6)** (-1.45) (-0.15) (-1.69) (-0.98) (0.09) (1.2) (1.87)* (0.00) (0.02) 
Sep -0.114 0.043 4.194 0.039 0.012 -0.014 -0.535 -0.817 -0.286 -0.054 -0.008 0.030 26.96 10.75 0.085 
(-1.21) (0,45) (3.92)** (0.47) (0.30) (-0.71) (-0.27) (-2.94)** (-0.14) (-0.81) (-0.17) (1.56) (0.00) (0.09) 
Oct -0.084 0.065 -0.551 0.439 -O. W9 -0.017 3.46 0.362 -1.053 -0.408 -0.085 0.034 19.75 6.42 0.082 
(-0.62) (0.46) (-0.35) (3.67)** (-0.16) (-0.58) (1.19) (-0.89) (-1.37) (-4.23)** (-1.24) (1.23) (0.00) (0.37) 
Nov -0.007 0.034 -0.861 -0.089 -0.04 -0.004 -1.023 0.008 0.524 0.102 -0.012 -0.002 19.75 7.50 -0.002 
(-0.06) (0.31) (-0.69) (-0.93) (-0.82) (-0.16) (-0.43) (0.03) (0.23) (1.30) (-0.21) (-0.07) (0.00) (0.28) 
Dec 0.127 -0.126 0.840 0.048 0.088 0.022 -2.203 -0.038 4.062 -0.039 -0.241 -0.016 4.96 0.02 0.002 
(0.94) (-0.89) (0.54) (0.39) (1.47) (0.77) (-0.76) (-0.95) (-1.43) (-0.40) (-1.09) (-0.59) (0.54) (0.99) 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
Firm Size and Time Variation in Expected Return 
7.1 Introduction 
Asset pricing models put few, if any restrictions on the behaviour of expected returns 
over time. However, in the implementation of most tests of market efficiency, and, or, a particular 
equilibrium model, expected returns are assumed to remain constant over some period of time. 
In this case, risk is measured using the historical distribution of returns which is assumed to be 
constant. This implies that the risk premium associated with a particular investment is invariant 
to the passage of time, irrespective of the behaviour of the assets return or the market return. 
The Capital Asset Pricing model which was originally proposedby Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965), Mossin (1965), and Treynor (1965) following the suggestions of mean variance 
optimisation proposed by Markowitz (1952,1959), has provided a simple but compelling theory 
of asset market pricing for almost 30 years. In its classical form, the theory predicts that the 
expected return to an asset, above the risk free rate, is proportional to the amount of 
non-diversifiable risk, which is measured by the covariance of the assets' return with a portfolio 
composed of all available assets in the market. 
Recently, a catalogue of empirical evidence has been collected to suggest that expected 
returns are time varying, and are able to explain a large proportion of the variation in realised 
returns. As Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3 indicated, Conrad and Kaul (1988) have shown, that as 
much as 26 percent of the variation in realised portfolio returns may be caused by time variation 
in expected returns. This is an important discovery because if expected returns are time varying 
and, autocorrelated, returns should be modelled accordingly. 
As Section 3.4 of Chapter 2 showed, a number of tests have now found that variables, 
other than the covariance, appear to be able to predict risk premiums. In particular, firm size, 
seasonalities, gearing ratios and price, -eamings ratios all appear to be able to explain expected 
returns better than the Capital Asset Pricing Model. One possible reason for the empirical failure 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model is that perhaps the classical version is empirically 
misspecified, because, risk rather than being a constant, is instead time varying '. In that case, 
these type of tests, many of which were discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, can only show us that a 
constant discount rate model is rejected, they can not tell us that CAPM is the wrong asset pricing 
model. Neither can such tests tell us that markets are inefficient, this can only be stated if a time 
varying model of expected returns is also rejected. 
1. The Capital Asset Pricing Model is a one period model and as such can not be theoretically misspecified by having a constant risk 
premium. However, in a multi-period application empirically risk may not be constant. 
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This chapter will be concerned with testing whether the systematic risk premium for a 
group of UK portfolios, which have been organised on the basis of firm size, is constant or time 
varying. The focus in this chapter will therefore be on identifying any distinguishing 
characteristics in the conditional risk premium of large and small firms, an issue which has 
received very little attention. Exceptions have been provided by Harvey (1989) and Boudurtha 
and Mark (1988) who find evidence of time varying conditional covariances for both large and 
small firms. However, both papers consider the US market, while neither Harvey (1989) or 
Boudurtha and Mark (1988) directly focus on the differences between the large and small firm 
portfolios. Despite this Harvey reports evidence of a "clientele effect" because the market price 
of risk, is found to be higher for large firms than for small firms, and also reports that the 
conditional version of the CAPM tested tends to overstate expected returns for large firms but 
not for small firms. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 7.2 will consider the static 
and the conditional version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Section 7.3, describes the ARCH 
family of models which are used to test the conditional CAPM. Section 7.4, describes the version 
of the conditional CAPM tested in this chapter and provides a detailed discussion of how the 
procedure is modified to take account of the characteristics of the data set used in this study. 
Section 7.5, provides results which indicate that the risk premium of large and small firms is 
time-varying but that there are also important differences between the behaviour of the large 
and small firms. Section 7.6, investigates the behaviour of the conditional risk premium and 
once again finds some important differences between large and small firms. Section 7.7, 
undertakes some sub-period analysis. Section 7.8, is concerned with how the January effect 
influences the risk premium and provides further support for a systematic risk premium which 
is higher during the month of January. Section 7.9 provides a summary and conclusions to the 
paper. 
7.2 The Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model 
According to the Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model, the expected return to any 
asset is a function of the risk free rate of return 2, and a risk premium which compensates investors 
for undertaking risky investments. The distinguishing characteristic of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model is that the market only compensates investors for non-diversifiable, or market risk. Other 
forms of risk are not priced. Furthermore, the Capital Asset pricing Model suggests that there 
is a linear relationship between market risk and expected return. This means that the expected 
2. The risk free rate of return reflects the fact that even when investments are risk free investors will require a positive rate of return. For a 
risk free investment, the positive required return compensates investors for the opportunity cost of the funds which are used for investment. 
When money is tied up in an investment, investors are unable to use the funds on goods or services, which provide positive utility. To 
encourage investors not to consume funds, but invest a positive required return is provided. 
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return for a portfolio of securities would be fully described by the risk free return and, a risk 
premium proportional to the amount of systematic risk. The implications of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, for an asset such as a portfolio of securities can be summarised by equation (7.1) 
below. 
E (Rp) = rf + Pp (E (R. ) - rf) (7.1) 
where, E(RP) is the expected return of portfolio p, rf is the risk free rate of return. The OP is the 
amount of systematic risk for portfolio p which can be estimated as (y(RP, R .. )/G2 (R. ) which is 
the covariance of the portfolio return with the market return divided by the variance of the market 
retum. 
We can rearrange equation (7.1) as follows, 
E (Rp) = rf + X((Y(Rp, R. )) (7.2) 
where X is (E (R .. )- rf)1(32(R .. 
) and is the market price of risk which captures how many units of 
excess market return investors require in compensation for one unit of market risk. (Y(RP, R .. ) is 
the amount of market risk associated with portfolio p. Then X times G(RP, R .. ) is the total risk 
premium for portfolio p. 
The expected return of the market will also be a function of the amount of risk 
and the price of risk. The amount of market risk is given by 
2 
(Y(Rm) 
and the price of market risk is given by k This means that in a similar way the 
market risk premium is a function of the price of risk and the amount of risk. 
A fundamental assumption of the Capital Asset Pricing Model described here is that the 
return distributions are constant over time. In which case the variances and covariances and 
therefore the P's are fixed. This is an assumption which appears to be increasingly unrealistic. 
For example, from the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) we know that as the gearing 
ratio of a company increases, investors require a proportional increase in the return to equity. 
The empirical specification of CAPM contradicts this statement, because, in the static version 
of CAPM the future gearing ratio of a company does not influence the required return of investors 
because the amount of risk is a constant. 
7.2.1 The Conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model 
In an attempt to explain why the Capital Asset Pricing Model does not appear to explain 
expected returns very well empirically, attention has focused on the possibility that the risk 
premium, rather than being constant, is instead time varying. In which case, PP would depend 
upon when PP was sampled. In this case, the beta of a security or portfolio last year might be 
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very different to the beta of a security or portfolio today. The transformation from the classical 
Capital Asset Pricing Model described in the previous section to the Conditional Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, in which the systematic risk premium is allowed to be time varying is 
straightforward. What is required is that the expectations of agents, regarding the means, 
variances and covariances of returns, rather than being fixed become conditional expectations, 
and are therefore random variables. 
Since it seems reasonable that investors would seek to utilise as much information as 
possible, investment decisions which are made in time t would utilise all information up until 
time t-1. In which case the conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model makes expected returns, 
variances and covariances conditional on the information available at t-I as follows. 
E(Rp,, I ot 
- 1) = rf, -I+ 
Pp, 
t(E(R.,, 10, - 1) - 1) 
(7.3) 
(7.4) 
pp't 
where, 0, -, 
is the information set available to agents when forming expectations regarding the 
mean, variance and covariance of an investment in time t. E(Rp,, ) is the expected return to 
portfolio p in time t, and Pp,, is the systematic risk of a portfolio in time t. 
Drawing on the analysis presented in the previous section, we can now write the expected 
return to a portfolio in terms of the conditional moments as follows. 
E (Rp,, I ýt 
- 1) = rf, -I+ 
X((T(Rp,,, R.,, I ýt 
- 1)) 
(7.5) 
In a similar way the market expected return can be written as 
(R.,, I ý, 1) = rf, I+ X((72(Rm, tI Ot -M 
(7.6) 
As Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 showed, realised portfolio returns can be expressed in 
terms of the expected portfolio return and an error which captures the difference between the 
realised and the expected return as follows. 
Rp, t=E (Rp', 
10, 
- 1) + up, ,= rf, t-i+ 
X(a(Rp,,, R, t 10, - 1)) + up, t 
(7.7) 
(U 2, E (up, ) =0Ep 1) = G2 (Rp,, 
In a similar way the market realised return can be written in terms of the expected market return 
and the error as follows 
Rt =E(R. 't 
1 et-, )+u. =r 
(7.8) 
f, t -1+ 
X(a(Rm, 
t 1 et - 1» + um, t 
E (u t) =0E 
(U. 2 
") = 
d2(R,. 
, t 
1 e, 
- 1) 
where, up, t is the error which reflects the 
difference between the realised return and the expected 
return of portfolio p such that, 
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up,, = Rp, t - E(Rp, t 
I ot 
- 1) 
(7.9) 
and u., is the error which reflects the difference between the realised market return and the 
expected market retum, 
u,,, = R., t - E(R,,,, t I ot - 1) 
(7.10) 
7.3 Modelling Time Varying Moments using ARCH Models 
7.3.1 Introduction to ARCH Models 
While it has been recognised for some time that the uncertainty of stock prices, as 
measured by the variances and covariances, are changing through time. The work of Fama (1965) 
and Mandelbrot (1966) which was discussed in earlier chapters indicated that there was a 
tendency for large returns to follow large returns and small returns to follow small returns. This 
would give rise to a changing conditional variance. However, it was not until recently that 
financial research began to model time variation in the second or higher moments. This section 
will be concerned with describing Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
related models which allow us to model the conditional moments of a time series. Three of the 
most prominent theories in asset pricing, the Capital Asset Pricing Model which was discussed 
earlier, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) Ross (1976) and the Consumption based CAPM 
model of Breeden (1979) have all found empirical implementations using ARCH models. Indeed, 
later in this chapter the Conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model, which was discussed earlier, 
will be tested using a multivariate ARCH related model for a selection of UK portfolios. 
7.3.2 The ARCH Model 
The ARCH model was first introduced by Engle (1982). This was a major breakthrough 
for the modelling of financial time series because ARCH models provide a framework with 
which uncertainty, in the variance and covariance of a series can be modelled. In the ARCH 
process, the variance of a time series, an example of which might be a time series of stock 
returns, rather than being constant is allowed to be time varying. Thus, the variance of returns 
in time t becomes conditional upon the past squared unexpected return of the time series. An 
example of an ARCH( 1) 3 model applied to stock returns is provided below. 
3. The model described here is called an ARCH(l) model because the conditional variance is a function of the one period past errors 
squared. An ARCH model can include any number of lagged squared errors. An ARCH(q) process is an ARCH model which contains q lags 
in the squared errors. 
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Rp, t 
: -- Oýp, I+ (Xp, 2Xp, t+ Up, 1 
2 (7.12) hp, l 
='Ip, I+ 7p, 2"p, I 
tip', 10, -1 -N(O, 
hp,, ) 
where, Equation (7.12) is known as the conditional mean equation and equation (7.13) is known 
as the conditional variance equation. Stationarity of the variance process requires that y2 <I 
while yl,, y2 >0 ensures that the variance is Positive. The Rp,, is a time series of portfolio 
returns, xp,, are exogenous variables which forecast Rp,,. The up,, is the unexpected component 
of returns which can not be forecast and hp, t is the conditional variance of Rp,,, which is 
conditional on the lagged unexpected return squared. 
What is happening in the ARCH model is that the conditional variance in time t becomes 
a function of the squared unexpected return in time t-1, which is a proxy for the previous 
periods volatility. A return in time t which is very different from the expected return, makes 
the squared error very large. The conditional variance in the next period must therefore become 
larger 4. In this case, because the distribution in time t+I flattens (because it has a higher 
variance) so it becomes more likely that the next periods return will also be a long way from 
the expected value. In contrast, a return in time t, which is very close to the expected return, 
causes the squared error to be very small, in which case the conditional variance is small (so 
the distribution narrows) making it more likely that in the next period another return will be 
observed which is also very close to the expected return. An ARCH process therefore allows 
us to capture volatility clustering, which causes the tendency for large returns to follow large 
returns and small returns to follow small returns, a characteristic of short-horizon returns which 
was identified by Fama (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966). 
An extension of this model which was proposed by Engle, Lilien and Robbins (1987) 
was the ARCH in mean or ARCH-M model which allows the conditional mean to be a -function 
of the conditional variance. This has an important application for finance because it allows us 
to investigate whether the past volatility of returns, as captured by the past squared errors, predicts 
the future value of Rp,,. This allows us to establish directly whether past volatility predicts future 
retums. 
4. Assuming that the coefficient on the past errors squared is positive. 
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An example of an ARCH (I)--M model is provided below. 
Rp, f= ap, I+ ocp, 2xp,, + 
Pp hp,, + up,, (7.13) 
h 7P, 12 (7.14) P, t+ 
7p, 2"p, t-I 
up,, -N(O, hp, 1) 
where, PP captures the extent to which the one period ahead portfolio return is related to the 
volatility shock, and other terms are as previously defined. 
A further extension of the ARCH model was proposed by Bollerslev (1986). Bollerslev 
modelled the conditional variance as a function, of not only the past errors squared, but also as 
a function of the past conditional variance. Such a model is known as a Generalised 
Autoregressive Heteroscedastic Model or GARCH model an example a GARCH(I, 1)5 model 
is provided below. 
Rp, tý 
Up, I+ ýXp, 2Xp, t+ Up, t (7.15) 
U2 hp, t= 
Yp, I +Yp, 2p '1_1 
+Yp, 3hp,, -1 (7.16) 
up, t I Ot -! -N(O, 
hp, t) 
where, stationarity of the variance process requires that y2+ y3< 1, hp,, in this model is conditional 
on the past values Of U2, t_ I and h P P't* 
The GARCH model has become very important in financial time series work because it 
allows researchers to model a conditional variance process which is persistent. If, for example, 
the conditional variance followed an ARCH process and was autocorrelated (that is the 
conditional variance process was persistent), it would indicate that a shock to the time series 
would have an influence on the conditional variance for some time. Such persistence would be 
captured by the lagged conditional variance which is analogous to the moving average term in 
an ARMA model. 
In a later paper Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) developed the conditional 
GARCH-M model. In such a model the conditional variance is determined by a GARCH process, 
but in this case the conditional variance is allowed to influence the conditional mean of the time 
series. 
5. A GARCH(l, 1) model has the one period lagged conditional variance and the one period lagged squared errors in the conditional 
variance. In the GARCH model any number of lags can be included in the conditional variance. A GARCH(p, q) model has p lagged 
conditional variance terms and q lagged squared error terms. 
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The applications of ARCH related models in finance have been numerous, a 
comprehensive survey of ARCH models and their application in finance is provided by 
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992). 
One of the first studies to investigate the relationship between expected returns and stock 
market volatility was undertaken by French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) who examined the 
relationship between returns to the value weighted NYSE index and the past volatility of market 
returns. Using a GARCH(l, l)-M model to capture volatility French et al found that there was 
a positive relationship between expected volatility and the risk premium to the market index. 
Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) investigated whether the systematic risk 
premium, derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model was time varying, whi ch would give 
rise to time varying expected returns. Essentially, Bollerslev et al test the conditional Capital 
Asset Pricing Model which was described in the previous section where the covariances between 
portfolio returns and the market return, are conditional on the past volatility of returns. Using 
a GARCH(l, l)-M model to capture volatility Bollerslev et al concluded that the estimated 
systematic risk premium was indeed time varying and closely related to the previous periods 
unexpected return. Over the sample period that is investigated it was found that the estimated 
risk premium was quite variable, so that the quarterly percentage risk premium for stocks ranged 
from a low of -2% to a high of about 1.5%. 
Results which have been found to be consistent with the findings of Bollerslev et al have 
been provided for a number of different asset markets and for a number of different national 
stock markets. Using the same GARCH-M framework developed by Bollerslev et al, De Santis 
and Sorbone (1990) find evidence of a time varying systematic risk premium for the Italian 
stock market. Engle and Rodriguez (1986) finds that the world systematic risk premium, obtained 
from an international Capital Asset Pricing Model is time varying, and related to the past volatility 
of the world market portfolio. While studies, such as those conducted by Attansio and Wadhwani 
(1989), have found evidence of time varying covariances in the APT model. 
Using the same framework which was developed by Bollerslev et al (1988) a study by 
Hall, Miles and Taylor (1989) investigated whether the systematic risk premium of UK 
portfolios, formed on the basis of industrial classification, were characterised by time variation. 
The results provided by Hall et al for the UK were comparable to the results provided by 
Bollerslev et al for the US. For the four portfolios investigated, O's were found to be time varying 
and again quite volatile. For example, over the sample period used by Hall et al which was 
1976-1986, the beta of the portfolio of companies which were from the chemical industry varied 
from about 0.77 in 1981 to about 1.06 in 1977. A similar degree of dispersion was also recorded 
for three of the portfolios in the sample, but not for the financial sector which appeared to have 
a much less volatile conditional risk premium than the other three portfolios. 
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The research which has been reviewed in this section is important because it demonstrates 
that time varying risk must be modelled when testing certain hypotheses about stock market 
behaviour, otherwise, it is possible to make erroneous conclusions. For example, DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988) argue that stock markets appear to be inefficient 
because stock returns appear to be predictable. However, there is now growing evidence to 
suggest that time variation in expected returns can account for a substantial proportion of the 
predictability which is identified in these studies, see for example, Chan (1988) and Ball and 
Kothari (1989) which were discussed in Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3. Furthermore, anomalies 
such as the book to market ratio and the small firm effect, which were discussed in Section 2.6 
of Chapter 3, appear to be the result of an empirical misspecification of CAPM rather than 
indicating that abnormal returns are predictable. Support for this possibility is provided by 
Jagannathan and Wang (1994) who re-estimate the Fama and French (1992) regressions (which 
found that in addition to the book to market ratio systematic risk did not appear to explain any 
of the variation in expected returns). Instead of using constant betas, Jagannathan and Wang 
estimate these regressions using betas which are time varying. Whereas, Fama and French found 
no relationship between systematic risk and return Jagannathan and Wang found that conditional 
beta has strong explanatory power, even after controlling for the book to market ratio. 
Furthermore, Attanasio and Wadhwani (1989) find that the predictability of stock returns from 
lagged dividend yields, see also, Shiller (1984), Levis (1989), Fama and French (1992) or Fama 
and French (1995) can be explained by a time varying measure of risk. 
In this chapter, the Conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model, which allows the covariances 
to be conditional on past volatility so that estimates of the systematic risk are allowed to be time 
varying, is tested for four portfolios which have been formed on the basis of firm size. The aim 
of these tests is to establish whether portfolio risk premiums, for portfolios which have been 
formed on the basis of firm size are time varying. This study is specifically looking for differences 
in the behaviour of the risk premiums of large and small firms, which distinguishes the work 
undertaken in this study from earlier research. 
7.4 The Estimation of The Conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model 
7.4.1 Data and Summary Statistics 
The weekly, Wednesday to Wednesday returns for four equally weighted portfolios over 
the sample period January 1976-December 1991 are utilised in this study. This is the same 
weekly portfolio return data which was described in Section 4.1.4 of Chapter 4. The four 
portfolios have been formed on the basis of market capitalisation as described in Chapter 4. P, 
denotes the portfolio which contains the smallest companies, while P4 denotes the portfolio 
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which contains the'largest firms in the sample. Summary statistics for all four portfolios were 
provided in Table 4.1 of Chapter 4. In this study, the FT All Share index is used as the 
representative market portfolio and the one week Treasury Bill rate is used as a proxy for the 
risk free rate of return. ' 
7.4.2 Modelling the Conditional Moments 
In this section, a GARCH(l, 1)-M version of the Conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
which is to be estimated in Section 5, is described. To specify a conditional Capital Asset pricing 
Model, in an economy with many assets, and allow for time varying conditional moments, the 
GARCH-M model described in the previous section has to be extended to a multivariate 
framework. In the conditional CAPM described here, as in the static CAPM, it is assumed that 
the risk premium is proportional to the covariance of each assets return with the return on the 
market. It is also assumed that all investors share the same expectations about the first two 
moments of the conditional distribution of returns. The distinguishing characteristic of the model 
tested here is that expectations are conditional on the squared lagged one period unexpected 
returns (which captures volatility) and the degree of persistence in the conditional variance. 7 
In Chapter 4, it was noted that the squared returns of all four portfolios used in this study 
were substantially autocorrelated, which indicated that when specifying the conditional variance 
this should be taken into account. This persistence could be captured by modelling the conditional 
variance as an ARCH model with a large number of autoregressive components. But, this would 
require the estimation of a large number of parameters. Instead, the GARCH specification of 
the conditional variance was used which allows persistence to be captured in a single parameter. 
The conditional version of the CAPM which allows for a time varying conditional 
covariance obtained from a GARCH(l, l)-M model can be written as follows, 
Rt =a+ X(H)e + U, (7.17) 
vech (H) = Ao +AI vech (U, -IU, - I') +B, vech 
(H, 
- 1) 
-N(O, H, ) 
where, R, is a vector of portfolio and market excess returns so that R, = (RP, t9 Rm, t)' where the 
excess returns have been calculated as the realised return less the risk free return. The a is a2 
xI coefficient vector of constants which captures the weekly expected return which is not 
associated with market risk. The H, is the conditional variance/covariance matrix of these returns 
6. This data is obtained from Datastream. 
7. The GARCH (1, I) is an ARMA(l, l) model in the variance. The past squared errors represent the autoregressive component, while the 
lagged conditional variance captures the moving average component, see for example, Hamilton (1995). 
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given the information available in time t-1. H, is estimated using the past squared errors from 
equation (7.19) and (7.20) and its own lagged values. The vech is the column stacking operator 
of the lower triangular portion of a symmetric matrix. U, = (up'lum't)' which are the unexpected 
return of the portfolio and the market respectively, AI is a2x2 symmetric coefficient matrix, 
these estimated coefficients provide an indication of the extent to which the conditional variance 
is related to past squared errors from the conditional mean equation. The AO is a2xI coefficient 
vector. This vector of estimated constants gives an estimate of the long run volatility because 
the coefficients indicate the amount of volatility present even if the squared errors and lagged 
conditional variance had no influence upon the conditional variance. B, Is a2x2 symmetric 
coefficient matrix. The co-efficient estimates in this matrix indicate the impact that the past 
conditional variance has upon its one period ahead future value. 
The coefficient estimate X is a point estimate of the market price of risk. In this study the market 
price of risk is assumed to be a constant throughout time, except if the month of the year is a 
January. Investigative empirical work not reported in this thesis suggests that this is a realistic 
assumption. A model which allowed X to vary in relation to volatility was found underperform 
the presented model (X was never found to be significant even at a 20% level, while in this case 
the variance process became explosive). A model where the market price of risk was allowed 
to increase if past returns were negative was also found to add nothing to the model. Finally, 
sub-period analysis which allowed the current model to be estimated over three non overlapping 
periods suggested that the market price of risk was not time varying. 
In the model which is estimated in this chapter, diagonality is assumed. This means that 
the elements in H, depend only on the past squared residuals and an autoregressive component, 
while the covariance, between the market return and the portfolio return depends only upon the 
past cross products of residuals and an autoregressive component as follows 
(h I ,, 
) (h12, t))( (Y2 (Rp,, I ot - 1) (T(Rp,, 
Rm, t I ot-1) H, = (k-2, 
t) 
(h22, 
t)) 
ý CF(Rp,,, R,,,, I ot - 1) (ý(R.,, 
10, 
- 1) 
2 Ao, II +A,, I l(iip, t-, )+Bl, ilh,,, t- I Ao, 12+Al, 12("p, t -I 
*Um, 
t - 1)+ 
BI, 12hl2, t -I 
*Um, 
t 1) + 
BI, (U2, t Ao, 12+Al, 12(Up, t -I 12hl2, t -I 
AO, 
22+ 
A1,22 
m _1) + 
BI, 
22h22, t -I 
It is also assumed that A, and B, are estimated scalar coefficients rather than vectors. 
This restriction is imposed because it implies that across the portfolios investors attatch the same 
relative importance to past events when forming expectations about volatility of prices. This 
amounts to investors using similar forecasting rules for similar problems because it is assumed 
that a shock to one portfolio has the same impact on the conditional variance of that portfolio 
as a shock to another portfolio has on the conditional variance of its portfolio. 
171 
amounts to investors using similar forecasting rules for similar problems because it is assumed 
that a shock to one portfolio has the same impact on the conditional variance of that portfolio 
as a shock to another portfolio has on the conditional variance of its portfolio. 
The bi-variate specification outlined in this section, requires the simultaneous estimation 
of the following system of five equations. It should be noted that since X is the price of market 
risk its estimated value has been restricted in equation (7-20) and (7.2 1) to be equal. Other 
variables and coefficients are as previously described in the previous page. 
RP= ap + 
k(h12, 
t) 
+ Up, 
t 
Rm, 1 = am + 
X(h22, 
t) 
+ Um, t 
hl, =A +A 2, -, 
)+B (h Oil 111(up t III Il't 
2 h22=A 022 +A 122 (um , I)+B 122 
(h22t 
- 1) 
hl2=A 012 +A, 12(UP, I- I* um, t-, )+B 112 
(hl2t 
- 1) 
7.4.3 Estimates of the Risk Premium and Thin Trading 
op = 
cT(Rp,,, R,,,,, ) (R., t- rf, 
(7.24) 
(ý(R. ) 
Section 7.2 of this chapter showed that the systematic risk premium for a portfolio of assets 
can be estimated as follows 
which is equivalent to 
(7.19) 
(7.20) 
(7.21) 
(7.22) 
(7.23) 
(R,,,, -r (7.25) 
G2 
(Y(Rp,,, R., (R,, ) 
As Section 2.7.2.1 of Chapter 2 indicated, Dimson (1979) has demonstrated that estimates 
of the systematic risk premium in the presence of thin trading will be biased downwards, because 
the covariance between the portfolio return and the market return will be understated. This 
happens because if a stock fails to trade in time t the effect of a systematic shock in time t will 
not be observed until the stock trades. Consequently, the extent to which the contemporaneous 
observed returns covary with the market will be understated. 
Dimson (1979), suggested an adjustment, which provides unbiased estimates of the risk 
premium when prices are set non-synchronously. Empirically, this adjustment requires that the 
estimated beta is measured as the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged serial covariances 
which provides an estimate of the risk premium in the presence of thin trading as follows 
a(Rp,,, R. ) 
-r )+ 62(R 
.. ) 
, &. m, t f, 
(T(Rp,, Rm,, T) 
(y2 
(R.,, - rf, (R .. ) 
,r=1,2,3.... T 
(7.26) 
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This aggregate coefficient beta provides an aggregate coefficient estimate of the risk premium 
as follows, 
(Rm, t- rf, f) T 
(Rm, t- rf,, ) (7.27) 
Cý 
(Y(Rp,, Rm, t)+.... + G2 
(Y(Rp,,, Rm, t (R. ) (R .. ) 
In this study a similar adjustment is proposed to correct estimates of the risk premium 
for the effect of thin trading. This is because, in the GARCH-M model estimated here, the 
conditional covariance will also be biased downwards, if stocks within a portfolio are 
characterised by thin trading. This bias would provide an estimate of the market price of risk 
which was upwards biased but an estimate of the conditional covariance which was downwards 
biased. Consequently, failing to adjust for thin trading would cause the estimated risk premium 
of small firms to be downwards biased. In order to correct for this understatement a conditional 
version of the aggregate coefficient model is proposed which allows the contemporaneous and 
the lagged covariances to enter the conditional mean equation as follows. 
Rp, a+ 4((F(Rp, týR,,,,, I ot 
T 
R,,,, t -, r 
I ot 
- 1)) + up, t 
11,2,3,... 
(7.28) 
p 1)) + 
X, ((Y(Rp, tl 
T 
where, + are collectively estimates of X which is the market price of risk. The term 
cy(Rp,,, R,,,,, 10, -) 
is the contemporaneous conditional covariance between portfolio p and the 
market and it is (Y(RP, tIR., t-T 10, -) which captures the covariance 
between the return of portfolio 
T 
p and the lagged return of the market, so that the terms I a(Rp,,, R.,, capture the 
.T=I 
understatement in the conditional covariance caused by thin trading. It should be noted that 
estimates of the risk premium will only be unbiased if sufficient lags are incorporated into the 
model. It should be noted that in this model (Y(Rp, t, R.,, is an estimate of the conditional 
covaraince between the market and portfolio p. 
In this study, all but the portfolio containing the largest firms in the sample are 
characterised by thin trading. ForP3, which is the portfolio containing the large-intermediate 
firms, one lag has been included in the conditional mean equation, for P2which is the portfolio 
containing the small-intermediate firms four lags have been included and finally P4the portfolio 
which contains the smallest firms six lags have been incorporated. Choosing the correct number 
of lags is difficult. As more lags are used the estimate of the covariance becomes less biased, 
however, as more lags are used the estimate of the covariance becomes increasingly inefficient, 
because of the effect that random variations have. The precise number of lags chosen here 
173 
reflected the decay in the autocorrelation coefficients which would be a good guide for the 
number of thin trading periods which would have a statistically significant impact on the 
covariances. 
7.5 Results From the Estimation of The Conditional CAPM Model 
For each portfolio in turn a bi-variate GARCH-M model which is similar to the one 
described in the previous section was estimated using Maximum Likelihood. There were two 
modifications in the specification of the model which is estimated here, the first reflects the 
adjustments which were made to account for thin trading, these were discussed in the previous 
section, secondly, a dummy variable was included for the month of October 1987 in order to 
control for the effect of the crash. The dununy variable takes on a value of one if it is October 
1987 but a zero otherwise. This extended model is as follows. 
R, =a+X(q)e+bC+U, (7.29) 
vech(H) = AO+Alvech(U, -, 
U, 
-, 
')+Blvech(H, 
-, 
) (7.30) 
Ut I 1-N(O, H) 
where b is a2xI coefficient vector which captures the effect of the crash on the conditional 
returns of the market and portfolio p respectively, the estimated coefficient values provided by 
this vector indicate the impact that the stock market crash had on the market portfolio and 
portfolio p respectively. C Is a vector of dummy variables as explained above. The X(H, ) is a 
point estimate which now reflects the adjustment for thin trading. 
The coefficients which are obtained from the estimation of this model are provided in 
Table 7.1. Looking at the conditional mean equations first, in only one case is the constant 
significant. This provides some support for the conditional CAPM model being tested here 
because it indicates that the Treasury Bill rate, the proxy for the risk free rate, fully captures the 
risk free component of realised portfolio returns. 
Not surprisingly, in all cases the crash dummy variable is very significant. This indicates 
that expected returns during this period were substantially lower than expected. The magnitude 
of the crash coefficient appears to be associated with the size of firms within a portfolio. As we 
move from the portfolio containing the smallest firms to the portfolio containing the largest 
firms the magnitude of the crash coefficient gets progressively larger. This does not indicate 
that the crash had less of an impact on small firms but reflects that the crash had less of a once 
and for all impact on the returns of small firms. Many of the small firms influenced by the crash 
174 
did not trade until some time after the crash, ' consequently, for such a portfolio the crash 
coefficient would be lower. An alternative specification, which tested the model using a crash 
dummy in the conditional variance equation, found that this was inappropriate because the 
dummy was insignificant for all four portfolios. 
The value of X for all four portfolios is close to 12. This means that for each unit of market 
risk that is accepted by investors 12 units of market return are required in compensation. This 
estimate is rather high compared to values provided by French et al (1987) and Miles et al 
(1989) who report coefficients close to 5. It should be noted that these studies looked at the 
market and value weighted portfolios respectively. However, Harvey (1989) reports values of 
;ý similar to those reported here. Since the study undertaken by Harvey examined capitalisation 
based portfolios it appears that the high value of k found here appears to be a consequence of 
the portfolio formation method. The same tests were performed on monthly data which provided 
estimates of X in the region of 7. The value of X obtained from these tests provided an annual 
risk premium which was similar in magnitude to the risk premium which was obtained from the 
weekly estimates. Estimates of the model without a crash dummy were also made. The value 
of X was found to be very sensitive to the inclusion of the crash dummy because when this was 
excluded the estimate of X was found to lie in the range 3.5 to 5. Although the estimates of ?, 
presented here appear to be high, it should be noted that the model without the crash dummy 
performed very badly, because the residuals had, in some cases, as much autocorrelation as the 
pure return series which suggests that the conditional mean in this case was badly specified. 
Turning now to the conditional variance equations, it is possible to see that for all four 
portfolios there is little evidence of any long run volatility because the magnitude of the constant, 
although, statistically significant is very small. 
In all cases the coefficients from the volatility shock (squared unexpected return) and 
the lagged conditional variance are statistically very significant. This provides evidence that the 
conditional variances and covariances examined here are time varying. Furthermore, because 
the coefficient on the lagged conditional variance/covariance is significant, support is provided 
for a conditional variance/covariance that is autocorrelated. 
For all four portfolios the coefficients from the squared lagged one period unexpected 
returns are close 0.1, and range from 0.1302 to 0.0869. Meanwhile, the magnitude of the 
coefficients appear to be related to firm size. As we move from the portfolio containing the 
8. The returns of the small firm portfolios suggest that at the time of the crash small firm portfolio returns fell by less than the returns of 
large firms. But, whereas the returns of large firms recovered in the week after the crash, the returns of small firms tended to continue to be 
significantly negative for several weeks after the crash. 
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small firms to the portfolio containing the large firms the magnitude of A, gets smaller. This 
indicates that an unexpected return experienced by small firms increases the conditional 
covariance by more than does a shock to large firms. 
The B, coefficients are much more dispersed ranging from 0.5071 to 0.7613. Again, the 
magnitude of the coefficient is associated with firm size. As we move from the portfolio 
containing the smaller firms to the portfolio containing the larger firms the magnitude of the 
coefficient gets progressively larger. This means that shocks to large firms appear to influence 
the conditional variance for longer than is the case for small firms. Surprisingly, this results in 
a shock to large firms lasting longer than a shock to small firms. This result is very interesting, 
because it is small firms and not large firms that are perceived as reacting more inertly to shocks. 
Further support for this is found in Chapter 7 of this study, which also investigates volatility but 
within an alternative framework. 
The sum of the A, and the B, coefficients are all close to but less than one. This means 
that a volatility shock is very persistent, having an almost permanent impact on the conditional 
variance. An indication of the degree of persistence in a shock is provided by the half life of a 
shock, which is the amount of time it takes for half of the shock to dissipate. This can be calculated 
as 
InO. 5 
AI+Bl 
(7.31) 
Estimates of the half life of a shock for each of the four portfolios are also presented in 
Table 7.1. For the portfolio containing the smallest firms the half life is II trading days and is 
therefore substantially less than the half life of the other portfolios. For example, the portfolio 
containing the largest firms has a half life of only 25 trading days. 
Table 7.2, provides the results of diagnostic tests which were performed on the residuals 
of these four models. Autocorrelation tests from one to six lags indicates that the autocorrelation 
which was present in the return series is substantially reduced, although, not entirely eliminated. 
The high autocorrelation appears to indicate that the conditional mean is not fully specified, at 
least for the portfolios which do not contain the largest firms in the sample. Although, an attempt 
has been made in this study to correct for the influence of thin trading, it seems likely that this 
adjustment has not been complete. Despite this, further lags in the conditional mean equation 
did not appear to improve the performance of the model. 
The kurtosis statistics for the weekly portfoli, o returns and for the residuals after the 
fitting of the GARCH model are presented in Table 7.2. As we can see for all four portfolios 
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the excess kurtosis has been eliminated indicating that the conditional variances of the residuals 
are no longer characterised by the volatility clustering which gives rise to a time varying 
conditional variance. 
The k2from the conditional version of the CAPM model tested here indicates that a large 
proportion of the variation in portfolio returns can be explained. In all cases the model can 
explain more than 10 percent of the variation in portfolio returns, although, as we move from 
the portfolio containing the largest firms to the portfolio containing the smallest firms the value 
of k2increases. For the smallest firms the conditional version of the CAPM tested here is able 
to explain as much as 30 percent of the variation in portfolio returns which reflects a substantial 
improvement in explanatory power in comparison to static versions of CAPM such as the one 
estimated in the previous chapter. 
Interestingly, these figures are comparable to those provided by Conrad and Kaul (1988) 
for the US (although, it should be noted that they model expected returns as a purely parsimonious 
time series process rather than using an asset pricing model). This result is important because 
it suggests that for all capitalisation based portfolios time variation in expected returns explains 
a substantial proportion of the variation in realised returns. Consequently, such time variation 
should be modelled when undertaking tests of market efficiency or asset pricing models. Like 
Conrad and Kaul, this study finds that for small firms time variation explains a larger proportion 
of the variation in realised returns than is the case for large firms. This is the first documentation 
of such a pattern for the UK stock market. 
7.6 Estimates of the Time Varying Risk Premium 
From the estimates presented in Table 7.1 and the conditional covariances obtained from 
the GARCH-M model, the portfolio risk premium can be calculated as follows. 
k(h12, (7.32) 
where, h(, 2,, ) iSthe conditional covariance between the return of portfolio p and the market return 
in time t. In this study the risk premium of the large firm portfolio has been calculated in this 
way. Because, the other portfolios have been adjusted for the effects of thin trading the risk 
prenuums for these portfolios have been calculated as follows 
Xjhl2j)+'ýIl (Up, 
t- I 'Um, t-2)+ "' 
+XC(Up, 
t- I ýUmj-) T=1,2,3,4... (7.33) 
For portfolio P, there is one lag term, for portfolio P2there are four lagged terms and for portfolio 
P, there are six lagged terms included in the model. 
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The estimated mean weekly risk premium for the four portfolios are presented in Table 
7.3. The expected risk premiums vary across the portfolios. The mean weekly risk premium for 
the large firm portfolio is approximately 0.0054 while the mean weekly risk premium of the 
portfolio containing the smallest firms is only 0.002 1. This difference may confirm the 
suggestion made earlier that the effects of thin trading on the covariances has not been fully 
captured. Although, it should also be noted that in the previous chapter it was found that 
systematic risk provided large firms with a higher risk premium than was the case for small 
firms. The difference in the magnitude of the risk premium reported here for large and small 
firms may reflect this finding, that is, for an equivalent amount of systematic risk large firms 
have a higher systematic risk premium than small firms which appears to be supported by Harvey 
(1989) who also finds that the conditional systematic risk premium of larger firms is higher than 
for small firms. 
The expected risk premium for the four portfolios is graphed in Fig I to 4. As we can 
see the risk premium in all cases is quite variable, although, there appears to be much greater 
week by week variability in the expected risk premium of the smaller firm portfolios. This 
reflects the magnitude of the ARCH coefficients which indicated that a volatility shock 
influenced the conditional variance of the small firm portfolio to a greater extent than was the 
case for large firms. In this case the expected risk premium is more sensitive to volatility shocks 
than are the large firms in the sample. 
By looking at these graphs we can see that specific periods can be identified in which 
the risk premium is unusually high and these periods appear to be consistent across the portfolios. 
The highest risk premium which is recorded is for 1977. During 1977 the expected risk premium 
for each of the portfolios is as much as three times the mean risk premium over the full sample 
period. Although, for the smallest firms in the sample this period provides a much more modest 
rise in the conditional risk premium. The risk premium is also exceptionally high for all portfolios 
during 1980,1982,1988 and 199 1, while for the smallest firms the period during 1982 provides 
the highest risk premium. 
Although, this study considers a different sample period to the one considered by Hall 
et al (1989), because of some overlap between samples some comparisons can be made. Hall 
et al finds that the beta of the chemical, financial and the electrical sector peaks in 1977 while 
for the mechanical sector the beta peaks at the end of 198 1. This is consistent with the results 
reported in this study because all of these periods provide unusually high conditional risk 
premiums for the four portfolios which are investigated in this study. 
The diagrams illustrate well the finding that a change in the conditional covariance of 
large firms has a more persistent impact on the risk premium than is the case for small firms. A 
rise in the risk premium lasts longer for large firms than is the case for small firms where a rise 
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in the risk premium disappears very quickly. This is illustrated by the fatter appearance of the 
peaks in Fig I and 2 relative to Fig 3 and Fig 4 which shows that a rise in the conditional risk 
premium of large firms tends to last longer than for small firms. 
7.6.1 The Behaviour of Excess Returns 
The excess return is the difference between the realised return and the expected return 
predicted by the conditional version of the CAPM tested here. The average excess return over 
the sample period is negative, which indicates that the model tested here tends to overestimate 
the risk premium. For example, the mean weekly excess return for the smallest firms in the 
sample is -0.000202 but for the largest firms in the sample it is -0.00 1480. This implies an annual 
overstatement in the risk premium of approximately 1.5 percent for small firms and 7.5 percent 
for large firms. 
As we can see from these figures, the risk premium of the larger firms in the sample is 
overstated by more than for small firms. This finding is consistent with Harvey (1989) who also 
reports that the conditional version of the CAPM overstates the risk premium, but, particularly 
for large firms. Figures 5 to 8 present a graphical account of the behaviour of excess returns 
over the sample period. These graphs illustrate the tendency for the larger firms to overstate the 
magnitude of the risk premium because there are rather more instances of a negative excess 
return for the lager firms than is the case for the smaller firms. 
7.6.2 Autocorrelation of the Risk Premium 
Table 7.3 provides estimates of the autocorrelation coefficients for each of the portfolio 
conditional expected risk premiums. It can be seen clearly that expected returns for all portfolios 
are very autocorrelated, although, the magnitude of the autocorrelation appears to be closely 
associated with firm size. For the portfolio containing the largest firms the autocorrelation in 
the expected risk premium is exceptionally high. For example, the first order autocorrelation 
coefficient for the large firm portfolio is approximately 86 percent (and therefore very close to 
a random walk model) which indicates that a change in the conditional expected risk premium 
has almost a permanent effect on the conditional expected risk premium. In contrast, the first 
order autocorrelation coefficient for the portfolio containing the smallest firms is only 46 percent, 
indicating that a change in the conditional risk premium of small firms does not have such a 
long impact on the conditional risk premium as is the case for large firms. Given the strong 
autocorrelation in the expected risk premiums found here it is not surprising that realised portfolio 
returns appear to be so strongly autocoffelated. The results for the large firms suggests that there 
is not much variation in the conditional risk premium of large firms on a week by week basis, 
that is, the expected return this week is not very different from the expected return next week. 
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This is therefore consistent with the results presented in Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5 which 
indicated an absence of short-horizon mean reversion for large firms. It appears that the reason 
for this is that the most recent weekly return of large firms provides very little additional 
information about the future performance of the portfolio return because the effect of a change 
in the expected return has an almost permanent effect on future returns. In which case this week's 
expected return therefore provides almost as much information as next weeks. 
In the case of the large firms at least 10 percent of the autocorrelation appears to be a 
consequence of time variation in the systematic risk premium. For the smaller firms it is more 
difficult to identify the component of autocorrelation caused by time variation because a 
substantial amount of the portfolio autocorrelation will have been caused by thin trading. 
It should be noted that the expected risk premium appears very much more autocorrelated 
than realised returns. This is expected because realised returns will also be influenced by random 
variations in the share price which will reduce the degree of autocorrelation in the time series 
of realised portfolio returns. Although, the error process between realised and expected returns 
of large and small is very different. The error process for the large firms is clearly much more 
random, but this probably reflects the different thin trading probabilities of the portfolios. 
7.7 Sub-Period Analysis of the Systematic Risk Premium 
Since the estimation of a GARCH model requires a very large sample this model has not 
been re-estimated over different sub-samples. However, to provide a gauge as to whether there 
have been shifts in the magnitude of the conditional risk premium over the full sample the mean 
weekly conditional risk premium has been calculated for four separate sub-periods. The 
sub-periods range from the first week in 1976 to the last week of 1980, the first week of 1981 
to the last of 1983, the first week of 1984 to the last week of 1987 and from the first week of 
1988 to the last week of 199 1. The results from this analysis are provided in Table 7.4. Generally 
it seems that as we move from the'beginning of the sample period towards the end of the sample 
period the magnitude of the risk premium tends to decline, but only slightly. For example, for 
the portfolio of large firms, the mean weekly risk premium in the first sub-period is approximately 
0.00606 but in the last sub-period it is only approximately 0.00507. This pattern is also reflected 
in the portfolios of smaller companies, for example, for the portfolio containing the smallest 
firms in the sample the estimated systematic risk premium is on average approximately 0.00224 
in the first sub-period but only 0.0019 in the second sub-period. Although, to some extent the 
difference in the magnitude of the conditional risk premium between the first and subsequent 
periods reflects the higher conditional risk premium present in 1977. 
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7.8 Seasonality and the Risk Premium 
One issue which has received little attention is whether the conditional expected risk 
premium varies on a seasonal basis, or whether the January effect can be explained within the 
context of a conditional asset pricing model. 
In this section the relationship between the conditional expected return and seasonality 
will be investigated. This section shows that conditional expected returns are higher during 
January which provides evidence to suggest that the January anomaly is not due to market 
inefficiency but instead reflects changes in required returns. 
7.8.1 The Month by Month Expected Risk Premium 
By looking at the graphical representations of the conditional risk premium which are 
presented in Figures I to 4, it is clear that at the start of the year the conditional risk premium 
appears to increase, this can be identified by the jump in the conditional risk premium which 
appears to occur at the start of the year. This pattern appears to exist for all four of the portfolios. 
Table 7.5 provides estimates of the mean weekly conditional risk premium for each month 
of the year and for the other months of the year excluding January. By looking at this table it is 
possible to observe that for all four portfolios the risk premium is highest during the month of 
January. For the small firm portfolio the mean weekly risk premium during the month of January 
is approximately 0.00282 but the mean risk premium for the other eleven months of the year is 
only 0.00201. Similarly, for the portfolio containing the largest firms in the sample the m. ean 
weekly risk premium during January is approximately 0.0077 but the mean weekly risk premium 
for the other months of the year is only 0.00520. 
In no other month of the year does the conditional systematic risk premium appear to be 
comparable to the January systematic risk premium. For example, although realised returns 
during the month of April appear to be higher than, any month other than January this is not the 
case for the conditional expected risk premium. During April the conditional risk premium 
appears to be indistinguishable from the risk premium during other months. This appears to 
indicate that in the UK the January and April regularity may be caused by different factors. The 
January risk premium appears to be related to the conditional systematic risk premium but the 
April seasonality does not. 
A comparison of the two means indicates that there is a significant difference between 
the risk premium in January and the risk premium for the other months of the year. Consistent 
with the results which were reported in Section 6.5 and 6.6 of Chapter 6 there appears to be an 
extraordinary relationship between systematic risk and return during the month of January. 
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7.8.2 January and The Market Price of Risk 
One possible explanation for the higher January risk premium is that the price of risk 
during January may be higher than during other months of the year. This would follow if investors 
perceived January as being more inherently risky than other months of the year. 
In order to test this possibility the GARCH-M version of the CAPM model which was 
tested in Section 7.5 of this chapter is re-estimated with a slope dummy variable to capture the 
price of risk during January. The dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if the portfolio or market 
return takes place during a January but a zero otherwise. This new version of the conditional 
mean equation is represented below. 
Rt =a+ X(H)e + d(Hj,,,, )e + bC + Ut (7.34) 
vech (H) = Ao +A, vech (U, -IU, - I') +B, vech 
(H, 
- 1) 
(7.35) 
I-N(O, H) 
where, d is a scalar which indicates how many additional units of market risk are required by 
investors during January9. Other variables are as previously defined. 
The results from the estimation of this model for all four portfolios are presented in Table 
7.6 which demonstrates that the price of risk in all cases is significantly higher in January than 
for other months of the year. These results imply that investors do perceive investments in 
January as being more risky than during other months of the year. For the large firms the market 
price of risk is approximately twice as high relative to the other months of the year, but, for the 
smallest firms the market price of risk is only slightly larger than during the other months of the 
year. This pattern confirms the work reported in Section 6.5 and 6.6 of Chapter 6 which found 
that during January the systematic risk premium of large firms was higher than the systematic 
risk premium of either smaller firms or the systematic risk premium during other months of the 
year. 
7.9 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has tested whether the systematic risk premium of four portfolios formed 
on the basis of firm size are time varying. Using a GARCH-M model framework to estimate 
the conditional covariances this study finds strong support for the conditional version of CAPM 
for both large and small firms. Although, there appear to be some interesting differences in the 
behaviour of the conditional moments of small and large firms. 
9. This has also been adjusted for the effects of thin trading in the same way as X. 
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It is found that for all four size-based portfolios which are investigated the systematic 
risk premium is sensitive to changes in the conditional covariance between the market and the 
portfolio return. This means that for both large and small firms the possibility that the risk 
premium is constant is rejected. Furthermore, it is found that in this study the k2 of the model 
tested is able to explain a large proportion of the variation in realised returns. Although there 
appears to be an inverse relationship between the magnitude of the variation in realised returns 
which can be explained and the size of firms within a portfolio. 
When the relationship between the return and volatility shock is investigated it is found 
that a number of differences exist between the behaviour of large and small firms. It appears 
that a shock to the conditional covariance of small firms causes more of a change in the 
conditional risk premium than is the case for large firms. However, it is found that a shock to 
large firms is much more persistent than is the case for small firms. This means that a shock of 
equal size which influences a portfolio of large and small firms will have a longer lasting effect 
on the portfolio of large firms. 
In this study the relationship between January returns and the magnitude of the conditional 
systematic risk premium is investigated. It is found that the conditional risk premium of all four 
portfolios investigated in this study are considerably higher during the month of January. This 
provides further support for linking high January returns to an extraordinary relationship between 
risk and return rather than assuming the January anomaly is evidence of market inefficiency. 
Again, an interesting relationship between firm size and the behaviour of the risk premium 
during the month of January appears to exist. It is found that for large firms, during the month 
of January the estimated market price of risk is considerably higher than for other months of 
the year, but for small firms, although, the market price of risk appears to be higher it is only 
moderately so. This appears to indicate that investors perceive January as a more risky month 
than the rest of the year. However, there is also evidence of a "clientele effect" because investors 
in large firms view January as being more risky than is the case for small firms. 
An interesting finding in this chapter is that the conditional risk premium of the four 
portfolios is heavily autocorrelated. Consequently, it is not surprising that realised portfolio 
returns have some autocorrelation. The autocorrelations in the conditional risk premium display 
a pattern which appears to be associated with firm size. As we move from the portfolio containing 
the smallest firms to the portfolio containing the largest firms the magnitude of the 
autocorrelation increases. For the large firm portfolio the conditional risk premium has an 
autocorrelation coefficient of 86 percent. This means that for large firms the predictable 
component in realised returns which is caused by time variation in expected returns does not 
decay very rapidly. This is an important finding because it helps to explain the lack of 
mean-reversion in short-horizon returns of large firms which was documented in Section 5.4 of 
Chapter 5. The reason there is no mean-reversion for large firms is that this weeks expected 
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anomalies we still do not understand why market premiums appear to be higher during January 
for countries which do not have tax years that end in December. Rather that documenting further 
the seasonal behaviour of risk premiums more work should be directed at investigating the 
institutional considerations which might cause January to be more risky than any other month. 
Future research could also be gainfully employed at investigating the impact that of thin 
trading on the conditional risk premium. Work presented in this chapter suggests that models 
of the expected risk premium should be modified in the presence of thin trading. Further research 
could be done in this area to establish more fully through the use of simulation models the impact 
that thin trading might have on estimates of the conditional variance/covariance relationships 
and the market price of risk. 
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Table 7.1 
Estimates from the GARCH-M Conditional CAPM 
The following table provides the results from the estimation of the following bi-variate GARCH(l, l)-M model. 
R, =a+XH, e+bC+U, 
vech(H) = A, + A, vech(U, _, 
U, 
-, 
') + B, vech(H, -, 
) 
U, I ý, 
-, -(OH, 
) 
a is a vector of constants, which should all be insignificantly different from zero if the conditional version of the CAPM here is fully specified. 
The coefficient X is a point estimate of the price of risk, and reflects how many units of market return investors require for additional units of 
market risk. The H, is the conditional variance matrix, b is the coefficient vector for the crash which is denoted by the vector C. A, are constant 
coefficients which captures the degree of long run volatility in either the covariances or variances, A, is the scalar coefficient associated with 
the past errors squared. This indicates how a shock influences the covariance or the variance, the scalar B, is the coefficient on the one period 
lagged conditional variance and indicates whether there is a relationship between the current conditional variance/covariance and its previous 
value. The coefficients which are obtained from the estimation of the conditional mean equation for the portfolios are sub-scripted by p. P, to 
P, are the portfolios containing the firms ranked on the basis of size so that portfolio P, contains the smallest firms in the sample down to P, 
which contains the largest firms in the sample. The t-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
P, P2 P3 P4 
ap -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0069 -0.0051 
(-0.91) (-0.99) (-0.01) (-0.13) 
12.7999 11.22 12.22 12.49 
(2.16) (1.88) (1.97) (2.11) 
bp -0.078 -0.066 -0.1085 -0.1291 
(-7.91) (-14.55) (-3.33) (-2.76) 
Ao, 
1 
0.00006 0.00004 0.00006 0.00008 
(9.30) (4.88) (5.77) (4.07) 
A012 0.00005 0.00004 0.00005 0.00008 
(6.95) (4.74) (6.03) (4.10) 
A R22 0.00017 0.00009 0.00007 0.00008 
(8.15) (4.65) (5.42) (4.15) 
A1 0.1302 0.1005 0.0869 0.077 
(4.88) (5.28) (6.07) (4.07) 
B, 0.5071 0.6963 0.7613 0.7499 
(10.58) (13.12) (24.49) (14.45) 
Half Life in days 11 21 29 25.5 
Y2 0.1287 0.1369 0.2610 0.3094 
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Table 7.2 
Diagnostics for the Residuals Obtained from the Conditional CAPM 
This table provides the results of diagnostic tests which were performed on the residuals from 
the estimation of the model presented in the previous table. Kurt Before refers to the kurtosis 
in the return series while Kurt After refers to the kurtosis in the residuals after fitting the 
GARCH-M model. The estimated autocorrelations in the residuals from lag one to six are 
captured by p, to P6- Standard errors for these are approximately 0.035. The Q is the sixth order 
Ljung-Box statistic which identifies autocorrelation from lags one to six. In all cases the 
probability values for the Q test were zero. 
Pi P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 Q Kurt Kurt 
Before After 
-0.1117 0.1173 0.0654 0.0556 0.0981 0.0584 38.94 10.63 2.19 
P2 
-0.0659 0.0833 0.0523 0.0950 -0.0199 0.0394 20.98 8,42 2.25 
P3 0.2241 0.1706 0.0698 0.1353 -0.0042 0.0596 88.93 6.38 2.59 
P4 0.0669 0.1054 -0.0144 0.0757 -0.0327 0.0268 19.55 7.35 1.377 
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Table 7.3 
Information About the Conditional Systematic Risk Premium 
This table provides information on the conditional risk premium. The conditional risk premium 
for portfolio 4, which contains the largest firms in the sample is calculated as X(hý2,, ). For the 
other portfolios which have adjustments to account for thin trading, the conditional expected 
risk premium has been calculated as 
X, 
O(hl2, t)+XI(Up, t-PUm, t-2)+ "' 
+X-r(Up, 
t-PUm, t-T) 
Prem is the mean weekly conditional risk premium over the sample period. PreMH and PreML 
are the highest and lowest recorded weekly conditional risk premiums respectively. The P^ i to 
P6 are the autocorrelation statistics for the conditional expected risk premium from lags one to 
six, standard errors for these are approximately 0.035. Q is the Ljung-Box statistic for the 
presence of autocorrelation from lags one to six in all cases the probability values are zero. P, 
to P4 are the portfolios containing the firms ranked on the basis of size so that portfolio P, 
contains the smallest firms in the sample down to P4which contains the largest firms in the 
sample. 
Prem PreML PreMH Pi P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 Q 
P, 0.00208 -0.0002 0.0137 0.4839 0.3297 0.2383 0.2108 0.1381 0.1358 403 
P2 0.00219 -0.0057 0.0115 0.3875 0.2553 0.2618 0.1987 0.2472 0.1271 335 
P3 0.00492 0.0000 0.0244 0.6957 0.5907 0.4962 0.4707 0.4108 0.3544 1337 
P4 0.00541 0.0000 0.0257 0.8642 0.7599 0.6534 0.5791 0.5033 0.4582 2138 
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Table 7.4 
Sub-Period Analysis of the Estimated Systematic Risk Premium. 
The following table provides estimates of the mean conditional risk premium for each of the 
four portfolios, estimated for four different sub-periods. Each sub-period begins during the first 
week of the year and ends at the last week of the year. The conditional risk premium for the 
four portfolios was estimated in the same way as reported in Table 7.3. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The P, to P4are the portfolios containing the firms ranked on the basis 
of size so that portfolio P, contains the smallest firms in the sample down to P4which contains 
the largest firms in the sample. 
1976-1980 1981-1983 1984-1987 1988-1991 
P, 0.00224 0.00196 0.00218 0.00194 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0008) 
P2 0.00258 0.00216 0.00208 0.00195 
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0008) 
P3 0.00627 0.00455 0.00436 0.00450 
(0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0013) 
P4 0.00606 0.00533 0.00518 0.00507 
(0.0031) (0.0013) (0.0052) (0.0051) 
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Table 7.5 
The Month by Month Conditional Systematic Risk Premium 
The following table provides estimates of the systematic risk premium on a month by month basis for all four 
portfolios. Feb-December provides the mean weekly return for each week in the sample except those that fall during 
a January. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The P, to P4are the portfolios containing the firms ranked on 
the basis of size so that portfolio P, contains the smallest firms in the sample down to P4which contains the largest 
firms in the sample. 
All Portfolios P, P2 P3 P4 
January 0.0054362 0.002818 0.003067 0.008151 0.007709 
(0.00147) (0.00499) (0.00217) (0-00151) 
February 0.0039437 0.001954 0.002391 0.005142 0.005769 
(0.00050) (0.00149) (0.00135) (0-00076) 
March 0.0037227 0.001958 0.002255 0.005103 0.005575 
(0.00033) (0.00136) (0.00080) (0-00073) 
April 0.0035977 0.001872 0.002239 0.004841 0.005439 
(0.00041) (0-00139) (0.00096) (0.00063) 
May 0.0037647 0.002093 0.002435 0.004952 0.005579 
(0-00070) (0.00242) (0.00151) (0.00166) 
June 0.0032020 0.001872 0.001803 0.004229 0.004904 
(0.00018) (0-00071) (0.00061) (0.00068) 
July 0.0033087 0.001953 0.002170 0.004090 0.005022 
(0-00043) (0-00117) (0.00144) (0.00074) 
August 0.003031 0.001856 0.001684 0.003913 0.004671 
(0.00016) (0.00056) (0.00042) (0-00036) 
September 0.0038807 0.002741 0.002395 0.005067 0.005322 
(0.00024) (0.00092) (0.00196) (0.00155) 
October 0.0034615 0.001951 0.002113 0.004648 0.005134 
(0-00039) (0.00101) (0.00082) (0-00057) 
November 0.0031447 0.001847 0.001802 0.004160 0.004773 
(0.00029) (0-00088) (0.00034) (0-00084) 
December 0.0034225 0.002020 0.001944 0.004707 0.005019 
(0.00046) (0-00182) (0.00102) (0.00099) 
Feb-December 0.003487 0.002010 0.002111 0.004629 0.005200 
(0.00101) (0.00124) (0.00211) (0.00267) 
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Table 7.6 
Estimates from the Multivariate GARCH-M Model with a January in Mean Dummy 
The following table provides the results from the estimation of the following bi-variate GARCH(l, l)-M model. 
R, =a+ XHe + XH,,.,, e + U, 
vech(H) = AO+Alvech(U, -, 
U, 
- 
I+ Blvech(H, 
-, 
) 
U, I ý, 
-, -(Ox) 
a is a vectoeof constants, which should be insignificantly different from zero if the conditional version of the 
CAPM here is fully specified. The coefficient X is a point estimate of the price of risk, and reflects how many units 
of market return investors require for each additional unit of market risk. d provides an estimate of how many 
additional units of market risk are required by investors during the month of January. H, is the conditional variance 
matrix. AO are constant coefficients which capture the degree of long run volatility in either the covariances or 
variances, A1 is the coefficient from thepast errors squared, B, is the coefficient on the one period lagged conditional 
variance and indicates whether there is a relationship between the current conditional variance/covariance and its 
previous value. P, To P4 are the portfolios containing the firms ranked on the basis of size so that portfoho P, 
contains the smallest firms in the sample down to P4 which contains the largest firms in the sample. The t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. 
P, P2 P3 P4 
a,, -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0055 
(-1.43) (-1.26) (-0.83) (-2.26) 
21.26 10.87 11.08 12.64 
(1.99) (1.87) (2.09) (2.18) 
8 1.81 13.30 11.25 11.98 
(2.23) (2.01) (1.96) (1.93) 
bp -0.078 -0.066 -0.123 -0.129 
(-7.77) (-12.65) (-23.75) (-0.96) 
Aol 1 
0.00006 0.00004 0.00006 0.00007 
(9.14) (4.85) (5.72) (40.07) 
A012 0.00005 0.00004 0.00005 0.00007 
(6.77) (4.72) (5.93) (77.10) 
A (t2 0.00017 0.00009 0.00007 0.00007 
(7.96) (4.63) (5.34) (39.79) 
A 0.1283 0.0986 0.0948 0.078 
(4.90) (5.16) (6.12) (5.44) 
B, 0.4969 0.6914 0.7502 0.7620 
(9.14) (10.58) (23.05) (44.27) 
R20.1383 0.1259 0.2672 0.2713 
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Fig 7.1 
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Fig 7.3 
The Weekly Conditional Systematic Risk Premium for Portfolio P2 
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Fig 7.4 
The Weekly Conditional Systematic Risk Premium for Portfolio P, 
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Fia 7.5 
The Weekly Conditional Excess retums for Portfolio P4 
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Fig 7.6 
The Weekly Conditional Excess returns for PortfolioP3 
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Fig 7.7 
The Weekly Conditional Excess returns -for 
Portfolio P2 
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Fig 7.8 
The Weekly Conditional Excess returns for Portfolio P. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Volatility, Leverage and Firm Size: The UK Evidence' 
8.1 Introduction 
Recent. evidence for the US stock market, such as that provided by Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990a) and Conrad, Gultekin and Kaul (199 1), has uncovered a number of asymmetries in the 
dynamic býhaviour of size-based portfolio returns. It had long been known that portfolios or 
indexes that give greater weight to small capitalisation firms were characterised by greater serial 
correlation than portfolios or indexes that gave little weight to small firms, see for example, the 
seminal paper by Fisher (1966), and the studies of the empirical application of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) which were discussed more 
fully in section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3. 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) pointed out that this was not the only difference between the 
serial correlations of size-based portfolio returns. For example, they systematically documented 
the cross serial correlations between the portfolio returns. They found that while the past returns 
of a portfolio of large firms were strongly correlated with the current return of a portfolio of 
small firms, the reverse was not the case. To illustrate, Lo and MacKinlay reported that the cross 
serial coefficient between the returns of a portfolio containing the smallest firms and a portfolio 
containing the largest firms in their sample was 27.6 percent if the returns of the large firms 
lead the returns of the small firms by one period. In contrast, it was found that the cross serial 
correlation coefficient was only 2 percent when large firtns lead small firms by one period. 
D- 
Results consistent with these findings are also reported by Conrad et al (199 1). This means that 
the returns of large firms help to predict the returns of small firtns but the reverse is not true, 
the returns of small firm do not- help to predict the returns of large firms. 
The discovery of asymmetries in the empirical characteristics of large and small firms was 
enhanced by the work of Conrad et al (199 1) who found that unexpected returns to large firm 
portfolios were important determinants of the future volatility and returns of small firms, but 
that the reverse was not the case. Using a GARCH (1,1) model to capture volatility, Conrad et 
al found that the unexpected returns of portfolios containing large firms predicted the future 
volatility for a portfolio of smaller firms. In contrast, the unexpected returns of small firms did 
not predict the future volatility of a portfolio of large firms. The aim of this chapter is to examine 
whether there are similar asymmetries in the dynamics of the returns of size-based portfolios 
for UK stocks, and to extend the search for size-related regularities to the leverage effect. 
l. 'Mis work has been undertaken jointlY with James Nfichael Steeley. 
199 ICA 
The leverage effect, which was introduced by Black (1976) and Christie (1982), refers to 
the tendency for returns and volatility to be negatively correlated. That is, negative returns are 
more likely to be associated with greater volatility than positive returns. There is good reason 
to expect a leverage effect in stock markets. Negative stock returns are caused by a fall in the 
share price of a company, which necessarily induces a fall in the capitalisation value, therefore 
causing an increase in the gearing ratio making the equity more risky. Consequently, investors 
will require higher returns, which can only be achieved by a fall in the share price, which 
introduceg additional Volatility 2. 
In this study a number of aspects to the leverage effect will be tested. Firstly, this chapter 
will seek to determine whether the leverage effect is influenced by firm size. Essentially, this 
means identifying whether an unexpectedly bad return causes more future volatility than an 
unexpectedly good return and, furthermore, looking at whether the magnitude of the predicted 
future volatility depends upon fmn size. Secondly, this chapter tests whether the sign of a shock 
to one portfolio is important for the volatility and returns of another portfolio, and whether this 
relationship is itself size-based. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 8.2 describes the characteristics 
of the data set used in this study. In Section 8.3, a specification of the generalised autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) family of statistical processes is used to identify the 
influence that portfolio return shocks have on the future volatility of a portfolio. Section 8.4 
investigates whether volatility shocks are transmitted across portfolios so that volatility 
spillovers; exist across portfolios. Section 8.5 reports the results of an investigation into the 
relationship between the leverage effect and firm size, using an asymmetric conditional variance 
model. Section 8.6 provides a summary and conclusions to the chapter. 
8.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
The weekly returns for four size-based portfolios of UK stocks spanning the period from 
January 1976 to December 1991 are tested in this chapter. These portfolio returns were the same 
as the ones used in Chapter 4 an4, Chapter 7. A detailed account of how the four portfolios were 
formed is provided in Section 4.1.4 of Chapter 4. 
As Chapter 4 demonstrated and, specifically by looking at Table 4.1 the autocorrelations 
for the portfolio weekly returns, squared returns, and absolute returns for the four 
equally-weighted portfolios indicated that there were striking differences among the 
autocorrelations of the portfolio returns. Furthermore, these differences appeared to be to be 
2. The impact that higher gearing ratios have on the risk and therefore the required return of investors is well documented. Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), for example, discuss the fact that as the gearing ratio of a company increases the probability of the company experiencing 
bankruptcy increases. The occurrence of bankruptcy is bad for shareholders because when a company is liquidated the shareholders are the 
last to receive their investment and are only paid after creditors and debt holders. 
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related to the capitalisation ranking of the portfolios. The portfolios of relatively small firms 
tended to have return autocoffelation coefficients which were greater than those for portfolios 
of relatively larger fir-ins. Although, for all portfolios the magnitudes of the autocorrelation 
coefficients decayed, at higher orders. More than half of the reported coefficients were 
statistically significant. All of the portfolios had significant first and second order 
autocorrelation, and all of the reported coefficients for the small firm portfolio were significant. 
The small firm portfolio had greater autocorrelation than the large firm portfolio in both squared 
and absolute returns. Autocorrelation coefficients were generally smaller as the lag length 
increases. 
In contrast to the autocorrelation observed for the underlying returns series, the coefficients 
for squared and absolute returns were generally much larger at lags I and 2. For example, first 
order autocorrelation coefficients for squared returns were 60 percent and 43 percent for the 
small firm portfolio and large firm portfolio, respectively. Strong autocorrelation in squared and 
absolute returns is a symptom of changing unconditional or conditional variances. In particular, 
these results suggest that the volatility of small firm portfolio returns is more clustered than the 
volatility of large firm portfolio returns. That is, large absolute returns are more likely to be 
followed by large absolute returns than by small absolute returns. 
Table 8.1 provides summary information on the debt/equity ratios of component securities, 
for each of the portfolios used in this chapter. As we can see from table 8.1 all of the portfolios 
have a reasonably similar mean debt/equity ratio over the period 1976-199 1. For portfolio I to 
3 the mean debt/equity ratio is in the region of 0.3. The variance of the debt/equity ratio is much 
higher for the portfolios containing the smaller firms. For example, for the portfolio containing 
the smallest companies the variance of the debt/equity ratio is about 0.127 but for the larger 
firms the variance is only 0.026. This means that the debt/equity ratio for large firms is reasonably 
homogeneous but for small firms, some have high debt/equity ratios while others have more 
modest ratios. 
Table 8.1 also provides information on the mean debt/equity ratio for the years 1976,1985 
and 199 1. What is noticeable from these figures is the downward trend in debt/equity ratios of 
smaller firms during 1991 but the rise in the ratios for large firms. 
In Table 83(a) of this chapter, the estimated cross serial correlations between the returns 
of each of the portfolios are reported. These cross serial correlations indicate a similar pattern 
to that documented by Lo and MacKinlay for the US stock market. It should be noted that the 
leading diagonal terms in the sections of Table 83(a) correspond to the autocorrelations reported 
in Table 4.1 of Chapter 4. The terms above the diagonal tend to be larger than the corresponding 
terms below the diagonal. This means that there is a stronger correlation between the past returns 
of portfolios which contain relatively large firms and the current portfolio returns of relatively 
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small firms than there exists in the opposite direction. For example, the previous week's return 
of the large firm portfolio and the current return for the small firm portfolio provide a correlation 
coefficient of 0.383. In contrast, the previous week's return of the small firm portfolio and the 
current week's return of the large firm portfolio provides a correlation coefficient of only 0.096. 
As with the autocorrelations, the cross serial correlations decay as the lag length increases. For 
example, the cross serial correlation coefficients at three lags, when the portfolio returns of large 
firms lead the portfolio returns of small firms is 0.154 but is only -0.063 when small firms lead 
the large firms. 
8.3 Asymmetries in the Conditional Variance of Portfolio Returns 
The strong autocorrelation in the portfolio returns indicates that a good way of modelling 
the returns for the portfolios would be to use a stationary first-order autoregressive 
moving-average model, ARMA(l, 1), as follows 3 
gi + ýjRj,, -I+ ci,, - 
OiF-,,, 
-Ii=1,2,3,4 
where, R,,, are the returns of one of the four portfolios, F, is the one period lagged error from 
portfolio i, and gi is a constant. 
The coefficients which are obtained from the estimation of this model are given in Table 
8.2. The autoregressive coefficient, ýj, captures the first order autocorrelation in the returns 
series. The coefficient is largest and most significant for the small firm portfolio returns, where 
the return autocorrelation is strongest. The moving-average coefficient, 0,, provides a 
parsimonious representation of the decay in the autocorrelation function of the returns and, as 
such, is less dissimilar among the different portfolio returns series. These characteristics have 
already been noted in Chapter 5. In the spirit of Box and Jenkins (1976), the autocorrelation 
structure of the residuals was analysed as a specification test. These residual autocorrelations 
are also reported in Table 8.2 and, with the slight exception of P3, there is little evidence of 
significant autocorrelation. So, the ARMA(l, 1) process provides a well-specified form for the 
conditional mean process, and will be used as the basis for the examination of the conditional 
variance '. 
Table 8.2, reports strong evidence of serial correlation among the squared residuals of the 
ARMA(l, 1) model ofretums. fbe pattern of autocorrelation in the squared residuals is consistent 
3. Alternative specifications were investigated. but did not appear to perform very well. For example, a number of MA and AR models were 
investigated but these tended to provide quite high autocorrelations in the residuals. 
4. Alternative conditional variance specifications such as the GARCH(1,2) were also tested but such models did not perform very well since 
higher order lags in the AR and MA component of the GARCH specification tended to be insignificant. 
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with an ARMA(l, 1) specification of the conditional variance process. Hence, volatility is 
modelled as a GARCH(l, 1) process. As Section 7.3 showed such a model allows us to capture 
the clustering and persistent nature of the conditional variance. 
ht =m +b; 2 +ch t-I 
(8.2) 
As Section 7.3 of the previous chapter showed, in this model, the coefficient b measures 
the tendency' of the conditional variance to cluster, while the coefficient c measures the degree 
of persistence in the conditional variance process. A tendency for volatility clustering will also 
give rise to leptokurtosis in the return series, which is present in this data set. The kurtosis figures 
are reported for each of the four portfolios in Table 8.2. As we can see, the kurtosis statistic for 
the residuals, for all four portfolios, is a long way from 3 which would indicate normality. For 
example, for the small firm portfolio the kurtosis is 8.234 but for the large firm portfolio the 
kurtosis is 5.941. 
In this study realised returns have been estimated as a purely parsimonious time series 
process rather than being modelled with reference to an asset pricing model such as CAPM. 
The reason for this is that it is important that the spillover results presented in this chapter are 
not due to mis-specification of the asset pricing model which is used. This would be a strong 
possibility in view of the evidence presented in Chapters 6 and 7 which indicated that CAPM 
did not explain realised returns very well for the portfolios examined in this study. Utilising the 
ARMA(l, 1) model instead, implies that expected returns follow an AR(l) process but no 
equilibrium conditions are imposed. This means that as long as the ARMA(l, 1) model appears 
to be well specified the behaviour of expected returns will be well captured by the model. 
The specification of the conditional mean equation which is estimated in this study is 
modified slightly from the model presented in equation (8.1). This modification is necessary to 
take into account the specific characteristics of the data set used in this study which otherwise 
might lead to a mis-specification in the conditional variance equation. Since the sample period 
overlaps with the equity market crash of October 1987, a dummy variable is included to cover 
this event. The dummy variable takes on a value of one if it is October of 1987 and a zero 
otherwise. Furthermore, as Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated the UK stock market is characterised 
by a significant turn-of-the-year effect, a dummy variable is also included for tWS5 . This dummy 
variable takes on a value of one if the portfolio return occurs in a January but a zero otherwise. 
In later specifications, the volatility shocks of one portfolio will be included in the conditional 
variance of another portfolio. To ensure, that these relationships are not obscured by the cross 
serial correlations in the returns, which were identified in Table 8.3(a), additional terms in the 
form of lagged returns of each of the other portfolio returns are included in the conditional mean 
5. Dummies to account for the start of the tax year in April were found to be insiginficant and were not included in the final version which 
was estimated. 
203 
equation. Since the cross serial correlation between the portfolios is a symptom of thin trading 
(see Section 2.7.2 which discussed this issue in detail), including the lagged one period returns 
of each of the other portfolios will ensure that this specification will purge from the data any 
remaining influence that thin trading might have which has not already been eliminated by the 
ARMA(l, 1) specification. The full model tested is as follows 
4 (8.3) Ri, t = gi + 
Pihi' + OiRi 
-I- 
Oi6i, 
t -I+ ^fi, jRj,, -I+ 
bi, IDI,, + 8i, 2D2, t + F-I't 2,3,4 't I't 
ij = 1, 
j*l 
2 hi, l = mi + biE7i,, -I+ cihi, t -1 
(8.4) 
mi > 0, b c, k 0, 
bi + ci < 1, 
4 
where I yiRj,, -I refers to the one period 
lagged return of each of the three other portfolios and j=4 
j=1 
the coefficients associated with these lagged one period returns. D, Is a dummy variable which 
takes on a value of I if it is a week in October of 1987. D21s a dummy which takes on a value 
of I if it a week in January but a zero otherwise. 81 And 82are coefficients which indicate how 
much above or below the constant returns are at this time. 
The results which have been obtained from the estimation of equation (8.3) and (8.4) are 
provided in Table 8.4. As a specification test of the model presented in equations (8.3) and (8.4), 
the Ljung-Box (1978) sixth order statistic has been calculated for the normalised residuals of 
each of the four portfolio expected return series. In each case, there was no significant evidence 
of serial correlation which indicates that the extended ARMA(l, 1) model of equation (8.3) is 
fully specified. 
listically significant for each portfolio. The dummy variable for the crash was found to be st"at 
While, the turn-of-the-year dummy variable was significant for all portfolios except the one 
containing the largest firms. 
Focusing now on the estimated conditional variance coefficients, it can be seen that they 
are all strongly significant. These results indicate a clear pattern, the past squared errors have 
more influence over the conditional variance of the small firm portfolio than they do over the 
conditional variance of the large firm portfolio. The coefficient b, takes the value 0.243 for the 
small firm portfolio, but has a value of only 0.121 for the large firm portfolio. These coefficients 
also reflect the relative levels of kurtosis in the return series of the portfolios. The small firm 
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portfolio returns are more leptokurtotic because they have the greatertendency toward clustering, 
this is reflected in the kurtosis statistic because the clustering introduces an excessive number 
of extreme returns which cause the fat tails in a leptokurtotic distribution. 
The estimated values of the coefficient ci are 0.356 and 0.730 respectively, for the small 
and large firm portfolios. The combination of these two features suggests that although shocks 
to the volatility of large firm portfolios have less impact than shocks to the volatility of small 
firm portfolios, they are much more persistent. This is an interesting finding because we usually 
think of the small firms as being characterised by more persistence, whether it is due to more 
inertia in the reaction of investors, or whether it is caused by microstructure frictions. These 
results confirm those reported in Section 7.5 of Chapter 7 which showed that a systematic shock 
had an influence on the conditional variance of large firms for longer than was the case for small 
firms. 
For small firms, but not for large firms, volatility implies stock return predictability. 
Because, both the GARCH in mean term and the components in the conditional volatility 
equation are all statistically significant it is possible to infer that volatility predicts stock returns 
for all but the largest portfolios. The estimated P, coefficients on the GARCH-M terms also 
display an interesting pattern. The coefficients have a greater magnitude and statistical 
significance in portfolios of smaller firms. This implies, that the smaller are the firms in a 
portfolio, the more valuable is information concerning the current value of the volatility. This 
feature is entirely consistent with the previous results concerning the relative persistence of 
volatility. Information on current volatility is most important for portfolios of small firms exactly 
because it has a big impact and then decays quickly. 
The results which are provided in this section indicate that if investors are concerned about 
risk, then during periods of high volatility they should hold portfolios of large firm stocks. This 
follows because during periods of high market volatility, it is the returns of small firms which 
will become the most volatile. Although, investors who hold portfolio,; of large firms do not 
obtain return compensation for this because volatility does not predict returns. 
It is possible to obtain a clearer picture of the persistence in the volatility processes by 
calculating the half-life of a shock to the process, that is, the time that it takes for half of the 
shock to have dissipated. This can be calculated as follows 
Half-life, = 
In(O. 5) 
In(c, + bi) 
(8.5) 
In the case of the small firm portfolio, the half-life is about 7 trading days in length, whereas 
for the large firm portfolio, the half-life is about 20 trading days. These estimates are almost 
identical to those reported in Section 7.5 of Chapter 7 which looked at the half life of a systematic 
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shock. This section suggests that volatility persistence is stronger for large firms than for small 
firms. We normally expect news to take longer to be reflected in the share prices of small firms 
not large firms. However, the results presented here may reflect the trading patterns of 
institutional shareholders better represented by the behaviour of large firms. When a large firm 
stock provides an unexpectedly high or low return this might cause large institutional investors 
to -rebalance their portfolios. The result of the portfolio rebalancing, if it has price implications 
is that futurd'volatility during the rebalancing period is increased. Small investors more active 
in small firm stocks are less likely to rebalance in response to immediate price pressure because 
of higher transaction costs see for example, Pagano and Roell (1990) who show that round trip 
transaction costs for small transactions are about 4% but only 1% for large transactions. 
8.4 Volatility Spillovers 
Although the residuals from the ARMA(l, 1) models did not possess significant 
autocorrelation, however, there is some evidence that the residuals from the ARMA(l, 1) models, 
for different portfolio returns are cross-autocorrelated, see Table 8.3(b). This suggests that return 
shocks, that is, unexpected returns experienced by one portfolio, may be important in determining 
the volatility and expected returns of another portfolio. Again there appears to be an asymmetry 
whereby the terms above the leading diagonal are larger than the terms below the diagonal, 
which suggests that shocks to large firm portfolios may influence small firm portfolios, but not 
the reverse. This idea of examining volatility spill-overs was pioneered by Hamao et al (1990), 
who considered the influence that stock market volatility in one country might have on the 
behaviour of the volatility and returns of the stock market in another country. Some evidence 
is provided by Hamao for spillovers of volatility from New York to Tokyo and London to Tokyo, 
but not from Tokyo to either New York or London. 
This idea of a volatility shock being transmitted across portfolios was introduced into the 
framework of portfolio returns by Conrad et al (199 1), who examined whether volatility shocks 
were transmitted across capitalisation. based portfolios in the US markets. Using a GARCH-M 
framework to capture volatility, Conrad et al found that a shock to large firms could predict 
future volatility in the portfolio returns of small firms, but not vice versa, that is, volatility surprises 
to small firms did not predict future volatility or returns for large firin portfolios. This finding 
indicated an interesting asymmetry in the behaviour of the conditional variance of large and 
small firms. 
In Table 8.5, maximum likelihood estimates of the model represented by equation (8.6) 
below are estimated. This equation is a modification of the conditional variance equation 
represented by equation (8.4) in the previous section. In equation (8.6) the conditional variance 
also includes volatility spillover terms. This means that the past volatility of one portfolio, 
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(measured by the past errors squared) is allowed to influence the conditional variance equation 
of another portfolio. This allows us to test whether a volatility shock to one portfolio can predict 
volatility in another portfolio. Specifically, the aim of these tests is to identify whether there is 
a spillover relationship associated with firm size. 
+ ki, j 
2#i (8.6) hi = m, + bi&i, t -, 
+ cihi -, Ei-. ' t-1i 
2 
where, is the squared unexpected return of portfolioj, k,, j is the coefficient which measures 
ei-It 
-I 
the impact of past return shocks to portfolio j on the conditional volatility of portfolio i, and 
other terms are as previously defined. 
Looking at the results from the estimation of this model, which are reported in Table 8.5, 
it can be seen that the estimated values of k,. j tend to be more statistically significant above the 
leading diagonal, which is in cases where the volatility spill-over is from a portfolio of relatively 
large firms to a portfolio of relatively small firms. The past volatility of the large firm portfolio 
is important in determining the future volatility of the small firm portfolio, but the reverse is 
not so. To illustrate, Table 8.5 shows that the coefficient on ki , when the spillover is coming 
from the small firm portfolio into the portfolios which contain the larger firms, in only one case 
is this coefficient statistically significant. This indicates that a shock from small firms does not 
predict the future volatility of larger firms. An exception, is the case of P2which contains the 
small-intermediate firme. In contrast, when a shock is observed for the largest firms in the 
sample, this shock always predicts future volatility for the smaller firms, k4 is statistically 
significant for portfolio P, and P2, the portfolios which contain the smaller companies in the 
sample. While, this general pattern is supported throughout. 
The estimated 0, coefficients on the GARCH-M terms maintain the same picture which 
was obtained without the inclusion of the spill. -over terms. That is, the volatility of relatively 
small firm portfolios is important in determining the conditional mean return of small firm 
portfolios, but the volatility of the large firm portfolio does not have a statistically significant 
influence on the mean return of the large firm portfolio. This feature, in combination with the 
spill-over results, means that the volatility shocks to the large firm portfolio are important in 
determining both the volatility and the mean return of the small firm portfolio. However, the 
reverse is not the case; shocks to small firms do not appear to spillover into large firms. 
The estimated values of b, and c, display the same clustering and persistence, features as 
documented in Table 8.4. Small firm portfolio returns are more clustered, but shocks are less 
persistent, than for large firm portfolio returns. We can use the ci coefficients in combination 
6. In this case a shock from the smallest firms in the sarnple 
does appear to predict future volatility since the coefficient is 0.062 and 
statistically significant. 
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with the ki, j to determine the half-life of a spill-over volatility shock, in the same manner as 
described in equation (8.5). Since the volatilities of larger firm portfolios display more 
persistence, we would expect that the half life of spillover shocks from small firm portfolios to 
large firm portfolios would be longer than those in the opposite direction. The calculated 
half-lives confirm this picture with the half-lifes being between 7 and 20 trading days for 
spill-over shocks from small firm portfolios to large firms portfolios, and between 3 and 7 days 
for spill-over'ýshocks from large firm portfolios to small firm portfolios. 
The results presented in this section suggest that the return performance of large fn-ms 
provides some new information about the return performance of small firms. This is consistent 
with findings presented elsewhere in this thesis which suggests that because small investors lack 
information about the their investments small investors may use the return performance of large 
firms to guess what is to happen next to the return performance of small firms. 
8.5 Conditional Volatility and the Leverage Effect 
This section tests for a leverage effect in UK capitalisation based portfolios. As the 
introduction stated, the leverage effect predicts that an unexpected return, when it is unexpectedly 
bad, causes more future volatility than an unexpected return when it is unexpectedly good. This 
phenomenon has been called the leverage effect since it has been explained in terms of the 
financial leverage of companies, see for example, Black (1976) and Christie (1982) who propose 
the following arguments. Increases in financial leverage increase both the required return and 
the risk of equity. The increase in the required rate of return leads to a decrease in the stock 
price7, which gives the negative relationship between stock price movements and volatility. 
The linear GARCH model is unable to capture the leverage effect, because, in this model 
the conditional variance is only linked to past conditional variances and squared innovations, 
hence the sign of return plays no role in determining volatility. This limitation of the standard 
ARCH or GARCH model is one of the primary motivations for the exponential or EGARCH 
model. The differences between the standard GARCH and the EGARCH model are that in the 
EGARCH model the effect of volatility is captured by two variables and is in logarithmic form. 
The first volatility term is the unexpected return relative to the contemporaneous conditional 
standard deviation. The second term is the absolute unexpected return relative to the conditional 
standard deviation. In this model a negative coefficient associated with the actual volatility 
implies that positive shocks generate less volatility than negative shocks. Nelson (1991) uses 
this framework to find evidence of a Leverage effect in the US market while Engle and Ng 
(1990) confirm the leverage effect using an EGARCH model for the Japanese stock market. 
7. The required return of a security can only go up if the stock price of the security goes 
down, ceteris paribus. 
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The existence of a leverage effect in the UK market has been investigated by Poon and 
Taylor (1992). Poon and Taylor confirm the leverage effect in the UK market, because they find 
that an unexpected return to the FF All share index predicts more future volatility if it 
unexpectedly bad than when it is unexpectedly good (although statistical significance is not 
always supported). Previous studies, have concentrated on whether there is evidence of a leverage 
effect in stock market indexes. But the issue of whether there is a leverage effect for capitalisation 
based portfolios, or whether the magnitude of the leverage effect is associated with firm size 
has not preliously been addressed. This section will be concerned with whether there is a leverage 
effect, for portfolios of large and small firms. Also, of interest in this study, is whether the 
magnitude of the leverage effect is dependant upon firm size. 
In order to test for a leverage effect it is necessary to isolate the impact that positive and 
negative unexpected returns have on the conditional variance. Isolating the impact of the sign 
of the shock from the pure volatility can be achieved by the following re-specification of the 
conditional variance model which is similar to a model by Taylor (1986). 
hi, 
t = mi + 
bi I F-i,, -II 
+ch,,, 
-I+ 
dici,, 
-I 
(8.7) 
where, ci,, I ý, - I-N(O, 
hi,, ), Rj,, is the return on portfolio i in week t, and ý, -, 
is the set of all 
available information at time t-1. 
In this specification, the past squared volatility shock in the conditional variance is replaced 
by the absolute value of the shock. The absolute value of a shock will capture the effect that an 
unexpected return will have on the conditional variance. In addition to this, the actual value of 
the shock is also included in equation (83) which allows us to isolate the additional impact that 
the sign of the shock will have on the conditional variance. 
If the coefficients bi are positive and di is negative, then the impact of a positive shock 
will be dampened, while the impact of a negative shock will be enhanced. This implies the 
existence of a leverage effect. However, if the coefficients bi and di in equation (8.7) are both 
positive, then there would be the reverse of a leverage effect because the coefficients would 
suggest that a positive shock would create more volatility that a negative shock. This specification 
has been suggested previously by Taylor (1986, p. 78). Such a model can capture the 
autocorrelation structure of the absolute residuals shown in Table 8.2. But, the mathematical 
properties of this model are less well known than for the symmetric GARCH model.. However, 
because this model does not explicitly model the autocorrelation in squared residuals, it will not 
capture the leptokurtosis in the returns distribution. 8 
8. Alternative methods of exarnining asymmetric variance responses have been suggested by Engle (1990) and Nelson (1991). 
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Table 8.6, contains maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients from the estimation 
of the model which is represented by equations (8.3) and (8.7). The specification of the 
conditional mean includes dummy variables for the turn of the year and the stock market crash, 
the lagged returns of other portfolios, and the GARCH-M term, in the underlying ARMA(l, 1) 
structure. As expected, the properties of the normalised residuals from this model suggest that 
the specificaýion is relatively poor. Nevertheless, the magnitudes, signs and significance of the 
estimated coefficients that feature in both the symmetric and asymmetric ARMA-GARCH-M 
specificati6ns shown in Tables 8.5 and 8.6 respectively, are remarkably similar. Furthermore, 
the estimated coefficients in the asymmetric specification are generally statistically significant 
and contain interesting results regarding the leverage effect. 
The estimated values of the coefficient ci are 0.286 and 0.637, respectively, for the small 
and large firm portfolios. These figures confirm the feature that shocks to large firm portfolios 
are more persistent than shocks to small firm portfolios. The values of all of the estimated bi 
coefficients (on the absolute shock) are positive, whereas the values of all of the estimated di 
coefficients (on the actual shock) are negative. This means that a positive shock will have a 
smaller impact on the volatility, than a negative shock. This establishes the existence of a strong 
leverage effect in the UK stock market. The difference between the b, and d, is greatest for the 
large firm portfolio, which means that the leverage effect will be more pronounced for large 
firms; than for small firms. Collectively, the coefficients indicate that the leverage effect 
diminishes with firm size. 
8.5.1 Spillover Volatility and the Leverage Effect 
In this section a spillover version of the asymmetric GARCH model is tested. The aim of 
the spillover leverage tests is to allow us to gauge whether a shock to another portfolio predicts 
more future volatility in another portfolio if that shock is a negative one. The spillover leverage 
effect has not previously been tested on any data set. Specifically, this study is concerned with 
testing whether there is a leverage spillover effect which is associated with firm size. 
Spill-over volatility shocks can be decomposed into the magnitude and the sign of the 
shock, by including in equation (8.7) both the absolute and actual value of the volatility shock 
of other portfolios. Such a transformation is provided by equation (8.8) below 
hi,, =mi+bi II +cihi,, - I +diei,, - I+ 
ki, j I Ej,, -, 
I +li, jej,, -, 
j#i (8.8) 
where, I Ej,, is the one period lagged absolute unexpected return from portfolio j, and Fj., 
is the one period lagged unexpected return from portfolio j. 
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Table 8.7 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the asymmetric volatility spill-over 
coefficients. Consistent with the spill-over model for the symmetric GARCH model, the past 
shocks to the volatility of large finns tend to influence the current volatility of relatively small 
firms, but there is little statistically significant effect in the reverse direction. Furthermore, in 
the cases where there is a significant spill-over shock, there is also a distinct leverage effect. 
That is, not only is the past volatility shock to large firms important for the volatility of small 
firms, but impact of the shock will be much greater if it is negative. 
To illustrate this more clearly we can look more closely at Table 8.7. If we look at the k, 
coefficients then we can see that typically below the diagonal the coefficients are insignificant. 
This means that typically a volatility shock experienced by small firms does not predict future 
volatility in large firms. Above the diagonal however, the magnitude and sign of the coefficients 
indicate that there is a relationship between the volatility of large firms and the future volatility 
of small firms. Looking now at the Ii coefficient, a pattern emerges here which also appears to 
be associated with firm size. Typically, the coefficients below the diagonal are positive, but 
since the corresponding ki coefficients were insignificant no evidence of a leverage spillover 
effect is provided. This means that there is not a spillover leverage effect coming from small 
firms and spilling over into large firms. In contrast, if we focus on the 1, coefficients above the 
diagonal then we can see that typically the coefficients are statistically significant and negative, 
indicating that a spillover volatility effect is being dampened if it is a positive shock. 
One possibleexplanation for the results presented in this chapter is that the large companies 
are displaying signs of short-termism. pressures. In the UK a large proportion of shares are traded 
by pension funds and other large institutional investors. These investors invest for short term 
gain, hoping to make a capital gain on stocks within the portfolio. On average pension funds 
tend to turn over their portfolio every 6 mths. The consequence of this is that large portfolio 
holders will only be willing to hold a stock if it is expected to perform well over the following 
months. If a stock performs badly, this may encourage portfolio holders to sell their holdings 
of a badly performing stock further depressing the price. Such behaviour will cause a leverage 
effect of the nature described in this chapter. A stock that provides an unexpectedly bad return 
may well experience further volatility in the future as portfolio managers reduce their holdings 
of such a stock , depressing the share price 
further. 
It is not surprising that the leverage effect is more pronounced for the large firms if we 
consider the composition of large institutional portfolios. Institutional investors tend to trade 
only large value stocks and ignore small firm stocks. Proportionately, small investors tend to 
hold more small firm stocks. Small investors behave very differently to large institutional 
portfolio holders. Small investors tend to hold stocks for long term gains rather than for short 
term capital appreciation. This means that if a stock a small investors holds falls in price it is 
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unlikely to trigger a desire to rebalance the portfolio. Large transaction costs payable on small 
trades would suggest that even a substantial fall in the price of a stock would not encourage 
individual investors to sell. For small stocks there would be less of a tendency for a price fall 
to be followed by further price declines. As a result, negative volatility in one period would 
generate less volatility in future periods because small investors react more inertly to the price 
fall than do large investors. 
8.6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter two conditional variance models have been tested to examine the influence 
that firm size might have on the relationship between volatility and return. The tests which have 
been performed in this chapter have sought to investigate a number of issues. Such as whether 
returns are time varying and related to past return volatility, whether volatility shocks spillover 
from one portfolio to another and whether there is any evidence of a leverage effect in the UK 
stock market for. capitalisation based portfolios. 
In the initial specification tested, which is an ARMA(l, l)-GARCH(l, l)-M model, it is 
found that the return conditional volatilities for portfolios of relatively large firms are more 
persistent than those of the returns on portfolios of relatively small firms. However, a shock to 
the returns of a small firm portfolio has a much larger impact on the volatility of a portfolio 
than is the case for large firms. This confirms the same pattern of results which was discovered 
when the conditional CAPM model was tested in the previous chapter. Moreover, shocks to 
large firms appear to spillover to small firms because volatility shocks in large firms appear to 
predict future volatility in small fh-ms, although, the reverse is not the case. Volatility shocks 
in small firms do not appear to spillover into large firms, a shock to small firms does not typically 
predict volatility in large firms. 
In the asymmetric specification of the conditional volatility, for the returns on UK stock 
portfolios, the model picks up a distinct leverage effect. This means that a negative unexpected 
return has a much greater impact on volatility than a positive unexpected return. Furthermore, 
this leverage effect is more pronounced for relatively large firm portfolios. The spill-over of 
volatility shocks is examined within this specification. Again, there are significant spill-overs 
from large firm portfolios to small portfolios. In these cases, it is appears that there is a distinct 
cross-leverage effect. A negative volatility shock will have a much greater impact than a positive 
volatility shock, when the shock spills over from relatively large to relatively small firm 
portfolios. 
This chapter has therefore identified a number of important differences in the conditional 
variances of large and small firms. Further research can be directed at investigating why the 
return volatility of small firm stocks appears to react to past return volatility experienced by 
212 
large firrns. It is possible that return surprises in large firms is news to investors in small firms. 
Perhaps the small firm investors are less well informed than investors in large firms so that 
volatility in large firms provides news about the behaviour of small firms. This needs to be 
ascertained empirically. 
Further research also needs to discover whether the institutional environment in which 
shares are held encourages the short-termism motives which were described earlier. It is 
important if this argument has any validity for it to be established empirically whether small 
investors do have different trading patterns to large firm investors and the impact this has on 
the price performance of equity portfolios. 
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Table 8.1 
Sample Portfolio Debt/Equity Ratios 1976-1991 
where, -u refers to the mean Debt/Equity ratios either for the full sample or for one of the 
three years 1976,1985 or 1991. The var refers to the variance of the Debt/Equity ratio over 
the full sample period or for one of the three years 1976,1985 or 199 1. 
Portfolio U varV u76 var76 u85 var85 ii9i var9l 
1 0.387 0.027 0.475 0.053 0.375 0.051 0.205 0.41 
2 Q. 314 0.061 0.279 0.029 0.315 0.035 0.544 0.143 
1 3 0.315 0.041 0.243 0.041 0.303 0.052 0.145 0.080 
4 0.237 0.127 0.341 0.102 0.369 0.085 0.172 0.163 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Summary and Conclusions 
1 Summary and Implications 
The chief objective of this study was to investigate the role that firm size might have 
in determining the empirical characteristics of UK stock returns. Whereas previous studies, 
which have considered both the US and the UK stock market, have focused primarily upon 
differences in the mean returns of large and small firms, this study has paid particular 
attention to noting differences in the higher moments of firms' returns. The main empirical 
findings are presented in Chapters 4 to 8, these chapters document a number of previously 
undiscovered differences between large and small firm returns. 
This thesis began by introducing the concept of an efficient market. Under the 
restrictive assumptions that markets are perfect, and in the absence of market frictions, it was 
demonstrated that returns should be uncorrelated. This definition now seems rather simplistic, 
because, we know that market frictions such as non-synchronous trading and bid-ask bounce 
can introduce autocorrelation into stock returns. Furthermore, as Chapter 3 suggested, 
autocorrelated time varying expected returns, can also introduce predictability in stock 
returns. This was a particularly important issue to review because chapters 7 and 8 were 
concerned with the characteristics of time varying expected returns for UK small and large 
firms. 
A survey of the existing literature, that has investigated whether stock market prices 
are predictable, was discussed in Chapter 3. Most of these studies indicated that the returns of 
small firms were much more predictable than the returns of large firms. Although, most of 
these studies investigated the US stock market, Chapters 4 and 5 confirm that the stock 
returns of small firms listed on the UK market are also more predictable than the returns of 
large firms. 
Chapter 4 began by considering the autocorrelation patterns of portfolios and 
individual securities, which had been grouped according to firm size. These autocorrelations 
revealed that the portfolio returns of small firms were indeed much more predictable than 
was the case for the large firms. In contrast, the returns of individual companies, irrespective 
of firm size did not appear to be predictable from their return autocorrelations. This reflected 
the findings of previous studies for the US, which were discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
also contained some co-integration analysis of the prices of a selection of UK individual 
securities. The results suggest that the individual security prices of small firms are more 
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predictable than for large firms, although, the nature of this predictability does not appear to 
be detectable in autocorrelation tests. This was the first time that these tests have been 
applied to tests of the small firm effect. 
The autocoffelation patterns which were identified for the portfolios in Chapter 5 
indicated that the returns of small firms contained predictable components which decayed 
rapidly. This implies that when forecasting future monthly returns additional weight should 
be given to the most recent weekly return of a month. This means that in autocorrelation 
tests, which give equal weights to each of the four weekly returns of the previous month, the 
extent to which future monthly returns are predictable will be understated. Empirical work 
undertaken in Chapter 5 reveals that as much as 15% of the variation in monthly portfolio 
stock returns can be explained by the previous periods monthly portfolio return for all but the 
portfolio containing the largest firms in the sample. 
Since previous work in the US has associated the small firm premium with monthly 
return regularities, Chapter 6 considered whether there were persistent regularities in the 
portfolio returns of UK firms. While, regularities appeared to exist during the months of 
January and April, in no month did small firms persistently outperform large firms. Although, 
during April, the returns of large firms appear to persistently outperform the returns of small 
firms. 
The January effect, in the UK stock market is particularly puzzling, unlike the January 
effect in the US it can not be linked to tax loss trading. This study has shown that the January 
effect in the UK appears to be influenced by the pricing of systematic risk. When the 
relationship between risk and return is tested during each month of the year separately it is 
found that for both large and small firms systematic risk appears to be priced in only a few 
months of the year, that is January, April and July. Furthermore, it is found that when 
systematic risk is priced, large firms always provide a higher risk premium than small firms. 
This partly explains why large firms outperform small firms during both January and April. 
The results presented in this chapter are important for two reasons. Firstly, the results indicate 
that the January and April anomaly are linked to an extraordinary relationship between risk 
and return during these months. Secondly, there are important month by month differences in 
the magnitude of the systematic premiums of large and small firms, a feature which had not 
previously been documented 
The existence of an unusual relationship between systematic risk and return was also 
supported in Chapter 7. In this chapter it was found that the conditional systematic risk 
premium for large and small firms appeared to be higher during the month of January. 
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Furthermore, it was found that during the month of January the market price of risk was 
considerably higher than during other months. This suggests that investors perceive January 
as inherently more risky than other months, consequently investors require higher returns 
during this month. Although, interestingly for large firms, the market price of risk appeared 
to be substantially higher than for small firms during this month and therefore explains why 
the risk premium was higher during January for large firms. This pattern had not previously 
been documented. 
Chapter 7 and 8 are both concerned with investigating the conditional variances and 
covariances of large and small firms. Chapter 7 found support for the conditional version of 
the CAPM for both large and small firms. It was reported that for both large and small firms 
expected returns are conditional on the past behaviour of the market. Essentially, during 
periods of high market volatility investors require higher risk premiums to compensate them 
for the additional risk they face. This rejects the notion that the CAPM can be explained 
within a framework in which beta and therefore risk remains constant. If expected returns are 
time varying, these characteristics should be modelled in tests of asset pricing models and in 
tests of market efficiency. 
Both chapter 7 and 8 note some interesting differences in the second moments of small 
and large firms. The effect of an unexpected return, that is, a volatility shock, appears to have 
more of an impact on the conditional variance of small firms than is the case for large firms. 
However, the effect of a volatility shock on large firms tends to last for much longer than is 
the case for small firms. This is the first time this pattern has been documented for UK 
portfolios. 
Chapter 7 found that the conditional expected risk premium of portfolios was 
autocorrelated, which implies that realised returns would also be autocorrelated. Indeed, for 
large firms nearly all the autocorrelation in realised returns appears to be explained by a 
conditional version of CAPM, although, for smaller firms which are also characterised by 
thin trading it is impossible to disentangle how much of the autocorrelation is due to time 
variation and how much is due to thin trading. 
The autocorrelations of the conditional expected risk premium reveal an interesting 
pattern. Typically, there is a positive relationship between the extent to which the conditional 
risk premium is autocorrelated and the size of firms within a portfolio. This is a particularly 
important finding because it explains why Chapter 5 found that the short-horizon returns of 
large firms were not mean reverting and why previous studies by Conrad and Kaul (1988) 
and Conrad, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991 a) found that realised returns of large firms were 
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not well explained by a time varying model of expected returns. The expected returns of large 
firms are very highly autocorrelated, unlike the expected returns of small firms. This means 
that a change in the expected return of large firms takes a long time to decay, in which case 
the most recent weekly returns of large firms do not provide much additional information 
about the future weekly returns of large firms because the effect of a change in the expected 
return of large firms is so slowly decaying. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the portfolio returns of small firms listed in US markets 
were cross serially correlated with the returns of large firms, but the reverse was not true. 
This pattern is confirmed for the portfolios investigated in this study. However, the primary 
aim of Chapter 8 was to explore whether volatility shocks are transmitted across portfolios. 
Essentially, this required investigating whether a volatility shock to one portfolio could be 
transmitted to another portfolio and vice versa and, whether there was a relationship 
associated with firm size. This chapter found that there are asymmetric volatility shocks 
operating in the UK stock market. The asymmetry exists because shocks to large firms 
predict future volatility in small firms but the reverse is not true. Shocks to small firms do not 
allow us to predict volatility in large firms. 
Having established the existence of spillovers in the UK market Chapter 8 also 
contained an investigation into whether there is a leverage effect operating in the UK market. 
Although, previous studies have examined the leverage effect on market wide indexes, no 
study has explored whether the leverage effect is associated with firm size. This chapter finds 
that for all size-based portfolios there is strong evidence of a leverage effect. However, yet 
another asymmetry is identified in this chapter. An unexpectedly bad volatility shock predicts 
more future volatility for large firms than is the case for small firms. The conclusion of this 
work is that a stronger leverage effect exists for large firms than for small firms. 
Chapter 8 concludes by investigating whether there are leverage spillover shocks in 
the UK market. This involves testing whether the magnitude of a spillover shock which is 
transmitted to another portfolio depends upon the sign of the shock. It is found that the sign 
of a volatility shock does influence the strength of the spillover. When a shock is experienced 
by large firms, the magnitude of the shock that is transmitted to smaller firms increases if the 
shock is a negative shock. 
In conclusion this thesis set out to explore whether the empirical characteristics of UK 
large and small firm returns differed. This was an important area of research to investigate 
because unlike the US market, very little attention has been focused on the size effect in the 
UK. This study found that a large number of differences exist between large and small firms, 
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many of which have not previously been identified on any data set. This is important 
information to participants in both the primary and secondary markets in the UK, where huge 
resources are allocated into and between risky assets. 
226 
Bibliography 
Alexander Sidney, S. (1961), Price Movements in Speculative Markets: Trends or Random 
Walks. Industrial Management Review, p7-26. Also reprinted in "The Random Character 
of Stock Market Prices" ed by Paul Cootner Cambridge MIT press 1964. 
Ariel, Robert (1987), A Monthly Effect in Stock Returns. Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol 17, p 161-174. 
Ariel, Robert (1990), High Stock Returns Before Holidays: Existence and Evidence on Possible Causes. Journal of Finance, vol 45, p 1611-1626. 
Atchison, M. K. Butler and R. Simonds (1987), Nonsynchronous Security Trading and Market Index Autocorrelation. Journal of Finance, vol 42, pIII- 118. 
Attanasio, Orazio and Sushil Wadhwani (1991), Risk and the Predictability of Stock Market 
Returns. Unpublished Manuscript Stanford University. 
Bachelier, L (1900), Theorie de la-Speculation (Gauthier-Villars, 1900). Translation by A. J. 
Boness in "The Random Character of Stock Prices", edited by Paul Cootner, Cambridge, 
Mass: Mit Press 1967. 
Ball, Ray (1978), Anomalies in Relationships Between Securities Yields and Yield Surrogates. 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol 6, p103-126. 
Ball, Ray (1989), What Do We Know about Stock Market Efficiency. In A Reappraisal of the 
Efficiency of Financial Markets. Edited by Rui M. C. Guimares B Kingsman and Stephen 
Taylor. 
Ball, Ray and Philip Brown (1968), An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 
Journal ofAccounting Research pl. 59-178. 
Ball, Ray and S Kothari (1989), Nonstationary Expected Returns: Implications for Serial 
Correlation in Returns and Tests of Market Efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 
vol 25, p51-74. 
Banerjee, Anindya, Juan Dolado, John W. Galbraith and David F. Hendry (1993), Co-integration, 
Error- Correction, and the Econometric Analysis of Non-Stationary Data. Oxford 
Univestity Press. 
B anz, R. (198 1), The Relationship Between Return and Value of Common Stocks, Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol 9, p3-18. 
Bernard Victor L. and Jacob Thomas (1990), Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed Price 
Response or Risk Premium? Journal of Accounting Research pI -48.. 
Basu, S. (1977), Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to their Price Earnings 
Ratio: A Test of Market Efficiency. Journal of Finance, vol 32', 'p663-682. 
Basu S. (1983), The Relationship Between Earnings Yield market Value and Return For NYSE 
Common Stocks. Journal of Financial Economics, vol 12, p129-156. 
Beaver, William (198 1), Market Efficiency. Accounting Review, vol 56, p23-37. 
Beenstock M. and K. Chan (1986), Testing the Arbitrage Pricing Theory in the United Kingdom, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol 48, p 121-14 1. 
Berges, A., J McConnell, and G. Schlarbaum, (1985), The Turn of the Year in Canada, Journal 
of Finance, vol 40, p 185-192. 
Bhandari, Laxmi Chand. (1988), Debt/Equity Ratio and Expected Common Stock Returns: 
Empirical Evidence. Journal of Finance, vol 43, p507-528- 
227 
PAGE 
NUMBERING 
AS ORIGINAL 
Copeland, L. S (1993), Testing the Efficiency of Forward Rates with Cointegration Tests. Oxford 
bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol 55, p65-72. 
Corhay A. G. Hawawini, and P. Nfichel (1989), Seasonality in the Risk Return Relationship: 
Some International Evidence, Journal of Finance, vol 42, p49-68. 
Corhay A. G. Hawawini, and P. Nfichel (1987), 77te Pricing of Equity on the London Stock 
Exchange: Seasonality and Size Premium. In Stock Market Anomalies, (Ed By Dimson 
Cambrýdge University Press. 
11 Cross F. (1973), The Behaviour Of Stock Returns On Fridays and Mondays. FinancialAnalysts 
Jour4al, vol 29, p67-69. 
Cunningham S. W. (1973), The Predictability of British Stock Market Prices. Applied Statistics, 
Vol 22 p315-33 1. 
DeBondt W. F. M. And Richard Thaler (1985), Does the Stock Market Overreact. Journal of 
Finance, vol 40, pp. 793-805. 
DeBondt W. F. M. And Richard Thaler (1987), Further Evidence on Overreaction and Stock 
Market Seasonality. Journal of Finance, Vol 42, p557-58 1. 
DeBondt, Werner and Richard Thaler (1989), A Mean-Reverting Walk Down Wall Street 
Journal o Economic Perspectives, vol 3, p 189-202. )f 
De Santis and Sbordone (1990). A CAPM with a Multivariate Generalised ARCH Process: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Italian Financial Market. Conference paper at the ARCH 
Conference held in Paris. 
Dickey, D. A. and W. A. Fuffer (198 1), Distributions of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time 
Seies with a Unit Root. Journal ofAmerx: an Statistical Association, vol 74, p427-43 1. 
Dickey, D. A. and W. A. Fuller (1984), Likelihood ratio statistics for Autoregressive Time Series 
with a Unit Root. Econometrica, vol 49, p 1057-1072. 
DimsonX. (1979), Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading, Journal 
ofFinancial Economics, vol 7, p197-226. 
Dimson, E and Paul I; L Marsh (1983), The Stability of UK Risk Measures and the Problem of 
Thin Trading, Journal ofFinance, p753-783. 
Douglas, G. (1968), Risk in the Equity Markets: An Empirical Appraisal of Market Efficiency. 
Yale Economic Essays, vol 9, p3-45. 
Dryden M. M. (1970a), Filter Tests of UK Share Prices, Applied Economics, vol 1 p261-275. 
Dryden M. M. (1970b), A Statistical Study of UK Share Prices, Scottish Joumal of Political 
Economy, vol 17, p369-389 
Engle, R. F. (1982), Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the 
Variance of U-K. Inflation, Econometrica, vol 50, p987-1007- 
Engle, R. F. (1990), Discussion: Stock Volatility and the Crash of 87, Review offinancial Studies, 
vol 3,103-106. 
Engle, Robert F. and Tim Bollerslev (1986), Modelling the Persistence of Conditional Variances. 
Econometric Reviews, vol 5, pl-50. 
Engle R. F. and C. W. J Granger (1987), Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation 
Estimation and Testing. Econometrica, vol 55, p251-176. 
Engle, R. F. Lilien, D. and R. Robins (1987), Estimating Time Varying Risk Prernia in the Tenn 
Structure: the ARCH-M Model, Econometrica, vol 55, p391-407. 
230 
Engle, R-F and Anthony, P Rodriguez (1989), Tests of International CAPM with Time Varying 
Covariances, Journal ofApplied Econometrics. vol 4, p 119-138. 
Fama, E. F. (1965), The Behaviour of Stock Market Prices, Journal of Business p34-105. 
Fama, EY and M. Blume (1966), Filter Rules and Stock Market Trading, Journal of Business, 
vol 39 p226-241. 
Fama E. F. (1970), Efficient Capital Markets, A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, Journal 
of Finance vol, 25, p383-47 1. 
Fama, E. And J. MacBeth (1973), Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests. Journal of 
Poli(ical Economy, vol 71, p607-36- A revised exposition is also presented in E. Fama, 
(1976) "Foundations- in Finance", New York: Basic Books. 
Fama, Eugene (1976a), Reply to LeRoy, Journal of Finance, vol 3 1, p 143-145. 
Fama, Eugene (1976b), Foundations in Finance, USA Basic Books. 
Farna, E. L. Fisher, M. Jensen andR, Roll, (1969), The Adjustment of Stocks to New Information, 
International Economic Review, 10 No I ppl-21. 
Fama E. F. and K. F. French (1988), Permanent and Temporary -Components of Stock Prices, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol 96, p246-276. 
Farna, E. F. and Kenneth French (1988), Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Returns, Journal 
of Financial Economics, vol 46, p3-25. 
Fama E. F. and Kenneth French (1992), The Cross Section of Expected Returns, Journal of 
Finance, vol 47 p427-465. 
Fama E. F. and Kenneth French (1995), Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and 
Returns. Journal of Finance, vol 50, pl. 31-157. 
Fama, E. F. (1991), Efficient Capital Markets 111. Journal ofFinance, vol 46, pl575-1617. 
Fisher, Lawrence, (1966), Some New Stock Market Indexes, Journal of Business vol 39, 
p191-225. 
Flavin, Maijorie A. (1983), Excess Volatihty in the Financial Markets: A Re-assessment of the 
Empirical Evidence, Journal of Political Economy, vol 96, p929-956. 
Forbes, William (1994), Picking Winners? A Survey of the Mean Reversion and Overreaction 
of Stock Prices Literature. Forthcoming in Journal ofEconomic Surveys. 
Fong, WX. (1992), The Size Effect: A Multiperiod Analysis. Applied Financial Economics, 
vol 2, p87-92. 
Fraser, Patricia and David Power (1993), Predictability, Trends and seasonalities: An Empirical 
Analysis of UK Investment Trust Portfolios 1970-1990. Unpublished Manuscript 
University of Dundee. 
French, Kenneth R (1980), Stock Returns And The Weekend Effect. Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol 8, p55-69. 
French, Kenneth and Richard Roll (1986), Stock Return Variances. The Arrival of New 
Information and the Reaction of Traders, Journal of Financial Economics p5-26. 
French, Kenneth and William Schwert and Robert Stambaugh (1987), Expected Stock Returns 
and Volatility. Journal of Financial Economics, vol 19 p3-30. 
Girmes D. H. and D. C. Damant (1975), Charts and The Random Walk. The Investment Analyst, 
vol 41 . 
231 
Gibbons, Michael and Patrick Hess (198 1), Day of The Week Effects and Asset Retums. Joumal 
of Business vol 54, p579-596. 
Gilles C. and S. T. LeRoy. (199 1) Econometric Aspects of the Variance-Bounds Tests: A Survey. 
Review of Financial Studies, vol 4, p53-791. 
Granger, Clive W. J. (1969), Investigating Causal Relations by Econmetric Models and 
Cross-Spectral Methods. Econometrica, vol 37, p24-36. 
Granger, Clive W. J. (1983), Cointegrated Variables and Error-correcting Models, Discussion 
Paper, 'University of California, San Diego. 
Granger, Clive W. J. (1991), Forecasting Stock Market Prices: Lessons for Forecasters. Invited 
Lecture, International Institute of Forecasters. 
Granger, Clive and A. P. Anderson (1978), A Introduction to Bilinear Time Series Models 
(Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Gottingen). 
Granger, Clive and 0 Morgenstern (1970) Predictability of Stock Market Prices. 
Lexington. -Mass, Heath). 
Grossman, Sanford J and Robert J Shiller (1981), The Determinants of the Variability of Stock 
Market Prices. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, vol 71, 
p222-227. 
Gultekin, Mustafa and Bulent Gultekin (1983), Stock Market Seasonality. International 
Evidence, Joumal of Financial Economics, vol 12, p469-489. 
Hakkio C. And M. Rush (1989), Market Efficiency and Cointegration: An Application to the 
Sterling and Deutschmark Exchange Markets, Journal of International Money and 
Finance, vol 8, p75-88. 
Hall, Miles and Mark Taylor (1989), A Multivariate GARCH in Mean Estimation of CAPM, 
Manchester School (1989). 
Hamilton, James, D (1994), Time Series Analysis. Princeton University Press. 
Hamao, Yasushi, R. W. Masulis, and V. Ng (1990), Correlations in Price Changes and Volatility 
across International Stock Markets, Review of Fintmcial Studies, vol 3,281-307. 
Handa, P, S. P Kothari and Charles Wasley (1989), The Relationship Between Betas and Return 
Interval: Implications for the Size Effect Journal offinancial Economics, vol 23, p79- 100. 
Harris, Lawrence (1986), A Transaction Data Study of Weekly and Intra-daily Patterns in Stock 
Returns. Journal of Financial Economics, vol 14,99-117. 
Harvey, Campbell, R. (1989), Time Varying Conditional Covariances in Tests of Asset Pricing 
Models, -Joumal offinancial Economics, vol 24, p289-318. 
Haugen Robert, A. and Joseph Lakonishok (1990). 77ie Incredible January Effect. - The Stock 
Market's Unsolved Mystery. Dow-Jones Irwin. 
Ikenberry, D. and Joseph Lakonishok. (1989) Seasonal Anomalies in Financial Markets: A 
survey. In A Reappraisal of the Efficiency of Financial Markets. Edited by Rui M. C. 
Guimares B Kingsman and Stephen Taylor. 
Jagannathan, Ravi, and Zhenyu Wang (1994), CAPM is Alive and Well. Conference paper 
presented at the Western Finance Meeting, Sante Fe, USA. 
Jegadeesh N. (1991), Seasonality in Stock Price Mean Reversion: Evidence from the US and the 
UK. Journal of Finance, Vol 46 p 1427-1444. 
Jensen, Michael (1972), Capital markets Theory and Evidence, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science. vol 6, p357-398. 
232 
Jensen, Michael (Edt). (1978) Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency. 
Journal o Financial Economics, Vol 6, p95-101. ?f 
Johansen, S. (1988), Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, Vol 12, p231-254. 
Jones Charles and Robert Litzenberger (1982), Quarterly Earnings Reports and Intermediate 
Stock Price Trends, Journal of Finance p143-149. 
Kato, K And Shallheim (1985), Seasonal and Size Anomalies in the Japanese Stock Market. 
Journal o Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol 20,. f 
Kaul G, and Nimalendran (1990), Price Reversals: Bid-ask Spreads or Market Overreaction?. 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol 28 p67-93. 
Keim, D. B. (1983), Size Related Anomalies and Stock Return Seasonality: Further Empirical 
Evidence. Journal Of Financial Economics, Vol 12, p 13-22. 
Keim, D (1985), Dividend Yields and Stock Returns-Implications of Abnormal January Returns. 
Journal q Financial Economics, Vol 14, p473-489. f 
Kendall M. G. (1953), The Analysis of Economic Time Series: Part 1. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society 11-25. Also in "The Random Character of Stock Prices" Edited by Paul 
Cootner. 
Kim, P, Charles Nelson and R Startz (1991), Mean Reversion in Stock prices: A Reappraisal 
of the Empirical Evidence, Review of Economic Studies. Vol 58 p515-528. 
Kleidon, Allan W. (1986), Variance Bounds Tests and Stock Price Valuation Models, Journal 
ofPolitical Economy, Vol 95, p953-1001. 
Kross, William and Schroeder, Douglas (1990), An Investigation of Seasonality in Stock Price 
Responses to Quarterly Earnings Announcements, Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, vol 17, p649-675. 
Lakonishok, Joseph and Levi. (1982), Weekend Effects on Stock Returns a Note. Journal of 
Finance, vol 37, p883-889. 
Lakonishok, Josef and Seymour Smidt (1984), Volume and Turn of the Year Behaviour, Journal 
of Financial Economics, p435-455. 
Lakonishok, Josef and Seymour Smidt (1989), Are Seasonal Anomalies Real? A Ninety Year 
Perspective, Review of Financial Studies, vol 1, p403-425. 
Lamoureux, C. G. And Lastrapes, W. D. (1990) Persistence-in-Variance, structural change and 
the GARCH model, Journal ofBusiness and Economics Statistics, vol 8,225-234. 
Lehmann, Bruce and David Modest (1988), The Empirical Foundations of the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory 1: The Empirical Tests. Journal of Financial Economics, vol 21 p213-254. 
Levis, M. (1985), Are Big Small Firms Big Performers. Investment Analyst, vol 76, p21-26. 
Levis, M. (1989), Stock Market Anomalies. Journal ofBanking and Finance. vol 13, p675-697. 
Leroy, Stephen (1973), Efficient Capital Markets and the Martingale Property of Stock Returns, 
International Economic Review 436-446. 
LeRoy, Stephen (1976), Efficient Capital Markets: Comment, Journal of Finance, vol 31, 
p139-141. 
LeRoy, Stephen F (1989), Efficient Capital Markets And Martingales, Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol 27, p1583-1621. 
233 
LeRoy, Stephen and Richard F. Porter (1981), The Present Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds. Econometrica, vol 49, p555-574. 
LeRoy, Stephen F. (1982), Expectations Models of Asset Prices: A survey 
of Theory, Journal of Finance, vol 37 p 185-217. 
LeRoy, Stephen F. (1984), Efficiency and the Variability of Asset Prices, American Economic 
Association Papers and Proceedings, vol 74, p 183-187. 
LeRoy S -F-(j 989), Efficient Markets and Martingales, Journal ofEconomic Literature, vol 27, 
p1583-4621. 
LeRoy, Stephen F. (199 1), Econometric Aspects of the Variance Bounds Tests: A Survey, 77ie 
Review of Financial Studies, vol 4, p753-79 1. 
Limmack, Robin (1995), Firm Size, Monthly Seasonalities and Tax Loss Selling: Further 
Evidence From the UK Conference paper fi-om European Accounting Association, 
Birmingham. 
Lintner, J (1956), Distribution of Income of Corporations among Dividend Retained Eamings 
and Taxes, American Economic Review, vol 46, p97-113. 
Lintner, J. (1965), The Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in 
StockPortfolios and Capital Budgets, Review ofEconomics and Statistics, vol 47, p13-47. 
Lintner, J. (1965), Security Prices and Risk: The Theory and a Comparative Analysis of AT and 
T and Leading Industries. Conferencepaper at Conference on the Economics ofRegulated 
Public Utilities, June 24 Chicago. 
Ljung, G. M. and G. E. P. Box (1978), On a Measure of Lack of Fit in Times Series Models, 
Biometrika, vol 66, p297-303 
Lo, A. W. And A. C. MacKinlay (1988), Stock Market Prices do not Follow Random Walks: 
Evidence from a Simple Specification Test, Review ofFinancial Studies, vol 1, p41-66. 
Lo, Andrew and Craig MacKinlay (1990a), When are Contrarian Profits due to Stock Market 
Overreaction, Review of Financial Studies, vol 3, p175-205. 
Lo, Andrew and Craig MacKinlay (1990b), An Econometric Analysis of Non-synchroneous 
Trading, Journal ofEconometrics, vol 45, p 181-211. 
Lucas, R. (1978), Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy, Econometrica vol 46, p 1429-1445. 
Ljung, G. M. And G. E. P. Box (1978), On a Measure of Lack of Fit in Time Series Models, 
Biometrika, vol 65, p297-303. 
MacDonald, Ronald and David Power (1992), Persistence in UK Stock Market Returns: Some 
Evidence using High-Frequ,; ncy Data. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol 
19, p505-514. 
MacDonald Ronald and David Power (1993), Stock Prices, Efficiency and Cointegration, 
International Review ofEconomics and Finance, Vol 2, p251-265- 
MacDonald R. And Mark P. Taylor (1989), Metals Prices and Efficiency and Cointegration. 
Some Evidence from the London Metal Exchange. Bulletin of Economic Research. 
Mandelbrot, Benoit (1966), Forecasts Of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, And Martingale 
Models, Journal of Business, vol 39, p242-255. 
Mankiw Gregory N, Romer David and Shapiro Matthew. (1985) An Unbiased Re-examination 
of Stock Market Volatility. Journal of Finance, vol 40, p677-689. 
Mankiw Gregory N, David Romer and Matthew Shapiro (1989), Stock Market Forecastability 
and Volatility: A Statistical Reappraisal. NBER Working Paper 3154. 
234 
Markowitz H. (1952) portfolio selection, Journal of Finance, vol 7, p77-0- 11. 
Markowitz H (1959) Ponfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments (Wiley, New 
York). 
Merton, Robert C and Terry Marsh (1986), Dividend Variability and Variance Bounds Tests 
for the Rationality of Stock Market Prices. American Economic Review, vol 73, p483-498. 
Merton, Robert C and Terry Marsh (1987), Dividend Behaviour and Aggregate Stock Market 
Behaviour. Journal of Business, vol 60 pl-40. 
. 11 Merton R. C . (1973), An Interternporal CAPM, Econometfict% vol 4 1, p867-887. 
Mayers, bavid (1973), Nonmarketable Assets and Capital Market Equilibrium Under 
Uncertainty, in Michael C. Jensen ed. "Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets" (New 
York: Praeger) 
Miles, David and Allan Timmermann (1993), The Predictability of Stock Returns: Evidence 
from a Panel of UK Companies, Working Paper No FE-2193 Birkbeck College, University 
of London. 
Miller, M. H. And Myron Scholes (1972), Rates of Return in Relation to Risk. - A Re-Examination 
of Some Recent Findings in Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets. Ed Michael Jensen 
New York Praeger. 
Mitchell, Joan E. (198 1), Three Banks Review, p5O-59. 
Modigliani , Franco and Merton Miller (1958), The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, American Economic Review, vol 48, p261-297. 
Mossin, J. (1966), Equilibrium in Capital Markets, Econometrica, vol 34, p768-783. 
Nelson, D. B. (1991) Conditional Heteroscedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach, 
Econometrica, vol 59, p347-371. 
Nelson, Charles and M. Kim. (1990), Predictable Stock Returns: Reality or Statistical Illusion, 
Unpublished NBER working paper No 3297 
Niederhoffer, Victor and Osborne, M. F-M (1966) Brownian Motion in the Stock Market, 
Operations Research, vol 7, p897-899. 
Osborne, M. F. M. (1959) Brownian Motion in Stock Market Prices, 0perations Research. vol 
7, p145-173. 
Pagano, M. and Ailsa Roell (1990), Economic Policy 
Perry, P. R. (1985) Portfolio Serial Correlation and Non-synchroneous Trading, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol 20, p517-523- 
Phillips, P. C. B. (1987), Time Series Regression with a Unit Root. Econometrica vol 55, 
p277-301. 
Phillips, P. C. B. and Pierre Perron (1988), Testing for Unit Roots in Autoregressive Processes. 
Annuals of statistics, vol20, p97 I- 1001. 
Poon, S-H and Stephen, J. Taylor (1991), Macroeconomic Factors and the UK Stock Market, 
Journal of Business Finance andAccounting, vol 18, p619-636- 
Poon, S-H and Stephen Taylor (1992), Stock REturns and Volatility: An Empirical Study of the 
UK Stock Market. Jornal of Banking and Finance, vol 16, p37-59. 
Poterba J. M. And L. H. Summers (1988), Mean Reversion in Stock Prices. Journal offinancial 
Economics, vol 22, p27-59. 
235 
Power D. M. A. A. Lonie and R Lonie (1991), The Over-Reaction Effect Some UK Evidence, 
British Accounting Review, vol23, p 149-170. 
Rendleman Richard, Charles Jones and Henry Latane (1982), Empirical Anomalies Based on 
Unexpected Earnings and the importance of Risk Adjustements. Journal of Financial 
Economics Vol 10 p269-287. 
Reinganum, M. R. (198 1), Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical Anomalies based 
on Earnings Yields and Market Values, Journal of Financial Economics, vol 9, p 19-46. 
Reinganum, M. P. (1982), A Direct Test of Roll's Conjecture on the Firm Size Effect, Journal 
ofFinance, vol 37, p27-35. 
Reinganum, M. R- (1983), The Anomalous Stock Market Behaviour of Small Firms in January: 
Empirical Tests for Tax Loss Selling Effects, Journal of Financial Economics, vol 12, 
p89-104. 
Ritter, J. R. (1988), The Buying and Selling Behaviour of Individual Investors at the Turn of the 
Year, Journal of Finance, vol 48, p701-717. 
Roberts H. V. (1959), Stock Market Patterns and Financial Analysis: Methodological 
Suggestions, Journal of Finance, vol 14, pl-10. 
Roll, Richard (1977), A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests, Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol 4, p129-176. 
Roll, Richard (198 1) A possible Explanation of the Small Firm Effect, Journal ofFinance, vol 
36, p879-888. 
Roll, Richard (1983), Vas ist das? The Turn of the Year effect and the Return Premia of Small 
Firms, Journal of Por#'olio Managernent, vol 10, p18-28. 
Roll, Richard (1984), A simple Implicit Measure of the Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market, 
Journal offinance, vol 3 1, p 1127-1139. 
Roll, R and Stephen Ross (1976), A Critical Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence on the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory: A Reply. Journal of Finance, vol 39, p347-350. 
Roll, Richard and Stephen Ross (1980), An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory, Journal of Finance, vol 27, p1073-1103. 
Rogalski, Richard (1984), New Findings Regarding Days of The week Returns Over Trading 
and Nontrading Periods, Journal of Finance, vol 39, p603-1614. 
Ross, Stephen A. (1976), The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, Journal of Economic 
Theory, vol 13, p341-360. 
Rozeoff, Michael S and Wiffip-. n R. Kinney Jr-ý. (1976)-, - Capital Market Seasonality. The Case 
of Stock Returns, Journal of Financial Economics, vo 13, p379-402. 
Rubinstein, M. (1976), The Valuation of Uncertain Income Streams and The Pricing of Options. 
Bell Journal of Economics and Management, vol 7 p4O7-425. 
Samuelson Paul. A. (1965), Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 
Industrial Management Review , vol 
6, p4l-49. 
Scholes, M. And Williams, J. (1977), Estimating Betas from Nonsynchronous Data, Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol 5, p309-327. 
Schultz, P. (1983), Transaction Costs andthe SmallFirmEffect. Journal ofFinancial Economics, 
vol 12, p8l-88- 
Schwert, William G and Paul J Seguin (199 0), Heteroscedasticity in Stock Returns. Journal of 
Finance, vol 45, p129-1155. 
236 
Sentana, Enrique and Sushil Wadhwani (1990), Feedback Traders and Stock Return 
Autocoffelations: Evidence From A Century of Daily Data. LSE Financial Markets Group 
Discussion Paper. 
Shanken, Jay (1986), Multivariate Proxies and Asset Pricing Relations: Living with The Roll 
Critique. Unpublished Working paper University of Rochester. 
Sharpe, William F. (1964), Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under 
- Conditions of Risk. Journal of Finance, vol 19, p425-442. 
Sharpe, William F and G. M. Cooper (1972), Risk-Return Class of New York Stock Exchange 
Common Stocks, 1931-1967. Financial Analysts Journal, vol 28, p46-52. 
Shiller, Robert. J. (1981a)Do Stock Prices move too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes 
in Dividends?. 7he American Economic Review, vol 71 p421-436. Also published in Stock 
Market Volatility by Robert Shiller (1989), Cambridge MIT Press. 
Shiller, Robert J. (1981b), The use of Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Efficiency, 
Joumal of Finance, vol 36, p291-31 1. 
Shiller, Robert (1984), Stock Prices and Social Dynaniics. Brooking Papers on Economic 
Activity. vol 2 p457-498. 
Smith, IC (1978) The Effect of Intervailing on Estimating Parameters of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol 13, p313-332. 
Smith, Tom (1994), Econometrics of Financial models and Market Microstructure Effects. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol 24, No 4, p519-54 1. 
Stambaugh, Robert (1982), Missing Assets, Measuring the market and Testing the Capital asset 
Pricing Model. Journal of Financial Economics, vol 10 p237-268. 
Steeley, James Michael (1995), The Nature and Implications of Serial Diversification, Advances 
in Investment Analysis and Por#'blio Management, vol. 3 fourthcoming. 
Strong Norman and Martin Walker (1989), Information and Capital Markets. Blackwell. 
Stoll, Hans and R-E. Whaley (1983), Transaction Costs and the Small Firm Effect. Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol 12 p59-67 
Stroyny, Alvin and Werner F. M. DeBondt. (1994) The Changing Beta-Risk of Winners and 
Losers: How Much ofit is a Statistical ]Illusion? Presentation at the LancasterManagement 
School Seminar Series. 
Strong, Norman and Gary Xu (1994), Explaining the Cross-Section of UK Expected Returns. 
UnpublishedManuscript, DepartmentofAccounting and Finance, Manchester University. 
Summers LawrenceH. (1986), DoesThe Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values. 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol 41, p591-602. 
Taylor, S. J. (1986), Modelling Financial Times Series, (Chichester: John Wiley). 
Taylor, Mark and Ian Tonks (1989), The Interrrationalisation of Stock Markets. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol 49, p332-336. 
Tinic, S and Richard West, (1984), Risk and Return: January Versus the Rest of the Year. Journal 
of Financial Economics, vol 13 p561-74. 
Tinic, S and Richard West (1986), Risk and Return, and Equilibrium: A Revisit. Journal of 
Political Economy, vol 94, p 126-47. 
Thaler, Richard H. (1987), Seasonal Movements in Security Prices IL Weekend, Holiday, Turn 
of the Month and Intra-day Effects. Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 1, p 169-177. 
237 
